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vRÉSUMÉ
On étudie dans cette thèse une classe de problèmes dynamiques concernant des choix collectifs
discrets. Il s’agit de situations où un grand nombre d’agents exercent un effort pendant un
horizon de temps fini pour se déplacer de leur position initiale et être à la fin de l’horizon aux
alentours d’un nombre fini d’alternatives. En bougeant, ils doivent minimiser leurs efforts.
De plus, le trajet de chaque agent est influencé par le comportement global de la population
(l’effet social). Par exemple, un groupe de robots explorant un terrain doivent bouger de leurs
positions initiales pour visiter plusieurs sites d’intérêt en minimisant leurs efforts. Le groupe
peut se diviser en plusieurs sous-groupes, mais la taille de chacun doit rester suffisamment
grande pour accomplir quelques tâches collectives, par exemple, des missions de secours.
Ces problèmes sont aussi reliés aux élections, où les électeurs changent continuellement leurs
opinions jusqu’au moment de décider pour qui ils veulent voter. Durant ce processus de
choix d’un candidat, l’électeur optimise ses efforts pour ajuster son opinion et rester dans
la zone de confort, c’est-à-dire, proche des opinions des autres. Le but de cette thèse est
de comprendre les comportements individuels des agents et en déduire le comportement
global de la population, et cela, lorsque les agents prennent leurs décisions de façon soit
non-coopérative, soit coopérative. En d’autres termes, pour chacun des deux cas, on répond
aux questions suivantes : comment un agent choisit-il sous l’influence de l’effet social? Peut-
on prédire le comportement global de la population et la distribution des choix entre les
alternatives?
On modélise les problèmes des choix discrets non-coopératifs par une nouvelle classe de
jeux dynamiques non-coopératifs qu’on nomme “min-LQG”. Ce sont des versions modifiées
des jeux LQG où les coûts individuels incluent un coût final qui est la distance minimale
à l’ensemble des alternatives pour modéliser le phénomène des choix discrets. On étudie
deux cas. Dans le premier (min-LQG dégénéré), on considère des agents décrits par des
équations différentielles avec des conditions initiales aléatoires, alors que dans le deuxième
(min-LQG non-dégénéré), leurs dynamiques sont des équations différentielles stochastiques.
On utilise la méthodologie des jeux à champs moyen pour analyser les jeux. On développe
des stratégies décentralisées, où chaque agent peut implémenter la sienne en observant son
état et la distribution de probabilité des états initiaux des agents. Ces stratégies convergent
vers un équilibre de Nash lorsque le nombre d’agents tend vers l’infini. Dans le cas dégénéré,
un agent fait son choix d’alternative avant de bouger en se basant sur son état initial. Mais,
dans le cas non-dégénéré, il ne peut plus s’engager à un choix dès le début. En effet, on
montre que l’agent revisite son choix continuellement pour prendre en considération le risque
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de faire une décision prématurée en faveur d’une alternative en se basant sur les conditions
actuelles, alors que le bruit l’envoie à l’une des autres alternatives.
Pour les problèmes coopératifs des choix discrets, on considère le cas dégénéré seulement.
On montre que le calcul d’un optimum social est complexe. De plus, son implémentation
requiert beaucoup de communications entre les agents. Grâce à la méthodologie des jeux à
champs moyen, des stratégies alternatives qui sont simples à calculer et implémenter sont
proposées. Ces stratégies convergent vers un optimum social lorsque le nombre d’agents tend
vers l’infini. On compare par un exemple numérique le comportement de la population dans
les cas coopératif et non-coopératif. Les résultats montrent que les stratégies coopératives
ont pour avantage de distribuer les agents d’une façon plus uniforme entre les alternatives.
Ce comportement est préférable lorsqu’on considère l’exemple robotique pour améliorer la
qualité des tâches collectives.
Alors que les choix finaux des alternatives dépendent des conditions initiales et du bruit,
il est toujours possible de prédire la distribution de ces choix dans les cas non-coopératifs
et coopératifs. En fait, on construit une bijection entre les solutions des problèmes non-
coopératifs (équilibre de Nash approximatif) ou des problèmes coopératifs (optimum social
approximatif) et les points fixes d’une fonction de dimension finie. Ces derniers sont les
distributions potentielles de probabilités des choix sur l’ensemble des alternatives. Cette
caractérisation des problèmes de choix discrets facilite la preuve d’existence de solutions et
leur calcul pour ces problèmes de dimensions infinies.
Enfin, on étend le modèle des choix discrets dégénéré non-coopératif pour inclure un agent
d’influence majeure dans le jeu. Cet agent (annonceur) fait des investissements publicitaires
pour convaincre les autres agents (consommateurs) de choisir l’une des alternatives. La
compétition considérée dans ce cas est de type Stackelberg, c.à.d., que l’annonceur investit,
d’abord, puis les consommateurs choisissent une alternative sous l’influence de l’effet social
et des investissements publicitaires. L’annonceur peut représenter, par exemple, l’équipe de
compagne électorale de l’un des candidats dans l’exemple des élections. On considère au
départ un continuum de consommateurs et l’on résout ce problème par la méthodologie des
jeux à champs moyen. On montre que lorsque les opinions a priori des consommateurs vis-à-
vis les alternatives sont suffisamment diversifiées, l’annonceur peut faire des investissements
optimaux en connaissant uniquement la distribution de probabilité a priori de ces opinions.
Quand ces investissements sont appliqués dans le cas réel d’un nombre fini de consommateurs,
ils induisent une perte de performance dans le processus de publicité. Mais, cette perte
devient négligeable quand le nombre de consommateurs croît suffisamment. On étudie le cas
particulier où les opinions a priori ont une certaine distribution uniforme, et on développe
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des formes explicites des investissements publicitaires. De plus, on anticipe la distribution
des choix sur l’ensemble des alternatives.
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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies a class of dynamic collective discrete choice problems, whereby a large
number of agents have to settle on one of a set of available alternatives within a finite
time. Motion in choice space involves a control effort and it is socially influenced, in that
the agents’ paths are influenced by the aggregate behavior of the group. For example, a
large collection of geographically dispersed robots exploring an unknown terrain must move
with least energy expenditure from their initial randomly spread positions towards one of
multiple potential sites of interest to visit. They do so, however, while trying to remain
grouped to achieve some collective tasks, such as search and rescue. Another example is a
mechanistic model of elections, where voters evolve continuously in opinion space until they
form a final decision regarding who they should vote for. Until voters settle on a candidate,
changes in their opinions will involve a mental strain, but at the same time, adhering to an
individual opinion when it currently deviates from that of the majority will cause some level
of discomfort. Even though both examples qualify as dynamic collective choice problems,
they differ in the manner the agents make their choices. In the robotic example, a designer
or social planner coordinates the robots’ paths to optimize a global cost, while in the second
example, the voters, left without any central coordinator, update their opinions selfishly
irrespective of whether they make others better or worse-off. This suggests a classification of
dynamic collective choice problems into cooperative and noncooperative types respectively.
This work aims at modeling these problems and understanding how the population behaves
on the microscopic (individual) and macroscopic (population) levels. In other words, we
try to answer the following main questions: how does an agent make its choice under the
social effect? Can one anticipate the evolution of the agents’ state probability distribution
(macroscopic behavior) along the time interval, and that of the agents’ ultimate choices over
the alternatives?
We formulate the non-cooperative problem as a dynamic non-cooperative game with a so-
called “min-LQG” individual cost. This consists of a modified version of the linear quadratic
Gaussian performance index that includes a choice-related minimization term in the final cost
to capture the discrete choice aspect. We study two cases. In the first one, the degenerate
case, the agents’ states evolve according to a set of linear ordinary differential equations
with the only source of randomness being their initial conditions. In the second one, the
non-degenerate case, besides their random initial conditions, agents are subjected to random
noise, thus evolving according to stochastic differential equations. On the methodological
side, we use the mean field games theory to generate decentralized rational strategies, which
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are shown to converge to a Nash equilibrium as the size of the agent population increases to
infinity. We show that in the degenerate case an agent makes its choice of an alternative at
the outset based on its initial condition and the initial probability distribution of the agent
states. In the non-degenerate case, however, the agents can no longer commit to a choice
from the beginning. Indeed, they continuously revise their decisions to account for the risk
of making a premature “myopic” decision in favor of one alternative based on the current
state, while being driven to one of the other alternatives by the noise process.
In the cooperative problem, we consider only the degenerate case. We show that the naïve
approach to computing a social optimum becomes intractable as the size of the population
increases. Furthermore, implementation of the resulting control law requires a significant
amount of communication between the agents. Instead, we develop via the mean field games
methodology a set of strategies that are simpler to compute and implement than the social
optimum. While these strategies induce a priori a loss of optimality, the latter becomes
negligible for a large number of agents. Indeed, they converge to a social optimum as the
size of the population increases to infinity. As in the degenerate non-cooperative case, the
agents make their choices at the outset based on their initial conditions and the agent states
initial probability distribution. We provide a numerical example to compare the cooperative
and non-cooperative formulations. The results show that the cooperative strategies have the
advantage of much more evenly allocating the agents to the alternatives, a crucial feature
required when considering the robotic example, for instance, to improve the quality of the
collective tasks.
Although the individual paths and ultimate agent choices remain dictated by an individual’s
random initial state and the associated noise process history, the mean field games methodol-
ogy allows one to anticipate both the probability distribution of the agents’ choices over the
alternatives and the evolution of the states’ probability distribution in the cooperative as well
as the non cooperative cases. In fact, we show that there exists a one-to-one map between the
infinite population Nash equilibria in the non-cooperative case, or social optima in the coop-
erative one, and the fixed points of a particular finite dimensional map. These fixed points
are the potential probability distributions of the agents’ choices over the alternatives, and
can in turn lead to a complete characterization of the corresponding macroscopic behaviors.
As a result of the identification of this map, the infinite dimensional problem of identifying
the candidate probabilistic evolutions of agent states in the dynamic non-cooperative and
cooperative situations is reduced to that of computing candidate fixed points of a finite di-
mensional map. Subsequently, numerical schemes based on Quasi-Newton or the bisection
methods are proposed to generate the infinite population Nash and social optima strategies.
xFinally, in the presence of only two alternatives, the degenerate non-cooperative framework
is further extended to include a single major agent called an advertiser, and a large collection
of minor agents called consumers. The major agent spends money on advertisements aimed
at convincing minor agents to choose a specific alternative among the two. The advertiser
represents, for instance, the electoral campaign team of one of two opposing candidates
in the elections example. He/She is “Stackelbergian”, in the sense that he/she invests at
first, and then the consumers make their choices under the social and advertising effects.
By going to the limit of a continuum of consumers, we solve the game via the mean field
games methodology. In particular, when consumers have sufficiently diverse a priori opinions,
we show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists at the consumers level. As a result, the
advertiser can anticipate the consumers’ behavior and decide on optimal investments. These
investments require that the advertiser know only the a priori probability distribution of the
consumers’ opinions. When these investments are applied in real situations of a finite number
of consumers, they induce a loss of performance in the advertising process. However, this loss
becomes negligible in a large population. For the particular case of a uniform distribution of a
priori opinions, we provide an explicit form of the advertiser’s optimal investment strategies,
and consumers’ optimal choices. Moreover, we anticipate the probability distribution of the
consumers’ choices over the alternatives.
xi
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1CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Discrete choice problems arise in situations where an individual makes a choice within a
finite set of alternatives, such as modes of transportation (Koppelman and Sathi, 2005),
entry and withdrawal from the labor market, or residential locations (Bhat and Guo, 2004).
These choices are dictated by some personal factors, such as a person’s financial status in
the residential locations example. In some circumstances, the aggregate behavior of a group
of individuals facing the same discrete choice problem contributes to the crystallization of
the individual choices, and this is referred to as the social effect. For example, teenagers’
decisions to smoke in schools are influenced by some personal factors, as well as by their peers’
behaviors (Nakajima, 2007). These situations were studied by Brock and Durlauf under the
name of discrete choice with social interaction (Brock and Durlauf, 2001). Our thesis proposes
and develops two new classes of discrete choice problems entitled dynamic collective discrete
choice (DCDC) and dynamic collective discrete choice with an advertiser (DCDCA). The first
is concerned with situations where a large number of agents exert an effort over a finite time
horizon to move and ultimately settle on one of multiple predefined alternatives. They do so
while influenced along the path by the agents population behavior. Throughout the thesis,
the population behavior or macroscopic behavior will refer to the evolution of the agents’
probability distribution. In the second problem, an additional agent/advertiser acting as a
major agent makes some investments to persuade the other (minor) agents/consumers to
move towards a specific alternative. In this case, the individual choices are shaped by some
personal factors, and the social and advertising effects.
Applications of the DCDC model range from biology, politics, robotics to advertising. Indeed,
the DCDC model helps understanding some successful biological collective decision making
mechanisms. For example, a group of honey bees searching for a new nectar site has to move
from its colony towards one of multiple sites of interests. Even though certain sites can be
easier to reach and are more attractive for some bees, following the majority is still a priority
to enhance the foraging ability (Seeley et al., 1991; Camazine et al., 1999). In politics, this
model can be considered as a mechanistic representation of opinion crystallization in elections
(Merrill and Grofman, 1999; Markus and Converse, 1979), where voters continuously update
their opinions until forming a final decision regarding who they should vote for. Until voters
settle on a candidate, changes in their opinions will involve a mental strain, but at the same
time, voters adhering to an individual opinion when it currently deviates from that of the
majority will experience some level of discomfort. The DCDCA model is relevant here when
one of the candidates makes some investments in the form of electoral campaigns to influence
2the voters’ opinions. The DCDC model is also connected to some navigation situations. For
example, a large collection of robots explore an unknown terrain (Vail and Veloso, 2003;
Halász et al., 2007; Hsieh et al., 2008), where they must move within a finite time horizon
from their initial positions towards one of multiple sites of interest. While moving, each robot
optimizes its efforts to remain close to the group and to arrive at the end of the time horizon
in the vicinity of one of the sites. The group may split, but the size of the subgroups must
remain large enough to perform some collective tasks, such as search, rescue, etc.
1.1 Research objectives
The purpose of the thesis is to develop abstract models for both the DCDC and DCDCA
problems. The former is formulated as a dynamic game involving a large number of agents
initially spread out in an Euclidean space. These agents must move within a finite time
horizon from their initial positions towards one of multiple predefined alternatives. They
do so while exerting as little effort as possible, and trying to remain grouped around their
average. According to whether they act selfishly or cooperate, the DCDC problem is modeled
as respectively a dynamic non-cooperative game or a social optimization problem. The
DCDCA problem is, however, formulated by adding an extra “major” agent (Huang, 2010)
(called advertiser in this case) to the non-cooperative DCDC game with two alternatives. The
advertiser makes some investments to subsequently influence the paths of the other “minor”
agents (called consumers in this case) and persuade them to choose a specific alternative
among the two. Within this framework, our work aims at answering the following questions:
• What are the optimal strategies that lead the agents to settle with least effort on one
of the alternatives under the social and advertising effects?
• What is the necessary information to compute and implement these strategies?
• Does an agent pick an alternative at the outset and commit to it? If not, how does it
make its choice?
• Can the agents population macroscopic behavior and the probability distribution of
their choices over the alternatives be anticipated?
• Does the population split between the alternatives in a unique or otherwise multiple
ways?
31.2 Methodology and related works
1.2.1 Methodology - Mean field games theory
Game theory was formalized in 1944 by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (Von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 2007). It studies situations where a group of interacting agents make
simultaneous decisions to maximize their utility functions, or minimize their costs. An agent’s
utility function depends on its decision variable and those of the other agents. The main
solution concept in non-cooperative games is the Nash equilibrium, formally defined by John
Nash in 1951 (Nash, 1951). It is a set of decisions for all the agents (strategy profile), such
that a unilateral deviant behavior is not profitable. Dynamic non-cooperative game theory
was developed later. While in static games the decisions are made once, the agents update
their strategies over time in dynamic games (Başar and Olsder, 1998). When the updating
process is repeated continuously over a time interval, the Nash equilibrium is characterized
by a set of coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations, whose number is equal to
that of the agents. Each equation describes an agent’s best-response to the other agents’
strategies (Başar and Olsder, 1998). As the size of the population grows, these equations
become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to solve.
In some situations, the agents become weakly coupled as their number increases sufficiently;
more precisely, an isolated individual agent’s decision has an increasingly negligible influ-
ence on the other agents’ strategies, while their aggregate behavior considerably shapes the
individual decisions. Ultimately, the agents interact anonymously through their mean field,
i.e. their states’ empirical distribution, as in the DCDC and DCDCA problems. The mean
field games (MFG) methodology, which is used in this thesis, has proved to be a powerful
technique to solve such games. It starts by assuming a continuum of agents, in which case,
because of the law of large numbers, the mean field term becomes deterministic, although
initially unknown. Unlike the finite population case discussed above, the infinite population
Nash equilibrium is characterized by only two coupled partial differential equations, a back-
ward HJB equation and a forward Fokker-Plank (FP) equation. The former characterizes
a generic agent’s best response to some assumed deterministic mean field term, while the
latter propagates the would be mean field when all the agents implement their computed
best responses. Consistency requires that sustainable mean field trajectories, if they exist,
be replicated in the process. Thus the requirement that limiting equilibria satisfy a system
of fixed point equations, herein given by the coupled HJB-FP equations. The corresponding
best responses, when applied to the finite population, constitute approximate Nash equilibria
(-Nash equilibria) (Huang et al., 2006, 2007).
4Definition 1 (−Nash Equilibrium). Consider N agents, a set of strategy profiles S =
S1 × · · · × SN , and for each agent i, a cost function Ji(u1, . . . , uN), for (u1, . . . , uN) ∈ S.
A strategy profile (u∗1, . . . , u∗N) ∈ S is called an -Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs
Ji, if there exists an  > 0, such that for any fixed 1 ≤ i ≤ N , for all ui ∈ Si, we have
Ji(ui, u∗−i) ≥ Ji(u∗i , u∗−i)− .
The MFG theory was introduced in a series of papers by Huang, Caines and Malhamé
(Huang et al., 2003, 2006, 2007), and independently by Lasry and Lions (Lasry and Lions,
2006a,b, 2007). Huang et al.’s 2003 and 2007 papers formulated the linear quadratic Gaussian
(LQG) MFG theory. The general case was developed in (Huang et al., 2006; Lasry and
Lions, 2006a,b, 2007). Though the results are similar, the approaches in these works are
different. In fact, Huang et al. start by solving the game under the infinite size population
assumption. Afterwards, they characterize the corresponding strategies when applied by
the finite population as approximate Nash strategies (−Nash). We follow this approach in
the thesis. By contrast, Lasry and Lions solve the game for a finite number of agents, and
claim that when the size of the population increases to infinity, the set of HJB-FP equations
describing the agents’ best responses and distributions, and whose number is equal to that
of the agents, reduce to the aforementioned coupled HJB-FP equations. Cardaliaguet et. al
show later (Cardaliaguet et al., 2015) that the finite Nash equilibrium converges in “average”
to the unique solution of the “master equation”. The latter is an equivalent formulation of
HJB-FP equations.
The cooperative LQG MFG formulation was developed later in (Huang et al., 2012). Under
an infinite population assumption, the authors investigate the structure of the LQG costs to
develop decentralized person-by-person optimal strategies (Başar and Olsder, 1998), a weaker
solution concept than the social optimum. They show that these strategies, when applied by
a finite number of agents, converge to a social optimum as the size of the population increases
to infinity.
Definition 2 (Person-by-person optimum). Consider N agents, a set of strategy profiles
S = S1 × · · · × SN and a social cost Jsoc(u1, . . . , uN), ∀(u1, . . . , uN) ∈ S. A strategy profile
(u∗1, . . . , u∗N) is said to be person-by-person optimal with respect to the social cost Jsoc, if for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, for all ui ∈ Si, Jsoc(ui, u∗−i) ≥ Jsoc(u∗i , u∗−i).
Definition 3 (Social optimum). Consider N agents, a set of strategy profiles S = S1×· · ·×SN
and a social cost Jsoc(u1, . . . , uN), ∀(u1, . . . , uN) ∈ S. A strategy profile (u∗1, . . . , u∗N) is said to
be a social optimum with respect to the social cost Jsoc, if Jsoc(u∗i , u∗−i) = inf(ui,u−i)∈S
Jsoc(ui, u−i).
In the above listed MFGmodels, each agent makes a tiny contribution to the mean field, which
5in its turn shapes the decisions of the agents. To account for influential agents, these models
were extended in two directions. At first, Huang introduced the major-minor LQG MFG
model (Huang, 2010). The general case was developed later in (Nourian and Caines, 2013).
The major-minor models are non-cooperative MFGs where a major agent has a considerable
impact on the other minor agents. The latter, however, influence each other and the major
agent through their mean field. As in the standard MFG models, the minor and major agents
make simultaneous decisions. The mean field is no longer deterministic for a continuum of
minor agents, but a stochastic process adapted to the major agent’s state. Subsequently,
Bensoussan et al. have formulated a general Stackelberg MFG model (Bensoussan et al.,
2014). Even though the influence relations between the agents in Huang and Bensoussan’s
models are similar, the major agent (or what Bensoussan et al call dominating agent) in the
latter plays first, and then the minor agents make their decisions. The agents seek in this
case a Stackelberg solution (Von Stackelberg, 1934; Başar and Olsder, 1998).
Definition 4 (Stackelberg Solution). Consider N + 1 agents, a set of strategy profiles S =
S0×· · ·×SN , and for each agent k, a cost function Jk(u0, . . . , uN), ∀(u0, . . . , uN) ∈ S. Suppose
that agent 0 is the dominating agent. A strategy profile (u∗0, . . . , u∗N) ∈ S is called a Stackelberg
solution w.r.t. the costs Jk, if there exists a map T from S0 to S1×· · ·×SN , such that for all
u0 ∈ S0, T (u0) is a Nash Equilibrium w.r.t. Jk, k = 1, . . . , N , and u∗0 = min
u0∈S0
J0(u0, T (u0)),
with T (u∗0) = (u∗1, . . . , u∗N).
Although the MFG methodology constitutes the backbone of this thesis, our results are
original with respect to the MFG literature. For a detailed discussion about the differences,
we refer the reader to the main contributions in Section 1.3 below.
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the DCDC and DCDCA models are related
to many problems in microeconomics, elections, robotics and advertising. We discuss this
relation in the following paragraphs.
1.2.2 Relation to the discrete choice problems in microeconomics
Discrete choice problems were developed in microeconomics to analyze an individual’s be-
havior facing a set of alternative choices. A first static model was formulated by McFadden
in (McFadden, 1974), where an agent chooses among a finite set of alternatives the one that
maximizes its utility. Later, Rust (Rust, 1994) introduced a dynamic discrete choice model
involving a Markov decision process for each agent. While the social effect is absent in Rust’s
and McFadden’s models, Brock and Durlauf (Brock and Durlauf, 2001) studied a discrete
choice problem with social interactions modeled as a static non-cooperative game, where a
6large number of agents choose between two alternatives while being influenced by the average
of their choices. The authors analyze the model using an approach similar to that of a static
MFG, and inspired by statistical mechanics.
Even though Rust’s model and the DCDC models of this thesis are dynamic discrete choice
models, the agents make in the former repeated choices at each discrete time period, but under
no social influence. In our non-degenerate DCDC model, however, they are continuously
reassessing the adequacy of their would-be choices and current actions along their random
state-space path, up until the end of the control horizon, at which point their ultimate
choice of alternative becomes fully crystallized. Besides, the DCDC model includes peer
influence. Thus, the DCDC formulation helps in modeling situations where the alternatives
are identified as potential points in a suitable state space, for example, physical space in
the robotics example, or opinion space in the election example. Moreover, implementation
of a given choice involves movement under a social effect towards a final destination state,
requiring control effort and constrained by specific dynamics.
Finally, the results in the non-degenerate DCDC case can be shown to have a direct relation
with the economic discrete choice models. Indeed, we show in Section 3.4.3 that the DCDC
model can be interpreted at each instant as a static discrete choice problem, where the
individual costs include an additional term that penalizes myopic decisions.
1.2.3 Relation to opinion dynamics and elections
There have been two trends in modeling opinion dynamics during the past forty years. The
first considers a group of agents evaluating a given subject. It tries to understand how
they update their opinions, and how the update rules help predicting different behaviors, for
instance, occurrence of a consensus, formation of opinion clusters, etc. In the early models
(DeGroot, 1974; Lehrer, 1975), for example, each agent updates its opinion by averaging the
opinions of the other agents. Under this update rule, it is shown that the agents’ opinions
converge to a common value. In other words, a consensus occurs. The averaging rule was
modified later in many ways (Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990; Hegselmann and Krause, 2002;
Jadbabaie et al., 2003; Acemoğlu et al., 2013). The second trend is the voter model (Liggett,
2012), whereby a group of agents choose continuously over a time horizon between two
alternatives. At each instant, the probability that an agent changes its current choice of
alternative from one to the other depends on the current neighbors’ choices.
The first trend is related for example to contexts where the agents give their opinions on
the quality of a product. The opinions take in this case values in a connected set. Even
though in some cases (Hegselmann and Krause, 2002) they ultimately form clusters around
7a finite number of values, these values are not defined a priori, but result from the update
rules. In the DCDC and DCDCA models, however, the opinions cluster around predefined
alternatives that shape the form of the update rules. As for the second trend, the choices are
restricted to a finite discrete set and are made at each instant. Although the voter model can
model opinion dynamics in elections, it does not capture (as the DCDC and DCDCA do) the
transition phase that a voter experiences before making a final decision regarding who he/she
should vote for. During this phase, the voters are indecisive. Indeed, they optimize their
efforts to steer their opinion state and stay in the comfort zone, i.e. close to the majority
opinion state, and to ultimately make a definite choice of a candidate.
1.2.4 Relation to robotics
Far from social sciences, the DCDC model is also related to some mobile robot deployment
problems (Halász et al., 2007; Hsieh et al., 2008). According to these models, a group of
robots, initially located at some sites, needs to autonomously redistribute itself between the
sites according to a desired distribution to achieve some collective tasks. Two main differences
exist between these problems and the DCDC model. First, the deployment models do not
consider scenarios where the robots are not initially at the sites, and need to travel to settle
on these. Moreover, the deployment is enforced by a desired distribution irrespective of
the energy expenditure. By contrast, in the case of the DCDC model, the robots move
from random initial positions toward the alternatives with least cost. Although their final
distribution over the sites is dictated by their dynamics and the location of the sites, the
DCDC model provides parameters indicating for each robot the attractiveness of the sites,
which can be calibrated to shape the final distribution. Second, unlike in (Halász et al., 2007;
Hsieh et al., 2008), a robot’s optimal strategy in the DCDC model takes into account a noise
process, which represents the random forces that disturb the robot’s path, for example.
1.2.5 Relation to the advertising models
Advertising models have been extensively studied in the context of differential games. Among
these are the Vidale-Wolfe, the Excess, the Lanchester and the Diffusion models. For a de-
tailed discussion about the differential advertising games, we refer the reader to (Erickson,
1995). Briefly, these games involve a finite number of producers that adjust their advertising
rates to control their market shares and increase their profit. This approach does not take
into account the consumers’ behaviors and their influence on the market shares and profits.
It cannot, for example, model situations where the consumers have different a priori prefer-
ences towards the products, or where they make their choices of a product under both the
8advertising and social effects. To account for such cases, the DCDCA model considers both
the advertiser and consumers as decision makers in the game. In its current form, however,
this model involves only a monopolistic advertising game, where two producers share the
market, but only one of them is investing in advertising.
1.3 Main contributions and structure of the thesis
The main contributions of the thesis are divided into two groups. The first is related to the
problem definition and research objectives. In other words, it contains the answers to the
questions posed in Section 1.1. The second group is related to the techniques used in the
proofs of some lemmas and theorems, which are intrinsic to the dynamic games in this work,
and differ from those used in the classical MFG theory.
1.3.1 First group of contributions
As discussed in Section 1.1, the main objective of the thesis is to develop mathematical
models for the DCDC and DCDCA problems. Accordingly, we introduce a new class of
dynamic games and social optimization problems, called “min-LQG”, which involves a large
number of agents with linear dynamics. The key feature of these problems is their individual
cost, the “min-LQG” cost, a modified version of the LQG one, that includes a choice-related
minimization term in its final cost to capture the discrete choice aspect.
For a large population, the discrete choices make the naïve approach to computing the ex-
act solutions of the non-cooperative and cooperative problems intractable. Moreover, the
implementation of these solutions requires a significant amount of communication between
the agents. Indeed, we show in Sections 2.2 and 4.2 that a naïve method to compute the
exact solutions involves solving an ordinary differential equation (ODE), whose dimension
increases exponentially with the number of the agents. To implement these strategies, each
agent needs to know the initial states of all the agents, and their parameters. Instead, we
solve the DCDC and DCDCA problems via the MFG methodology. This allows to develop
“simple” solutions, understand how the agents make their choices, and anticipate the aggre-
gate agents’ behavior. More explicitly, we obtain the following results, which constitute the
first group of contributions of this thesis.
Non-cooperative DCDC model
• We develop via the MFG methodology a set of strategies that are computationally
tractable. Moreover, the implementation of these strategies requires that an agent know
9only its state, and the probability distributions of the initial states and parameters.
• We show that the mean field based strategies constitute an approximate Nash equilib-
rium (−Nash equilibrium).
• In the degenerate case, i.e., in the absence of a noise process in the dynamics, we show
that an agent makes its choice of an alternative prior starting to move, and based on
its initial state.
• In the non-degenerate case, the agents can no longer commit to a choice from the
beginning. Instead, they continuously revise their decisions to account for the risk
of making a “myopic” decision in favor of one alternative based on the current state,
while being driven to one of the other alternatives by the noise process. Accordingly,
we interpret the min-LQG problem at each instant as a static discrete choice problem
(McFadden, 1974), where an agent’s cost of choosing one of the alternatives includes
an additional term that penalizes myopic decisions.
• We show that there exists a one-to-one map between the infinite population Nash
equilibria and the fixed points of a finite dimensional map. The latter are the potential
probability distributions of the agents’ choices over the alternatives. As a result, this
one-to-one correspondence reduces the infinite dimensional problem of finding a Nash
equilibrium for the limiting game to solving a fixed point for the finite dimensional map.
Furthermore, it simplifies the existence proofs and numerical schemes to compute the
equilibria.
For a detailed discussion of these contributions, we refer the reader to Sections 2.5 and 3.4.
The degenerate non-cooperative DCDC model is introduced in Chapter 2, while Chapter 3
considers the non-degenerate case.
Degenerate cooperative DCDC model
• We develop via the MFG methodology a set of strategies that are computationally
tractable. Moreover, the implementation of these strategies requires that an agent
know only its state, and the probability distributions of the initial agent states and
parameters.
• We show that the mean field based strategies converge to a social optimum as the
number of agents increases to infinity.
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• As in the degenerate non-cooperative case, we show that an agent makes a choice prior
starting to move and based on its initial state.
• We show that there exists a one-to-one map between the infinite population social op-
tima and the fixed points of a finite dimensional map. The latter are the potential
probability distributions of the agents’ choices over the alternatives. This character-
ization of the infinite population problem has consequences similar to those in the
non-cooperative case.
• We provide a numerical example that illustrates the advantage of the cooperative strate-
gies compared to the non-cooperative ones in evenly allocating the agents to the alter-
natives, a crucial feature required when considering the robotic example, for instance,
to improve the quality of the collective tasks.
For a detailed discussion of these contributions, we refer the reader to Section 4.4. The
degenerate cooperative DCDC model is studied in Chapter 4.
DCDCA model
To model the advertising effect, we add in Chapter 5 an advertiser to the degenerate non-
cooperative DCDC game, which constitutes then a Stackelberg competition. The main con-
tribution of the DCDCA model is to introduce an advertising model involving two competing
alternatives and in which both the consumers and advertiser are part of the game. Our model
describes the consumers’ individual behaviors, from which it deduces the way the population
of consumers splits along the alternatives under both the social and advertising effects. We
start by assuming a continuum of consumers, and solve the game via the MFG methodol-
ogy. When the consumers have sufficiently diverse a priori opinions, we show that a unique
Nash equilibrium between the consumers exists. As a result, the advertiser can anticipate
the consumers’ behavior and make optimal investments. These investments require that the
advertiser know only the probability distribution of the a priori opinions. When these in-
vestments are applied in real situations of a finite number of consumers, they induce a loss of
performance in the advertising process. However, this loss becomes negligible in a large pop-
ulation. For a certain uniform distribution of a priori opinions, we provide an explicit form
of the advertiser’s optimal investment strategies, and consumers’ optimal choices. Moreover,
we anticipate the probability distribution of the consumers’ choices over the alternatives.
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1.3.2 Second group of contributions
The min-LQG final costs (2.2)-(3.2) change drastically the analysis of the non-cooperative
DCDC game with respect to the standard non-cooperative MFG literature discussed in Sub-
section 1.2.1. Indeed, in the LQG MFG theory (Huang et al., 2003, 2007), the authors derive
an explicit form of the generic agent’s best response, which is a linear feedback policy. In
this case, it is sufficient to know the initial mean of the population to solve the mean field
equations (coupled HJB-FP equations). In the nonlinear MFG theory (Huang et al., 2006;
Lasry and Lions, 2006b; Carmona and Delarue, 2013), however, an explicit solution is not
generally possible, and the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the coupled HJB-FP
is proved under strong assumptions. For example, in (Huang et al., 2006), the authors as-
sume that the control laws are Liptschiz continuous with respect to the mean field term, and
derive the result via Banach’s fixed point theorem. In (Carmona and Delarue, 2013; Lasry
and Lions, 2006b), the result is shown under a smooth and convex final cost assumption via
Schauder’s fixed point theorem (Conway, 2013). The non-cooperative min-LQG game lies
somewhere between the LQG and the general MFG theories. Indeed, the linear dynamics
and quadratic running costs allow one to derive an explicit form of the generic agent’s best
response, which is nonlinear in this case. Hence, one needs to know the complete distribution
of the initial states in order to solve the mean field equations. Moreover, the best responses
are not Lipschitz continuous and the final costs are not convex or smooth, which result in
a multitude of solutions to the HJB-FP equations. But, thanks to the linear dynamics and
quadratic running costs, we construct a one-to-one map between these solutions and the fixed
points of a finite dimensional map. The existence of at least one fixed point, equivalently of
a solution to the HJB-FP equations, is shown by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem (Conway,
2013).
Similarly, the non-convexity and non-smoothness of the final costs in the cooperative DCDC
problem require a proof machinery different from that of the LQG MFG (Huang et al., 2012).
Indeed, the convergence proofs of the decentralized mean field based strategies to a social
optimum are tightly related to the special form of the min-LQG final costs, see Lemma 6,
Theorem 14, and Section 4.4.3. Finally, unlike in (Bensoussan et al., 2014, 2015), the ad-
vertiser’s optimal control problem (5.12) in the DCDCA game involves a dynamic constraint
that depends non-linearly on his/her state and the consumers’ macroscopic behavior. An
explicit Stackelberg solution is thus possible only in some special cases, for instance, when
the consumers’ a priori opinions have a certain uniform distribution.
12
CHAPTER 2 DEGENERATE NONCOOPERATIVE DYNAMIC
COLLECTIVE DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL
We formulate the non-cooperative degenerate DCDC problem in Section 2.1 as a dynamic
non-cooperative game, where an agent’s state evolves according to a controlled linear ODE.
The agents are cost coupled through their average state. In Section 2.2, we consider the
problem of finding an exact Nash equilibrium for the game. We show that there exists a
one-to-one map between the equilibria and the fixed points of a finite dimensional map.
The latter is defined on a finite set of size increasing exponentially with the number of
agents. A Nash equilibrium may not exist. Moreover, the naïve approach to computing
an equilibrium, if it exists, becomes computationally intractable as the number of agents
increases, and its implementation requires a significant amount of communication between
the agents. Instead, we solve the game via the MFG methodology. We start by assuming a
continuum of agents for which one can ascribe a deterministic, although initially unknown,
mean trajectory. In order to compute its best response to this trajectory, a generic agent
solves an optimal tracking problem, which constitutes the subject of Section 2.3. The problem
of determining a sustainable mean trajectory, that is, a trajectory that is replicated by the
mean trajectory of the agents when they optimally respond to it, is treated in Section 2.4.
We show in that section that there exists a one-to-one map between the sustainable mean
trajectories and the fixed points of a finite dimensional map. The latter are the potential
probability distributions of the agents’ choices over the alternatives. We derive conditions
for the existence of a fixed point, equivalently of a sustainable mean trajectory, to hold. We
discuss the results and contributions of the degenerate non-cooperative DCDC problem in
Section 2.5. In Section 2.6, the model is further generalized to include initial preferences
towards the alternatives, and nonuniform dynamics. In Section 2.7, we show that the mean
field based strategies constitute an −Nash equilibrium (See Definition 1) when applied by a
finite number of agents. Finally, Section 2.8 provides some numerical simulation results, and
Section 2.9 concludes this chapter.
2.1 Mathematical model
We formulate the degenerate non-cooperative DCDC problem as a dynamic non-cooperative
game involving a large number N of agents with the following linear dynamics,
d
dt
xi = Axi +Bui, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (2.1)
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where xi(t) ∈ Rn is the state of agent i at time t and ui(t) ∈ Rm its control input. In a large
population, the knowledge of all the agents’ initial states xi(0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is not realistic
and requires a complex communication network among the agents. It is thus convenient
to think of the initial states as realizations of random variables resulting from a common
probability distribution function in a collection of independent experiments. Formally, we
assume that xi(0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
vectors on a probability space (Ω,F ,P), with distribution equal to P0 and finite second
moment E‖xi(0)‖2 <∞. An agent i is associated with the following individual “min-LQG”
cost functional,
Ji (ui, x¯) = E
(∫ T
0
{
‖xi − x¯‖2Q + ‖ui‖2R
}
dt+ min
1≤j≤l
‖xi(T )− pj‖2M
)
, (2.2)
where Q  0, R  0, M is a large positive definite matrix in the sense that will become
clear later (See Theorem 3 below), and ‖z‖L =
√
1
2z
′Lz for any vector z and matrix L  0.
Along the path, the running cost forces the agents to exert as little control effort as possible,
and to stay close to the population’s average state x¯ := 1/N ∑Nj=1 xi. At the end of the time
horizon T > 0, each agent should reach the vicinity of one of the alternatives pj, 1 ≤ j ≤ l.
Otherwise, it is strongly penalized by the final cost. Indeed, Theorem 3 below shows that the
probability that a cost-minimizing agent is close to one of the alternatives can be arbitrary
increased by making the final cost’s coefficientM large enough. Hence, the overall individual
cost captures the problem faced by each agent of deciding between a finite set of alternatives,
while trying to remain close to the population’s average trajectory. For each agent, we define
the set of admissible control strategies,
U =
{
u ∈ (Rm)Ω×[0,T ]|u is σ {x1(0), . . . , xN(0)} ⊗ B([0, T ])−measurable,
and E
∫ T
0
‖u‖2dt <∞
}
. (2.3)
2.2 Exact Nash equilibria
We consider in this section the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium for the non-cooperative
DCDC game defined by (2.1) and (2.2). We assume here that each agent observes its state
and the states of the other agents. In the following, we construct a one-to-one map between
the Nash equilibria and the fixed points of a finite dimensional map. This allows us to analyze
the existence and computation of an equilibrium.
Let us consider (u∗i , u∗−i) a Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs (2.2). We denote by
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(x∗i , x∗−i) the corresponding states. At first, we show that the strategy u∗i is the optimal
control law of a linear quadratic regulator (LQR) problem. Moreover, the strategy profile
(u∗i , u∗−i) is a Nash equilibrium for some LQR game. An agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , computes its
best response to u∗−i by solving the following degenerate min-LQG optimal control problem,
inf
ui∈U
J¯i(ui, x¯∗−i, xi(0)) = inf
ui∈U
(∫ T
0
{∥∥∥∥xi − 1N xi − x¯∗−i
∥∥∥∥2
Q
+ ‖ui‖2R
}
dt+ min
1≤j≤l
‖xi(T )− pj‖2M
)
,
(2.4)
subject to agent i’s dynamics, where x¯∗−i = 1N
∑N
k=1,k 6=i x
∗
k.
The cost J¯i is similar to (2.2), but we drop the expectation, since agent i observes the initial
states of the other agents. Moreover, the others’ states captured by x¯∗−i are assumed known
in this cost. In the following, we show that there exist l x¯∗−i-dependent basins of attraction,
each corresponding to one of the alternatives. If agent i is initially inside one of the basins,
then it moves under its best response to u∗−i towards the corresponding alternative.
The cost function J¯i defined in (2.4) can be written as the minimum of l LQR costs, each
corresponding to one of the alternatives, as follows,
J¯i(ui, x¯∗−i, xi(0)) = min1≤j≤l J¯
j
i (ui, x¯∗−i, xi(0)), (2.5)
where J¯ ji (ui, x¯∗−i, xi(0)) =
∫ T
0
{∥∥∥∥xi − 1N xi − x¯∗−i
∥∥∥∥2
Q
+ ‖ui‖2R
}
dt+ ‖xi(T )− pj‖2M . (2.6)
Moreover, we have that inf
ui∈U
min
1≤j≤l
J¯ ji (ui, x¯∗−i, xi(0)) = min1≤j≤l infui∈U J¯
j
i (ui, x¯∗−i, xi(0)). Assuming
a full state feedback, this equality implies that the optimal control law u∗i of (2.5) is the
optimal control law of the LQR problem with the least optimal cost. Explicitly, u∗i = uki if
J¯ki (uki , x¯∗−i, xi(0)) = min1≤j≤l J¯
j
i (u
j
i , x¯
∗
−i, xi(0)), where u
j
i is the optimal control law of the LQR
problem with cost functional J¯ ji .
The optimal value of J¯ ji , 1 ≤ j ≤ l, is a function of x¯∗−i and xi(0). This suggests to partition
the space of initial states Rn into l x¯∗−i-dependent regions D
j
i (x¯∗−i), 1 ≤ j ≤ l, such that if
agent i’s initial state is inside Dji (x¯∗−i), then the LQR problem corresponding to J¯
j
i is the less
costly, and u∗i = u
j
i . We recall the optimal value and the corresponding optimal control law
(feedback policy) of J¯ ji (Anderson and Moore, 2007),
J¯ ji∗(x¯∗−i, xi(0)) =
1
2xi(0)
′Γ¯(0)xi(0) + βji (0)′xi(0) + δ
j
i (0) (2.7)
uji (t, x, x¯∗−i) = −R−1B′
(
Γ¯(t)x+ βji (t)
)
, (2.8)
where Γ¯, βji and δ
j
i are respectively matrix-, vector-, and real-valued functions satisfying the
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following backward propagating differential equations:
d
dt
Γ¯ = Γ¯BR−1B′Γ¯− Γ¯A− A′Γ¯−Q
(
1− 1
N
)2
, Γ¯(T ) = M (2.9)
d
dt
βji =
(
Γ¯BR−1B′ − A′
)
βji +Q
(
1− 1
N
)
x¯∗−i, β
j
i (T ) = −Mpj (2.10)
d
dt
δji =
1
2(β
j
i )′BR−1B′β
j
i −
∥∥∥x¯∗−i∥∥∥2Q , δji (T ) = ‖pj‖2M . (2.11)
The basins of attraction, defined in equation (2.12) below, are thus regions in Rn delimited
by hyperplanes that depend on x¯∗−i.
Dji (x¯∗−i) =
{
x0 ∈ Rn|J ji∗(x¯∗−i, x0) ≤ Jki∗(x¯∗−i, x0),∀1 ≤ k ≤ l
}
=
{
x0 ∈ Rn|
(
βji (0)− βki (0)
)′
x0 + δji (0)− δki (0) ≤ 0, ∀1 ≤ k ≤ l
}
. (2.12)
On the boundaries of the basins of attraction, two or more LQR problems have equal optimal
costs. As a result, an agent initially on a boundary has multiple best responses. To avoid
this situation, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Conventionally, we assume that if xi(0) ∈ ∩km=1Djmi (x¯∗−i), for some j1 <
· · · < jk, then agent i goes towards pj1.
Under Assumption 1, agent i has a unique best response to u∗−i,
u∗i (t, x) = −R−1B′
(
Γ¯(t)x+ βji (t)
)
, if xi(0) ∈ Dji (x¯∗−i). (2.13)
Given the initial conditions, equation (2.13) shows that an agent’s best response is the optimal
control law of the LQR problem that corresponds to the alternative chosen by this agent.
Moreover, equations (2.13) and (2.9)-(2.11), for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , imply that (u∗i , u∗−i) is a Nash
equilibrium for the game defined by the N agents, but with the LQR costs that correspond
to the chosen alternatives. Explicitly, if d = (d1, . . . , dN) ∈ {p1, . . . , pl}N are the chosen
alternatives (i.e., agent i chooses di), then (u∗i , u∗−i) is a Nash equilibrium with respect to the
following LQR costs, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
J¯
(d)
i (ui, u−i) =
∫ T
0
{
‖xi − x¯‖2Q + ‖ui‖2R
}
dt+ ‖xi(T )− di‖2M . (2.14)
To construct the one-to-one map between the Nash equilibria and the fixed points of a finite
dimensional map, let us define for each d ∈ {p1, . . . , pl}N the non-cooperative LQR game with
the individual costs J¯ (d)i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and denote it by Game(d). We assume that for each d,
Game(d) has a unique Nash equilibrium Nash(d). We discuss this assumption in Remark 1
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below. We define the finite dimensional map FNash = F2 ◦F1, where F1 and F2 are defined as
follows. If we assign for each agent i an alternative di, then F1 maps the assignment profile
d = (d1, . . . , dN) to the unique Nash equilibrium of the LQR game Game(d) that corresponds
to d. Formally, F1 : {p1, . . . , pl}N → UN , such that F1(d) = Nash(d). On the other hand, F2
maps a strategy profile (u1, . . . , uN) to the choices made by the N agents, when each agent
i optimally responds to the other agents’ strategies u−i. Formally, F2 : UN → {p1, . . . , pl}N ,
such that F2(u1, . . . , uN) = (d1, . . . , dN), with di is the choice of agent i under its best response
(2.13) to u−i. We summarize the aforementioned functions in the following diagram,
{p1, . . . , pl}N F1−→ UN F2−→ {p1, . . . , pl}N
d 7−→ F1(d) = Nash(d) 7−→ FNash(d) = F2 ◦ F1(d).
(2.15)
Theorem 1 (Exact Nash equilibrium). Assume that ∀d ∈ {p1, . . . , pl}N , Game(d) has a
unique Nash equilibrium Nash(d). Then, (u∗i , u∗−i) is a Nash equilibrium for the degenerate
non-cooperative DCDC game if and only if (u∗i , u∗−i) = Nash(d), with d is a fixed point of
FNash.
Proof. Let (u∗i , u∗−i) be a Nash equilibrium for the DCDC game, and d = (d1, . . . , dN) be
the chosen alternatives. Then, (u∗i , u∗−i) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the LQR game
Game(d). Furthermore, an agent i that optimally responds to u∗−i will go towards di. Thus,
d is a fixed point of FNash. Conversely, let d = (d1, . . . , dN) be a fixed point of FNash. We
prove that (u∗i , u∗−i) := Nash(d) is a Nash equilibrium for the DCDC game. Fix 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
(u∗i , u∗−i) is a Nash equilibrium for Game(d), therefore, inf
ui∈U
J¯
(d)
i (ui, u∗−i) = J¯
(d)
i (u∗i , u∗−i). By
the definition of J¯ (d)i , J¯
(d)
i (u∗i , u∗−i) ≥ Ji(u∗i , x¯∗i ), where x¯∗i is the population’s average state
under (u∗i , u∗−i). Moreover, F2(u∗i , u∗−i) = d, since d is a fixed point of FNash. This means
that the choice of agent i under its best response to u∗−i is di. Hence, inf
ui∈U
Ji(ui, 1/Nxi +
x¯∗−i) = inf
ui∈U
J¯
(d)
i (ui, u∗−i). Thus, inf
ui∈U
Ji(ui, 1/Nxi + x¯∗−i) ≥ Ji(u∗i , x¯∗i ), and (u∗i , u∗−i) is a Nash
equilibrium for the DCDC game.
According to Theorem 1, there exists a one-to-one map between the Nash equilibria of the
degenerate non-cooperative DCDC game and the fixed points of a finite dimensional map
FNash. But, this map is defined on the discrete set {p1, . . . , pl}N . Hence, a fixed point
of FNash, equivalently a Nash equilibrium, may not exist. A naïve method to compute an
equilibrium, if it exists, is to run a search for a fixed point over the set {p1, . . . , pl}N of
size lN . This operation becomes quickly intractable as the size of the population becomes
large. Furthermore, the implementation of the Nash strategies requires a significant amount
of communication between the agents. Indeed, each agent needs to know its state and the
17
initial states of all the other agents. Instead, we solve the game in the following sections via
the MFG methodology.
Remark 1. We assume in Theorem 1 that Game(d) has a unique Nash equilibrium for each
d. Indeed, one can derive a sufficient condition for this assumption to hold as follows (Başar
and Olsder, 1998, Theorem 6.12). Using Pontryagin’s maximum principle, an agent’s best
response is described by its state and co-state equations. By concatenating these equations,
we obtain a pair of coupled forward-backward linear ODE’s. The existence and uniqueness
of a solution to these equations is guarantied under a condition that does not depend on d.
This condition involves the existence and uniqueness of a solution to a Riccati equation that
does not depend on d.
2.3 The mean field games methodology and the generic agent’s best response
Following the MFG methodology (Huang et al., 2006), this section starts by assuming a
continuum of agents. Accordingly, we assume that the mean field term x¯ is deterministic
and known throughout this section. The problem of determining x¯ is treated in Section 2.4
below. The agents, which are cost coupled through x¯, become decoupled under an infinite
size population assumption. Hence, a generic (representative) agent of state x and control
input u computes its best response to x¯ by solving the following degenerate min-LQG optimal
control problem,
inf
u∈U
J (u, x¯, x(0)) = inf
u∈U
(∫ T
0
{
‖x− x¯‖2Q + ‖u‖2R
}
dt+ min
1≤j≤l
‖x(T )− pj‖2M
)
(2.16)
s.t. d
dt
x = Ax+Bu, (2.17)
where the generic agent’s initial state x(0) is a random variable with distribution equal to P0.
Similarly to Section 2.2, there exist l x¯-dependent basins of attraction, each corresponding
to one of the alternatives. If the generic agent is initially inside one of the basins, then it
goes towards the corresponding alternative. We define the basins of attraction as follows,
Dj(x¯) =
{
x0 ∈ Rn|J j∗(x¯, x0) ≤ Jk∗ (x¯, x0),∀1 ≤ k ≤ l
}
=
{
x0 ∈ Rn|
(
βj(0)− βk(0)
)′
x0 + δj(0)− δk(0) ≤ 0, ∀1 ≤ k ≤ l
}
, (2.18)
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where J j∗(x¯, x(0)) =
1
2x(0)
′Γ(0)x(0) + βj(0)′x(0) + δj(0), (2.19)
d
dt
Γ = ΓBR−1B′Γ− ΓA− A′Γ−Q, Γ(T ) = M (2.20)
d
dt
βj =
(
ΓBR−1B′ − A′
)
βj +Qx¯, βj(T ) = −Mpj (2.21)
d
dt
δj = 12(β
j)′BR−1B′βj − ‖x¯‖2Q, δj(T ) = ‖pj‖2M . (2.22)
Assumption 2. Conventionally, we assume that if x(0) ∈ ∩km=1Djm(x¯), for some j1 < · · · <
jk, then the generic agent goes towards pj1.
Under Assumptions 3 and 5 in Sections 2.4 and 2.6, this convention does not affect the
analysis in the remainder of this chapter. We summarize the above analysis in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 (The generic agent’s best response). Under Assumption 2, the degenerate min-
LQG optimal control problem (2.16)-(2.17) has a unique optimal control law (best response
to x¯)
u∗(t, x, x¯, x(0)) = uj∗(t, x, x¯, x(0)) := −R−1B′
(
Γ(t)x+ βj(t)
)
if x(0) ∈ Dj(x¯), (2.23)
where Γ, βj, and δj are the unique solutions of (2.20)-(2.22).
As mentioned in Section 2.1, the final cost forces an agent to be close to one of the alternatives.
Indeed, we show in the following theorem that the probability that an agent reaches an
arbitrary small neighborhood of one of the alternatives increases with M . Furthermore, a
generic agent cannot expect to reach exactly the alternatives, unless the optimal state at
time T , y∗(T ), of the following optimal control problem is one of the alternatives,
J0(u, x¯, x(0)) =
∫ T
0
{
‖y − x¯‖2Q + ‖u‖2R
}
dt
s.t. d
dt
y = Ay +Bu, y(0) = x(0).
(2.24)
The result is proved for tracked paths x¯ that are uniformly bounded with respect to M , a
property that is shown to hold later in Theorem 4 for the desired tracked paths (sustainable
mean trajectories).
Theorem 3 (Well-defined discrete choice problem). Suppose that the pair (A,B) is control-
lable and for each M  0, the generic agent is optimally responding to a path x¯, with x∗
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is its optimal state. Assume that the path x¯ is uniformly bounded with respect to M for the
semi-norm
( ∫ T
0 ‖.‖2Qdt
) 1
2
. Then, the following statements hold:
(i) For any  > 0,
P
 l⋂
j=1
{‖x∗(T )− pj‖ > }
 = O( 1
2λmin(M)
)
. (2.25)
(ii) The generic agent reaches at time T the alternative pj if and only if pj = y∗(T ).
Proof.
(i) It is sufficient to show that the expectation of the optimal cost of (2.16) EJ∗(x¯, x(0)) ≤
K, for some K > 0 independent of M . The result is then a direct consequence of
Chebyshev’s inequality (Durrett, 2010, Theorem 1.6.4)
P
(
min
1≤j≤l
‖x∗(T )− pj‖ > 
)
≤ 1
2
E
(
min
1≤j≤l
‖x∗(T )− pj‖2
)
≤ 2
λmin(M)2
EJ∗(x¯, x(0)).
(2.26)
The couple (A,B) is controllable, therefore, the following control law transfers the
generic agent’s state x˜ from x(0) at time 0 to p1 at time T (Rugh, 1996, Theorem 9.2),
u˜(t) = −B′eA′t
(
W−1(0, T )
(
p1 − eATx(0)
))
∈ U , (2.27)
where W is the Gramian of (A,B). Following E‖x(0)‖2 < ∞, the term E ∫ T0 ‖u˜‖2Rdt
is bounded by a constant K1 > 0 that does not depend on M . By implementing u˜ in
the generic agent’s dynamics (2.17), and noting that the path x¯ is uniformly bounded
w.r.t. M , one can show that the generic agent’s state x˜ satisfies E
∫ T
0 ‖x˜ − x¯‖2Q < K2,
where K2 > 0 does not depend on M . By the optimality of J∗ and the definition of u˜,
we obtain that
EJ∗(x¯, x(0)) ≤ EJ(u˜, x¯, x(0)) = E
∫ T
0
{‖x˜− x¯‖2Q + ‖u˜‖2Q}dt ≤ K1 +K2. (2.28)
This proves the first point.
(ii) Suppose that the generic agent reaches at time T the alternative pj while minimizing
its individual cost, that is, x∗(T ) = pj. The optimal cost is then equal to J j∗(x¯, x(0)),
where J j∗ is defined in (2.19). We have, for all u ∈ U , J j(u, x¯, x(0)) ≥ J0(u, x¯, x(0)),
with J0 defined in (2.24). Under the optimal control law uj∗ of J j, the generic agent
reaches pj. Therefore, J j(u0, x¯, x(0)) = J0 (u0, x¯, x(0)) = minu J0(u, x¯, x(0)), where u0
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is the optimal control law of J0. The uniqueness of an LQR optimal control law implies
that uj∗ = u0. Therefore, pj = y∗(T ).
We now prove the sufficient condition. We have pj = y∗(T ) for some j ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
Moreover, J j(u, x¯, x(0)) ≥ J0(u, x¯, x(0)) for all u ∈ U . We have min
u
J0(u, x¯, x(0)) =
J0(u0, x¯, x(0)) = J j(u0, x¯, x(0)). Therefore, the optimal control of J j is u0. Hence, the
agent reaches pj.
2.4 Mean field equations
Having computed a generic agent’s best response to an arbitrary path x¯, we consider in
this section the problem of determining a sustainable x¯, i.e., a trajectory that is replicated
by the average state of an infinite number of agents when they optimally respond to it. A
generic agent’s optimal state under its best response (2.23) to a deterministic path x¯ is a
random variable adapted to its initial condition. Moreover, for any finite population, the
agents’ initial states are i.i.d.. Hence, the strong Law of Large Numbers (Durrett, 2010)
suggests that the average state of an infinite number of agents is equal to the mathematical
expectation of a generic agent’s optimal state. Accordingly, a sustainable path x¯ must satisfy
the following mean field equations,
d
dt
x∗ = Ax∗ +Bu∗(t, x∗, x¯, x(0)), x∗(0) = x(0), (2.29)
Ex∗ = x¯, (2.30)
where x∗ is the generic agent’s optimal state under its best response u∗ (2.23) to x¯. Equations
(2.29)-(2.30) constitute a nonlinear degenerate Mckean-Vlasov equation (Huang et al., 2006).
Indeed, (2.29) is an ODE with random initial condition, where the right-hand side depends
on the probability distribution of the solution x∗ via the constraint (2.30).
Solving (2.29)-(2.30) directly is not an easy task. Alternatively, we derive in Lemma 1 below
an equivalent representation of a solution x¯ of (2.29)-(2.30). It consists of two forward-
backward ODE’s (2.31)-(2.32). These equations are coupled in the co-state boundary con-
dition q¯(T ) through what we call the “Choice distribution vector (CDV)” λ(x¯). The CDV
is a l dimensional probability vector, where the k−th element is the probability that the
generic agent optimally responding to x¯ is at time T closer to pk than the other alterna-
tives. Equations (2.31)-(2.32) are obtained by aggregating the state and co-state equations
of a generic agent optimally responding to x¯. The advantage of this new representation is
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that if one considers the CDV in the q¯(T ) boundary condition as a parameter (say any l
dimensional probability vector λ), then equations (2.31)-(2.32) become totally linear. As a
result, they can be treated as the state and co-state equations of a LQR problem (2.47) that
have a unique explicit solution (2.44) parametrized by λ. This implies that the solutions x¯ of
the mean field equations lies in the family of paths (2.44) parametrized by the l dimensional
probability vectors. Conversely, in order to have a path x¯λ parametrized by some candidate
λ be a solution of (2.29)-(2.30), consistency requires that λ be equal to the associated CDV
when the generic agent optimally responds to x¯λ. This is equivalent to requiring that λ be a
fixed point of the finite dimensional map F defined by (2.45). Indeed, F maps a probability
vector λ to the CDV λ(x¯λ) when the generic agent optimally responds to x¯λ.
In effect, we establish a one-to-one map between the solutions of (2.29)-(2.30), equivalently
the sustainable mean trajectories, and the fixed points of a finite dimensional map. Later, we
show that there exists at least one fixed point, equivalently one sustainable path. We make
the following technical assumption to exclude the case where the probability that a generic
agent is initially on the boundaries of the basins of attraction is nonzero.
Assumption 3. We assume that the P0-measure of hyperplanes in Rn is zero.
Assumption 3 is satisfied if the initial distribution P0 is absolutely continuous with respect
to the Lebesgue measure for example.
Lemma 1 (Equivalent representation). Under Assumption 3, a path x¯ satisfies the mean
field equations (2.29)-(2.30) if and only if it satisfies the following forward-backward ODE’s,
d
dt
x¯ = Ax¯−BR−1B′q¯, x¯(0) = Ex(0), (2.31)
d
dt
q¯ = −A′q¯, q¯(T ) = M
x¯(T )− l∑
j=1
λj(x¯)pj
 , (2.32)
with λ(x¯) = (λ1(x¯), . . . , λl(x¯)) =
(
P0 (D1(x¯)) , . . . , P0
(
Dl(x¯)
))
.
Proof. Consider x¯ a solution of (2.29)-(2.30) and x∗ the generic agent’s optimal state cor-
responding to x¯, and that satisfies (2.29). To prove that x¯ satisfies (2.31)-(2.32), we derive
at first a maximum principle for the degenerate min-LQG problem. If x∗(0) ∈ Dj(x¯), then
u∗ = uj∗ = −R−1B′qj∗, where uj∗ and qj∗ are the optimal control law and co-state of the LQR
problem that corresponds to pj. The co-state satisfies the following backward ODE,
d
dt
qj∗ = −A′qj∗ +Q(x∗ − x¯), qj∗(T ) = M(x∗(T )− pj). (2.33)
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Hence, under Assumption 3, the optimal state x∗ and co-state q∗ :=
∑l
j=1 q
j
∗1Dj(x¯)(x∗(0))
of the degenerate min-LQG problem satisfy P0-a.s the following forward-backward ODE’s,
which constitute the maximum principle of the degenerate min-LQG problem,
d
dt
x∗ = Ax∗ −BR−1R′q∗, x∗(0) = x(0) (2.34)
d
dt
q∗ = −A′q∗ +Q(x∗ − x¯), q∗(T ) = M
x∗(T )− l∑
j=1
pj1Dj(x¯)(x∗(0))
 (2.35)
u∗ = −R−1B′q∗. (2.36)
By taking the expectation of the right- and left-hand sides of (2.34)-(2.35), and noting that
Ex∗ = x¯, we obtain that x¯ satisfies (2.31)-(2.32), with q¯ = Eq∗.
Conversely, consider (x¯, q¯) satisfying (2.31)-(2.32), and x∗ the generic agent’s optimal state
under its best response u∗ to x¯. In the following, we show that x¯ = Ex∗, or equivalently x¯
is a solution of the mean field equations. Following the discussion above, x∗ and its co-state
q∗ satisfy (2.34)-(2.35). By taking the expectation on both sides of equations (2.34)-(2.35),
and subtracting the resulting equations from (2.31)-(2.32), we get,
d
dt
ex = Aex −BR−1B′eq, ex(0) = 0, (2.37)
d
dt
eq = −A′eq +Qex eq(T ) = Mex(T ), (2.38)
where ex = Ex∗ − x¯ and eq = Eq∗ − q¯. Equations (2.37)-(2.38) describe the optimal state ex
and co-state eq of the following LQR problem,
∫ T
0
{
‖y − x¯‖2Q + ‖v‖2R
}
dt+ ‖y(T )‖2M (2.39)
s.t. d
dt
y = Ay +Bv, y(0) = 0, (2.40)
which has a unique optimal solution v∗ = 0. Thus, ex = eq = 0. This proves the result.
We define the following functions, which are used to compute the solution (2.44) of (2.31)-
(2.32) when the CDV is considered as a parameter,
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d
dt
γ = −A′γ − γA+ γBR−1B′γ, γ(T ) = M (2.41)
d
dt
R1(t, s) =
(
A−BR−1B′γ(t)
)
R1(t, s), R1(s, s) = In, (2.42)
d
dt
R2(t) =
(
A−BR−1B′γ(t)
)
R2(t) +BR−1B′R1(T, t)′M, R2(0) = 0, (2.43)
x¯λ = R1(t, 0)Ex(0) +R2(t)Pλ, (2.44)
where λ ∈ S := {λ = (λ1, . . . , λl) ∈ Rl|λj ≥ 0 and ∑lj=1 λj = 1} and P = (p1, . . . , pl) ∈ Rn×l
is the matrix of alternatives. Next, we define the finite dimensional map F from the simplex
S into itself, such that, ∀λ ∈ S,
F (λ) =
(
P0
(
D1
(
x¯λ
))
, . . . , P0
(
Dl
(
x¯λ
)))
. (2.45)
We are now ready to state the main result of this chapter.
Theorem 4 (Sustainable mean trajectories). Under Assumption 3, the following statements
hold:
(i) x¯ satisfies (2.29)-(2.30) if and only if
x¯ = x¯λ, (2.46)
with λ ∈ S is a fixed point of F , where x¯λ is defined in (2.44).
(ii) F has at least one fixed point, equivalently, there exists at least one x¯ satisfying the
mean field equations (2.29)-(2.30).
(iii) The paths x¯λ are uniformly bounded with respect to M  0 and λ ∈ [0, 1]l, for the
semi-norm
( ∫ T
0 ‖.‖2Qdt
) 1
2
.
Proof.
(i) Consider x¯ a solution of the mean field equations (2.29)-(2.30). Following Lemma 1, x¯
satisfies the equivalent representation (2.31)-(2.32). We define λ := λ(x¯), where λ(x¯) is
the CDV of x¯ defined in Lemma 1. Then, x¯ and q¯ are the optimal state and co-state of
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the following optimal LQR control problem,
∫ T
0
‖v‖2Rdt+ ‖y(T )− Pλ‖2M (2.47)
s.t. d
dt
y = Ay +Bv, y(0) = Ex(0).
This, optimal control problem has a unique optimal state x¯λ defined by (2.44). Hence,
x¯ = x¯λ, where
λ = λ(x¯) =
(
P0
(
D1 (x¯)
)
, . . . , P0
(
Dl (x¯)
))
=
(
P0
(
D1
(
x¯λ
))
, . . . , P0
(
Dl
(
x¯λ
)))
= F (λ). (2.48)
The first equality follows from the definition of λ, the second from the definition of the
CDV λ(x¯), the third from x¯ = x¯λ, and the forth from the definition of F .
Conversely, let x¯ = x¯λ, for a fixed point λ ∈ S of F . Following Lemma 1, it is sufficient
to show that x¯ satisfies the equivalent representation (2.31)-(2.32). But x¯λ defined by
(2.41)-(2.44) is the optimal state of (2.47). Hence, x¯λ and its co-state q¯ := γx¯λ + β
satisfy (2.31)-(2.32), but with q¯(T ) = M(x¯λ − Pλ). Here, β is the unique solution
of d
dt
β = (γBR−1B′ − A′) β, with β(T ) = −MPλ. Thus, it remains to show that
λ = λ(x¯), where λ(x¯) is defined in Lemma 1. Indeed,
λ = F (λ) =
(
P0
(
D1
(
x¯λ
))
, . . . , P0
(
Dl
(
x¯λ
)))
=
(
P0
(
D1 (x¯)
)
, . . . , P0
(
Dl (x¯)
))
= λ(x¯). (2.49)
The first equality follows from the hypothesis that λ is a fixed point of F , the second
from the definition of F , the third from x¯ = x¯λ and the fourth from the definition of
λ(x¯). This proves the first point.
(ii) F is a function from the convex compact set S into itself. It is sufficient to show that F
is continuous. Brouwer’s fixed point theorem (Conway, 2013, Section V.9) guaranties
then the existence of at least one fixed point. The definition of F (2.45) includes the
basins of attraction Hjλ := Dj(x¯λ), 1 ≤ j ≤ l, parametrized by λ. Thus, we need at
first to understand how these basins vary with λ. Indeed, by solving the linear ODE’s
(2.21)-(2.22) of βj and δj, where x¯ is replaced by x¯λ defined in (2.44), and by replacing
the explicit solutions βj and δj in the expression of the basin of attraction, (2.18), we
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get the following expression for the basin of attraction Hjλ,
Hjλ =
{
x0 ∈ Rn|β′jkx0 ≤ δjk + θ′jkEx(0) + ξ′jkPλ,∀1 ≤ k ≤ l
}
, (2.50)
where βjk, θjk, ξjk ∈ Rn and δjk ∈ R depend on the alternatives pj and pk, and A,B,Q,R
and M . More importantly, they do not depend on λ. Thus, if {λk}k∈N is a sequence in
S that converges to λ, then the boundaries of Hjλk , which are hyperplanes in R
n, are
translated towards those of Hjλ. Thus 1 ◦
H
j
λk
(x0) converges to 1 ◦
H
j
λ
(x0) for all x0 ∈ Rn.
Under Assumption 3, this means that 1Hj
λk
(x0) converges to 1Hj
λ
(x0) P0-a.s.. Lebesgue’s
dominated convergence theorem (Rudin, 1987) implies that F (λk) converges to F (λ).
This completes the proof of the second point.
(iii) Following the proof of point (i), the paths x¯λ are the optimal states of the control
problem (2.47). Since (A,B) is controllable, the corresponding optimal control law vλ
satisfies ∫ T
0
‖vλ‖2Rdt ≤
∫ T
0
‖v˜λ‖2Rdt, (2.51)
where v˜λ = −B′eA′t
(
W−1(0, T )
(
Pλ− eATx(0)
))
is the continuous control law that
transfers the state y from y(0) to Pλ, and W the Gramian of (A,B). But v˜λ is inde-
pendent of M and continuous with respect to λ. Hence,
sup
λ∈[0,1]l
∫ T
0
‖vλ‖2dt ≤ 1
λmin(R)
sup
λ∈[0,1]l
∫ T
0
‖vλ‖2Rdt ≤
1
λmin(R)
max
λ∈[0,1]l
∫ T
0
‖v˜λ‖2Rdt. (2.52)
Moreover,
x¯λ(t) = exp(At)Ex(0) +
∫ t
0
exp(A(t− σ))Bvλ(σ)dσ. (2.53)
Therefore,
∫ T
0
‖x¯λ‖2Qdt ≤ λmax(Q)
∫ T
0
‖x¯λ‖2dt ≤ K1 +K2
∫ T
0
‖vλ‖2dt, (2.54)
for some positive constants K1 and K2 that are independent of (M,λ). This proves the
result.
Remark 2. The third point of Theorem 4 is used to prove Theorem 3 in Section 2.3.
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2.5 Discussions
Theorems 2 and 4 include the following main contributions of the degenerate non-cooperative
DCDC problem, which were listed in Section 1.3.1.
2.5.1 Commitment to the initial choice
Theorems 2 and 4 show that in the limit of an infinite number of agents, an agent makes its
choice of an alternative based on its initial condition, and assuming that it knows the initial
distribution P0. Moreover, it commits to its choice along the path. Indeed, given the initial
distribution P0, the agents compute a fixed point λ of F defined in (2.45), and anticipate
their mean trajectory x¯ = x¯λ defined in (2.44). Subsequently, an agent i makes its choice of
an alternative at time t = 0 as follows. It checks to which basin of attraction its initial state
xi(0) belongs. If xi(0) ∈ Dj(x¯λ), then agent i goes toward the alternative pj by implementing
the optimal control law uj∗ of the LQR problem (2.19) that corresponds to pj along the time
horizon [0, T ]. This choice process is summarized in Figure 2.1.
Prior starting to move t = 0 t ∈ [0, T ]
P0 λ = F (λ) x¯ = x¯λ
xi(0) ∈ D1(x¯λ)
xi(0) ∈ Dl(x¯λ)
p1
pl
... ...
u1∗
ul∗
Figure 2.1 Degenerate non-cooperative DCDC: the choice process
2.5.2 Exact vs. approximate Nash equilibria
We show in Section 2.2 that the exact Nash equilibria are mapped one-to-one to the fixed
points of FNash. A naïve approach to compute an equilibrium (if it exists) is to check for
each d ∈ {p1, . . . , pl}N whether it is a fixed point of FNash or not. But, the computation of
FNash(d) includes solving the LQR game Game(d), which involves a common Riccati equation
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of dimension n2N , and a d-dependent linear ODE of dimension nN + 1. In total, the naïve
method requires solving an ODE of dimension n2N+ lN(nN+1). Furthermore, to implement
an exact Nash equilibrium, each agent needs to know at least the exact initial states of all the
other agents. Instead, we develop in Theorems 2 and 4 a set of decentralized strategies that
are simple to compute, and where an agent is only required to know its state and the initial
probability distribution P0. In this case, we need only to solve one Riccati equation (2.20) of
dimension n2, l ODE’s (2.21)-(2.22), each of dimension n+ 1, and a fixed point λ ∈ Rn. We
will show later in Section 2.7 that these strategies converge to an exact Nash equilibrium as
the number of agents increases to infinity. We summarize the differences between the exact
and approximate Nash equilibria in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Degenerate non-cooperative DCDC: exact and approximate Nash strategies
Exact Nash Approximate Nash
Computation Solve an ODE of Solve an ODE of
dimension n2N + lN(nN + 1). dimension n2 + ln,
and a fixed point λ ∈ Rn.
Implementation Each agent needs to know Each agent needs to know
its state and the initial its state and P0.
states of the others.
2.5.3 Full characterization of the limiting game
Theorem 4 constructs a one-to-one map between the infinite population Nash equilibria and
the fixed points of F . This allows in some cases, for example the Gaussian binary choice case
below, to derive sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of fixed points of F (equivalently,
the uniqueness of infinite population Nash equilibria) to hold.
Gaussian binary choice case
We assume here that the number of alternatives is two (l = 2) and the initial distribution
P0 is Gaussian with mean µ0 and variance matrix Σ0. For any n × n matrix Σ such that
β′12Σβ12 <
(
ξ12(p1 − p2)
)2
/2pi, we define
a(Σ) = δ12 + ξ12p2 −
√
log ξ12(p1 − p2)− 12 log 2piβ
′
12Σβ12
√
2β′12Σβ12
b(Σ) = δ12 + ξ12p1 +
√
log ξ12(p1 − p2)− 12 log 2piβ
′
12Σβ12
√
2β′12Σβ12
S(Σ) =
{
µ ∈ Rn,
(
β′12 − θ12
)
µ ∈ (a(Σ), b(Σ))
}
,
(2.55)
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where β12, δ12, θ12 and ξ12 are defined in the proof of point (ii) of Theorem 4.
Corollary 1. F has a unique fixed point if one of the following conditions is satisfied
(i) β′12Σ0β12 ≥
(
ξ12(p1 − p2)
)2
/2pi.
(ii) β′12Σ0β12 <
(
ξ12(p1 − p2)
)2
/2pi and µ0 /∈ S(Σ0).
Proof. The generic agents’ initial state x(0) is distributed according to a Gaussian distribu-
tion N (µ0,Σ0). Therefore, β′12x(0) has a normal distribution N
(
β′12µ0, β
′
12Σ0β12
)
. Thus, one
can analyze the dependence of
[
F (α, 1−α)
]
1
−α on α to show that this function has a unique
zero in [0, 1] in case (i) or (ii) holds. Indeed, in both cases, the sign of the derivative with
respect to α of
[
F (α, 1− α)
]
1
− α does not change. As a result, this function is monotonic,
and F has a unique fixed point.
Corollary 1 states that in the Gaussian binary choice case, if the initial distribution of the
agents has enough spread, then the agents make their choices in a unique way. On the other
hand, if the uncertainty in their initial positions is low enough and the mean of population
is inside the region S(Σ0) (a region delimited by two parallel hyperplanes), then the agents
can split between the alternatives in multiple ways.
The map F characterizes also the way the agents split between the alternatives. Indeed, if
λ = (λ1, . . . , λl) is a fixed point of F , and the agents are optimally responding to x¯λ, then
the Law of large numbers (Durrett, 2010) implies that P−a.s. lim
N→∞
∑N
i=1 1Dj(x¯λ)(xi(0)) =
E1Dj(x¯λ)(x(0)) = λj. This means that, in the limit, λj% of the agents go towards pj. In other
words, the fixed points of F are the potential probability distributions of the agents’ choices
over the alternatives.
2.5.4 Simple numerical scheme
The computation of the mean field term in the general MFG theory involves solving a forward
FP equation coupled with a backward HJB equation (Achdou and Capuzzo-Dolcetta, 2010).
In our case, however, Theorem 4 reduces this infinite dimensional problem to the computation
of a fixed point for the finite dimensional map F . This map is a vector of probabilities of some
regions delimited by hyperplanes. Although a fixed point can be computed using Newton’s
method, this is computationally expensive as it requires the values of the inverse of the
Jacobian matrix at the root estimates. Alternatively, we use a quasi Newton method such as
Broyden’s method (Broyden, 1965). According to this method, the inverse of the Jacobian
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is estimated recursively provided that F is continuously differentiable; this will be the case
if the initial probability distribution has a continuous probability density function.
2.6 Nonuniform population with initial preferences
Hitherto, the agents’ affinities towards different potential alternatives are dictated only by
their a priori opinions (initial states) in Rn. In this section, the model is further generalized
by considering that the agents have also different tendencies towards the alternatives. When
modeling smoking decision in schools for example (Nakajima, 2007), this could represent
a teenager’s tendency towards “Smoking” or “Not Smoking”, which is the result of some
endogenous factors such as parental pressure, financial condition, health, etc. In the elections
example, it represents personal preferences that transcend party lines. Moreover, we assume
that the agents have nonuniform dynamics and costs in this section.
We consider N agents with the following nonuniform dynamics,
d
dt
xi = Aixi +Biui, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (2.56)
with random initial conditions as in Section 2.1. An agent i is associated with the following
cost functional,
Ji (ui, x¯) = E
(∫ T
0
{
‖xi − x¯‖2Qi + ‖ui‖2Ri
}
dt+ min
1≤j≤l
‖xi(T )− pj‖2Mji
)
, (2.57)
where Qi  0, Ri  0 and M ji  0.
In contrast to the final cost coefficients in (2.2), the coefficients M ji , 1 ≤ j ≤ l, in (2.57)
depend on the alternatives, to model the initial tendency. By definition, we say that a
population has a tendency to move towards pk in a first scenario stronger than that in a
second scenario, if in the absence of a social effect, the number of agents that go towards pk
in the first scenario is greater than that in the second scenario. We show in the following
lines how the tendency, according to this definition, is controlled by M ji . Explicitly, we show
that without a social effect (Qi = 0), the number of agents that go towards an alternative
pj decreases as M ji increases (all other coefficients remaining constant). Hence, the tendency
to move towards pj decreases as M ji increases. To simplify the argument, we consider only
the binary choice case l = 2. In the absence of a social effect, an agent i minimizes its
individual cost (2.57). Following similar arguments to those of Theorem 2, agent i goes
towards p1 if and only if the optimal cost of the LQR problem corresponding to p1 (i.e. with
cost functional equal to (2.57), but where p1 is the only available alternative) is less than
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that corresponding to p2. Now, if the coefficient M2i increases, then the optimal cost of the
LQR problem corresponding to p2 increases, and that corresponding to p1 remains constant.
Therefore, by increasing M2i , the number of agents that go towards p2 cannot increase.
As N tends to infinity, it is convenient to represent the limiting sequence of parameters of
{θi}i∈{1,...,N} = {(Ai, Bi, Qi, Ri,M1i , . . . ,M li )}i∈{1,...,N} by a random vector θ, which belongs
to a compact set Θ. We denote the empirical measure of the sequence {θi}i as PNθ (A) =
1/N ∑Ni=1 1{θi∈A} for all (Borel) measurable sets A. We assume that PNθ converges weakly to
the probability distribution Pθ of θ, that is, for all φ continuous, limN→∞
∫
Θ φ(x)dPNθ (x) =∫
Θ φ(x)dPθ(x). For further discussions about this assumption, one can refer to (Huang et al.,
2012). The initial states xi(0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N and θ are assumed independent. Moreover, an
agent i knows its initial position xi(0), its parameters θi, as well as the distributions P0 and
Pθ. The following analysis is developed for a generic agent with an initial position x(0) and
parameters θ = (Aθ, Bθ, Qθ, Rθ,M1θ , . . . ,M lθ). Assuming an infinite size population, a generic
agent optimally responds to a posited deterministic although initially unknown continuous
path x¯. Following the analysis in Section 2.3, its best response is as follows,
u∗(t, x, x¯, x(0), θ) = −B′θR−1θ
(
Γjθ(t)x+ β
j
θ(t)
)
, if x(0) ∈ Djθ(x¯), (2.58)
with Γjθ, β
j
θ and δ
j
θ are the unique solutions of the ODE’s (2.20)-(2.22), where we replace the
parameters (A,B,Q,R,M) by (Aθ, Bθ, Qθ, Rθ,M jθ ). The basins of attractions defined in the
following equation are now regions in Rn delimited by quadric surfaces that depend on x¯.
Djθ(x¯) =
{
x0 ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣12x′0
(
Γjθ(0)− Γkθ(0)
)
x0 +
(
βjθ(0)− βkθ (0)
)′
x0 + δjθ(0)− δkθ (0) ≤ 0,
∀1 ≤ k ≤ l
}
. (2.59)
The continuum of parameters, as represented by the random element θ, makes it impossible
to reduce the search for a sustainable path x¯ to a finite dimensional problem as in the uniform
population case. The existence proof for such a path relies now on an abstract Banach space
version of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, namely Schauder’s fixed point theorem (Conway,
2013).
We define the operator G : C([0, T ],Rn) → C([0, T ],Rn) that maps a path x¯ to the mean
trajectory of a generic agent that responds optimally to x¯. A sustainable path is thus a fixed
point of G. We obtain the generic agent’s optimal state by solving the linear ODE of βjθ ,
replacing the solution in (2.58) and the resulting optimal control law in (2.56). Thus, the
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optimal state is,
x∗ (t, x¯, x(0), θ) = Φjθ(0, t)′x(0) +
∫ t
0
Ψjθ(σ, t, σ, T )M
j
θpj dσ
−
∫ t
0
∫ σ
T
Ψjθ(σ, t, σ, τ)Qθx¯(τ)dτdσ, if x(0) ∈ Djθ(x¯), (2.60)
where Ψjθ(η1, η2, η3, η4) = Φ
j
θ(η1, η2)′BθR−1θ B′θΦ
j
θ(η3, η4), Π
j
θ(t) = Γ
j
θ(t)BθR−1θ B′θ −A′θ, and Φjθ
the unique solution of
dΦjθ(t, η)
dt
= Πjθ(t)Φ
j
θ(t, η) Φ
j
θ(η, η) = In. (2.61)
When deriving (2.60), we use one main property of the state transition matrix Φjθ, namely
the state transition matrix Φ˜jθ(η1, η2) of −(Πjθ)′ (i.e. solution of (2.61), where Πjθ in the right
hand side of (2.61) is replaced by −(Πjθ)′) is equal to Φjθ(η2, η1)′. For more details about the
properties of the state transition matrix, we refer the reader to (Rugh, 1996). By taking the
expectation on both sides of (2.60), we get the following expression of the operator G. For
all x¯ ∈ C([0, T ],Rn),
G(x¯) = Ex∗ (t, x¯, x(0), θ) =
l∑
j=1
∫
Θ
∫
Rn
1Dj
θ
(x¯)(x0)
{
Φjθ(0, t)′x0 +
∫ t
0
Ψjθ(σ, t, σ, T )M
j
θpj dσ
−
∫ t
0
∫ σ
T
Ψjθ(σ, t, σ, τ)Qθx¯(τ)dτdσ
}
dP0(x0)dPθ(θ), (2.62)
where the second inequality follows from Fubini-Tonelli’s theorem (Rudin, 1987). Theorem
5 below states that there exists a fixed point of G, i.e. a sustainable mean trajectory x¯. We
prove the result via Schauder’s fixed point theorem, which requires the boundedness of G
on bounded subsets of its domain, and its continuity. These are guaranteed by the following
two assumptions respectively.
Assumption 4. We assume that
√
max(k1 + k2, k3)T < pi/2, where
k1 = E‖x(0)‖ ×
 l∑
j=1
max
(θ,t)∈Θ×[0,T ]
‖Φjθ(0, t)‖

k2 =
l∑
j=1
max
(θ,t)∈Θ×[0,T ]
∥∥∥∥∥
∫ t
0
Ψjθ(σ, t, σ, T )M
j
θpjdσ
∥∥∥∥∥
k3 =
l∑
j=1
max
(θ,t,σ,τ)∈Θ×[0,T ]3
‖Ψjθ(σ, t, σ, τ)Qθ‖.
(2.63)
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Since Θ and [0, T ] are compact and Φjθ is continuous with respect to time and parameter θ,
k1, k2 and k3 are well defined. Noting that the left hand side of the inequality tends to zero
as T goes to zero, Assumption 4 can be satisfied for a short time horizon T for example.
Assumption 5. We assume that the P0−measure of quadric surfaces in Rn is zero.
Similar to Assumption 3, Assumption 5 is satisfied when P0 is absolutely continuous with
respect to the Lebesgue measure for example.
Theorem 5 (Sustainable mean trajectories, nonuniform agents). Under Assumptions 4 and
5, G has at least one fixed point.
Proof. We show the result by Schauder’s fixed point theorem (Conway, 2013), which states
that if G is a compact operator from the Banach space
(
C([0, T ],Rn), ‖.‖∞
)
into itself, and
there exists a nonempty, bounded, closed and convex subset U of
(
C([0, T ],Rn), ‖.‖∞
)
, such
that G(U) ⊂ U , then G has at least one fixed point in U . G is a compact operator means that
it is continuous and maps bounded sets to relatively compact sets. To show the continuity,
let x¯ ∈ C([0, T ],Rn) and {x¯k}k∈N be a sequence converging to x¯ in
(
C([0, T ],Rn), ‖.‖∞
)
. Let
Cj > max
(θ,t)∈Θ×[0,T ]2
‖Φjθ(t)‖+ max(θ,t)∈Θ×[0,T ]4 ‖Ψ
j
θ(t)‖+ max
θ∈Θ
‖θ‖. (2.64)
Then,
‖G(x¯k)−G(x¯)‖∞ ≤
l∑
j=1
Cj
{
Cj‖x¯k − x¯‖∞ + V1j + Cj‖pj‖T + Cj‖x¯‖∞T 2V2j
}
, (2.65)
where V1j =
∫
Θ
∫
Rn
∣∣∣∣1Dj
θ
x¯k)(x0)− 1Djθ(x¯)(x0)
∣∣∣∣‖x0‖dP0(x0)dPθ(θ)
V2j =
∫
Θ
∫
Rn
∣∣∣∣1Dj
θ
(x¯k)(x0)− 1Djθ(x¯)(x0)
∣∣∣∣dP0(x0)dPθ(θ).
Under Assumption 5, we get that
V1j =
∫
Θ
∫
Rn
∣∣∣∣1 ◦
D
j
θ(x¯k)
(x0)− 1 ◦
D
j
θ(x¯)
(x0)
∣∣∣∣‖x0‖dP0(x0)dPθ(θ). (2.66)
But,
∣∣∣∣∣1 ◦Djθ(x¯k)(x0)− 1 ◦Djθ(x¯)(x0)
∣∣∣∣∣ ‖x0‖ ≤ 2‖x0‖ and converges to zero for all (x0, θ) in Rn × Θ.
Moreover, E‖x(0)‖ <∞. Therefore, by Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem (Rudin,
1987), V1j converges to zero. Similarly, V2j converges to zero. Hence, G is continuous.
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Let V be a bounded subset of C([0, T ],Rn). We show via Arzela-Ascoli Theorem that the
closure of G(V ) is compact, which along with the continuity of G imply that this operator is
compact. Let {G(x¯k)}k∈N ∈ G(V ). By the continuity of Φjθ(σ, t) with respect to (σ, t, θ), of
its derivative with respect to t and σ, and by the boundedness of x¯k, one can prove that for
all (t, s) in [0, T ]2,
‖G(x¯k)(t)−G(x¯k)(s)‖ ≤
(
K1E‖x(0)‖+K2
)
|t− s|, (2.67)
where K1 and K2 are positive constants. This inequality implies the uniform boundedness
and equicontinuity of {G(x¯k)}k∈N. By Arzela-Ascoli Theorem (Conway, 2013), there exists
a convergent subsequence of {G(x¯k)}k∈N. Hence, G(V ) and its closure are compact sets.
It remains to construct a nonempty, bounded, closed, convex subset U ⊂ C([0, T ],Rn) such
that G(U) ⊂ U . Let C = max(k1 + k2, k3), where k1, k2 and k3 are defined in (2.63). Hence,
‖G(x¯)(t)‖ ≤ C + C ∫ t0 ∫ Tσ ‖x¯(τ)‖dτdσ. We consider the following set
U =
{
x¯ ∈ C([0, T ],Rn)| ‖x¯(t)‖ ≤ R(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
}
, (2.68)
where R is a continuous positive function on [0, T ] to be determined later. U is an nonempty,
bounded, closed and convex subset of C([0, T ],Rn). If we can find an R positive such that
R(t) = C + C
∫ t
0
∫ T
σ R(τ)dτdσ, for all t ∈ [0, T ], then for all x¯ ∈ U , we obtain that
‖G(x¯)(t)‖ ≤ C + C
∫ t
0
∫ T
σ
R(τ)dτdσ = R(t), (2.69)
and G(U) ⊂ U . Hence, It remains to find such R. Note that the equality in (2.69) is equiv-
alent to the second order differential equation d2R
dt2 = −CR, with the boundary conditions,
R(0) = C and dR
dt
(T ) = 0. Thus, R(t) = C/ cos(
√
Ct), which is positive under Assumption
4. By finding R, U is well defined. This proves the result.
Note that if T goes to zero, the costs become decoupled, and each agent will choose the “clos-
est” alternative in the minimum energy sense. It is then expected that a Nash equilibrium
exists in this case. Assumption 4 gives an upper bound on the time horizon T under which
one can prove that such an equilibrium continues to exist.
Remark 3. If the parameters take a finite number of values, i.e. Θ is a finite set, then we
can relax Assumption 4 and construct a one to one map between the sustainable paths and
the fixed points of a finite dimensional map. For more details about this case, we refer the
reader to Chapter 3 below.
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2.7 Approximate Nash equilibrium
We develop in Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.6 a set of Nash strategies for a continuum of agents.
These strategies are given by (2.23) in the uniform population case, and (2.58) in the nonuni-
form case. This section shows that these strategies, when applied by a finite number of agents,
constitute an −Nash equilibrium (see Chapter 1, Definition 1), where  goes to zero as the
number of agents increases to infinity. This equilibrium makes the group’s behavior robust
in the face of potential selfish behaviors. Indeed, unilateral deviations from the associated
control policies are guaranteed to yield negligible cost reductions when the size of the group
increases sufficiently.
Theorem 6 (−Nash equilibrium). When applied by a finite number N of agents, the strate-
gies defined by (2.23) (resp. (2.58)) for a sustainable mean trajectory x¯ constitute an N -Nash
equilibrium in the set U (2.3) with respect to the costs (2.2) (resp. (2.57)), where N goes to
zero as N increases to infinity.
Proof. Since the uniform population problem is a special case of the nonuniform one, we
prove only the latter. Consider an arbitrary agent i ∈ {1, ..., N} in a population of N agents.
Suppose that agent i applies an arbitrary control law ui ∈ U , while the rest of the agents apply
the mean field based control law defined by (2.58). That is, an agent k 6= i of parameters
θk = (Ak, Bk, Qk, Rk,M1k , . . . ,M lk) implements the control law u∗(t, x, x¯, xk(0), θk) where x¯ is
a fixed point of G defined in (2.62). x∗(t, x¯, xk(0), θk) defined in (2.60) is the corresponding
optimal state. In the following, xi denotes the state of agent i under its control input ui,
x¯
(N)
−i (t) = 1N
∑N
k=1,k 6=i x∗(t, x¯, xk(0), θk) + 1N xi(t) the average of the population when agent i
applies ui, and x¯(N)(t) = 1N
∑N
k=1 x∗(t, x¯, xk(0), θk) the average of the population when all the
agents apply (2.58).
Assume that agent i can profit by a unilateral deviation from the decentralized strategies
(2.58). This means that
Ji
(
ui, x¯
(N)
−i
)
≤ Ji
(
u∗(x∗(t, x¯, xi(0), θi), x¯(N)
)
, (2.70)
where Ji is defined by (2.57). We show in the following that this potential cost improvement
is bounded by some N that converges to zero as N increases to infinity. In view of (2.57), the
compactness of Θ, the continuity of x∗ with respect to θ, and E‖xk(0)‖2 <∞, the right hand
side of (2.70) is bounded by C1 > 0 independently of N . Hence, E
∫ T
0 {‖xi‖2 +‖ui‖2}dt < C2,
where C2 does not depend on N . We decompose the cost Ji(ui, x¯(N)−i ) as follows,
Ji
(
ui, x¯
(N)
−i
)
= Ji(ui, x¯) + S1 + S2 + S3 + S4, (2.71)
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with
S1 =
1
2N2E
∫ T
0
‖xi − x∗(t, x¯, xi(0), θi)‖2Qidt+
1
N
E
∫ T
0
(x∗(t, x¯, xi(0), θi)− xi)′Qi(xi − x¯)dt
S2 =
1
N
E
∫ T
0
(x∗(t, x¯, xi(0), θi)− xi)′Qi
(
x¯− x¯(N)
)
dt (2.72)
S3 = E
∫ T
0
(
x¯− x¯(N)
)′
Qi(xi − x¯)dt+ E
∫ T
0
∥∥∥x¯− x¯(N)∥∥∥2
Qi
dt,
where x¯ is a fixed point of G. By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
|S1| ≤
max
θi∈Θ
|Qi|
N
(
E
∫ T
0
‖x∗(t, x¯, xi(0), θi)− xi‖2dt
) 1
2
(
E
∫ T
0
‖xi − x¯‖2dt
) 1
2
+
max
θi∈Θ
|Qi|
N2
E
∫ T
0
‖x∗(t, x¯, xi(0), θi)− xi‖2dt. (2.73)
In view of C1 and C2,
(
E
∫ T
0 ‖x∗(t, x¯, xi(0), θi)− xi‖2dt
) 1
2 and
(
E
∫ T
0 ‖xi − x¯‖2dt
) 1
2 are bounded.
Thus, |S1| ≤ η1/N , where η1 > 0. Similarly, |S2| ≤ η2/N , where η2 > 0. In the remain-
ing of the proof, we show that E
∫ T
0
∥∥∥x¯− x¯(N)∥∥∥2 dt converges to zero as N goes to infinity.
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality implies then that S3 and
∣∣∣Ji(u∗(t, x, x¯, xi(0), θi), x¯)− Ji (u∗(t, x, x¯, xi(0), θi), x¯(N))∣∣∣ =∣∣∣∣∣E
∫ T
0
(
x¯− x¯(N)
)′
Qi
(
2x∗(t, x¯, xi(0), θi)− x¯− x¯(N)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣∣ (2.74)
converge to 0 as N increases to infinity. Moreover, the optimality implies that
Ji(u∗(t, x¯, xi(0), θi), x¯) ≤ Ji(ui, x¯). (2.75)
Therefore,
Ji
(
ui, x¯
(N)
−i
)
≥ Ji
(
u∗(t, x¯, xi(0), θi), x¯(N)
)
+ N , (2.76)
where
N = Ji(u∗(t, x¯, xi(0), θi), x¯)− Ji
(
u∗(t, x¯, xi(0), θi), x¯(N)
)
+ S1 + S2 + S3 (2.77)
converges to 0 as N increases to infinity. Thus, it remains to show that E
∫ T
0
∥∥∥x¯− x¯(N)∥∥∥2 dt
converges to zero as N goes to infinity. We define
αN =
(∫ T
0
∥∥∥x¯− Ex¯(N)∥∥∥2 dt) 12 = (∫ T
0
(∫
Θ
x¯θ dPθ(θ)−
∫
Θ
x¯θ dPNθ (θ)
)
dt
) 1
2
, (2.78)
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where x¯θ = E(x∗|θ), with the optimal state x∗ is defined in (2.60). But,
E
∫ T
0
∥∥∥x¯− x¯(N)∥∥∥2 dt ≤ 2α2N + 2E ∫ T0
∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
k=1
(
Ex∗(t, x¯, xk(0), θk)− x∗(t, x¯, xk(0), θk)
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
dt.
(2.79)
By the compactness of [0, T ]×Θ, the family of functions x¯θ(t) defined on Θ and indexed by
t is uniformly bounded and equicontinuous. Corollary 1.1.5 of (Stroock and Varadhan, 1979)
implies that
lim
N→+∞
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∥∥∥∥x¯(t)− 1N
N∑
k=1
Ex∗(t, x¯, xk(0), θk)
∥∥∥∥ = 0. (2.80)
Thus, αN converges to 0 as N increases to infinity. By the independence of the initial
conditions, and thus the independence of x∗(t, x¯, xk(0), θk), k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we obtain that
E
∫ T
0
∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
k=1
(
Ex∗(t, x¯, xk(0), θk)− x∗(t, x¯, xk(0), θk)
)∥∥∥2dt = O(1/N). (2.81)
This proves the result.
Remark 4 (Rate of convergence of the N). Following the proof of Theorem 6, the profit
margin N of a unilateral deviant behavior converges to 0 with order O(1/
√
N) + αN , where
αN is defined by (2.78). The rate of convergence of αN depends on the rate of convergence
of the finite population parameters distribution PNθ to the infinite population one Pθ. In case
of a uniform population, the parameters set Θ is a singleton {θ0}, and the distributions PNθ
and Pθ are equal to the point mass distribution at θ0. Hence, αN is identically zero in this
case.
Remark 5 (Deterministic initial conditions). One could assume that the initial conditions
xi(0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are deterministic. In this case, the initial states’ empirical measure
is assumed to have a weak limit, known to all the agents. Noting that the optimal control
law (2.58) is continuous with respect to the parameters, and discontinuous in the initial
condition, considering the initial states as deterministic requires a special treatment to deal
with the discontinuity and prove (2.80). For more details about this case, we refer the reader
to Chapter 4.
2.8 Simulation results
We illustrate in this section the degenerate non-cooperative DCDC problem via a numerical
example. We consider 300 agents with initial positions in R2 drawn from the Gaussian
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distribution N (0, 5I2). These agents choose between the alternatives p1 = (−39.3,−10),
p2 = (−27, 9.5) or p3 = (0, 40). They have uniform dynamics (2.1) and costs (2.2), where
A =
 0 1
0.2 −0.3
 , B =
 0
0.3
 , (2.82)
R = 10 and M = 6000I2. The game lasts for T = 1.3. To analyze the influence of the social
effect on the choices’ distribution, we consider four scenarios. Figure 2.2 shows the agents’
initial and final positions, and the basins of attraction (2.18) of p1, p2 and p3 for the different
scenarios.
In the first scenario, an agent makes its choice of an alternative without a social effect, i.e.
Q = 0. In this case, λ = (0.24, 0.11, 0.65) is a fixed point of F defined in (2.45). We compute
λ using the method described in Section 2.5. Without a social effect, the majority of the
agents, 65%, choose p3. These are the green stars in Figure 2.2-Q = 0. 24% choose p1
(red crosses in Figure 2.2-Q = 0), and the rest p2 (blue diamonds in Figure 2.2-Q = 0).
As the social effect increases, it incites more agents to follow the majority. In the second
scenario (Q = 8I2), for example, the size of majority increases to 80%, while in the third
one (Q = 16I2), it reaches 86.3%. In the fourth scenario, as the social effect becomes strong
enough (Q = 24I2), a consensus to follow the majority occurs. The yellow balls are the agents
that change their decisions with respect to those in the absence of a social effect. Finally,
the relation between the size of the majority and the strength of the social effect is reflected
in the shape of the basins of attraction. Indeed, Figure 2.2 shows that as the social effect
increases, the basin of attraction of p3 expends at the expenses of those of p1 and p2.
Finally, Figure 2.3 shows, for Q = 8I2, that the sustainable mean trajectory x¯λ defined in
(2.44) for the fixed point λ = (0.07, 0.13, 0.8) of F , and the average state of the 300 agents,
when they optimally respond to x¯λ, are almost identical.
2.9 Conclusion
We formulate in this chapter the degenerate non-cooperative DCDC problem as a dynamic
game with a novel class of individual costs, the min-LQG costs. To solve the game, we use
the MFG methodology and develop a set of decentralized strategies that qualify as approxi-
mate Nash strategies as the size of the population increases sufficiently. According to these
strategies, an agent chooses an alternative before it starts moving based on its initial condi-
tion. Moreover, it commits to its initial choice along the path. Afterwards, we construct a
one-to-one map between the −Nash equilibria and the fixed points of a finite dimensional
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Figure 2.2 Degenerate non-cooperative DCDC: influence of the social effect on the choices’
distribution.
map. The latter characterizes the game in terms of number of equilibria and the potential
distributions of the agents’ choices over the alternatives. Moreover, it reduces the infinite
dimensional problem of solving the mean field equations to finding a fixed point of a finite
dimensional map. The only randomness in the current formulation lies in the initial condi-
tions. In the next chapter, we extend the current model to include noise processes in the
agents’ dynamics.
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Figure 2.3 Degenerate non-cooperative DCDC: average state vs. sustainable mean for Q =
8I2.
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CHAPTER 3 NON-DEGENERATE NONCOOPERATIVE DYNAMIC
COLLECTIVE DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL
We consider in this chapter the non-degenerate non-cooperative DCDC problem, where the
agents are driven by a set of noise processes. In the robotic example of Section 1.2.4, this
would model the forces that perturb a robot’s trajectory while moving toward the potential
sites. The noise processes can also represent the unexpected events that influence a voter’s
opinion during electoral campaigns in the elections example of Section 1.2.3.
We formulate in Section 3.1 the non-cooperative non-degenerate DCDC problem as a dynamic
non-cooperative game. The agents’ dynamics are now controlled diffusion processes, and their
individual costs are similar to those in Chapter 2. Following the MFG methodology, Section
3.2 starts by considering a continuum of agents with assumed known mean trajectory. In
order to compute its best response to this trajectory, a generic agent solves a non-degenerate
min-LQG optimal tracking problem. We derive an explicit solution of this problem, and show
that an agent faces a continuously revised discrete choice problem (McFadden, 1974), where
the costs include a term penalizing myopic decisions. The problem of finding a sustainable
mean trajectory is considered in Section 2.4. As in the degenerate case, we construct a
one-to-one map between the sustainable mean trajectories and the fixed points of a finite
dimensional map. The latter are the potential probability distributions of the agents’ choices
over the alternatives. We derive conditions for the existence of a sustainable mean trajectory
to hold. In section 3.4, we discuss the results and contributions of this Chapter. Finally,
Section 3.5 illustrates the non-degenerate DCDC problem by some numerical results, and
Section 3.6 concludes this chapter.
3.1 Mathematical model
We model the non-degenerate non-cooperative DCDC problem as a stochastic dynamic non-
cooperative game involving a large number N of agents with the following dynamics,
dxi(t) = (Aixi(t) +Biui(t)) dt+ σidwi(t), (3.1)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , where Ai ∈ Rn×n, Bi ∈ Rn×m, σi ∈ Rn×n, and {wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are N
independent Brownian motions in Rn on a probability space (Ω,F ,P, {Ft}t∈[0,T ]). {Ft}t∈[0,T ]
is the augmented filtration of {σ(xi(0), wi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ N)}t∈[0,T ] (Karatzas and
Shreve, 2012, Section 2.7), where xi(0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are the initial states assumed i.i.d. with
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finite second moments E‖xi(0)‖2 <∞, and also independent of {wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}. We assume
that σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are invertible. In the remainder of this chapter,M([0, T ],Rn) denotes the
set of progressively measurable Rn-valued functions with respect to the filtration {Ft}t∈[0,T ].
The vector xi(t) ∈ Rn is the state of agent i at time t and ui(t) ∈ Rm its control input. Each
agent is associated with the following min-LQG individual cost functional:
Ji (ui, x¯) = E
(∫ T
0
{
‖xi − x¯‖2Qi + ‖ui‖2Ri
}
dt+ min
1≤j≤l
‖xi(T )− pj‖2Mi
)
, (3.2)
where pj ∈ Rn, 1 ≤ j ≤ l, are the l alternatives, T > 0, Qi  0, Ri  0 and Mi  0.
The agents are cost coupled through their average state trajectory x¯ = 1/N ∑Ni=1 xi. For a
detailed discussion about the min-LQG cost, we refer the reader to Section 2.1.
We assume a population of k types of agents, that is, the vector of individual parameters
θi := (Ai, Bi, σi, Qi, Ri,Mi) takes values in a finite set {Θ1, . . . ,Θk}, which does not de-
pend on the size of the population N . The empirical probability measure of the sequence
{θi}i=1,...,N is denoted by PNθ (Θs) = 1/N
∑N
i=1 1{θi=Θs} for s = 1, . . . , k. We assume that
(PNθ (Θ1), . . . , PNθ (Θk)) converges to Pθ = (α1, . . . , αk), as N → ∞, where αs > 0 for all
1 ≤ s ≤ k.
For each agent, the set of admissible control laws is defined as follows:
U =
{
u ∈M([0, T ],Rm)
∣∣∣∣ E ∫ T0 ‖u(s)‖2ds <∞
}
. (3.3)
The set of admissible Markov policies is
L =
{
u ∈ (Rm)[0,T ]×Rn|∃L1 > 0,∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, ‖u(t, x)‖ ≤ L1(1 + ‖x‖), and
∀r > 0,∀T ′ ∈ (0, T ),∃L2 > 0,∀‖(x, y)‖ ≤ r, t ∈ [0, T ′], ‖u(t, x)− u(t, y)‖ ≤ L2‖x− y‖
}
.
(3.4)
If u ∈ L, then the stochastic differential equation (SDE) (3.1), with ui equal to u(t, xi),
has a unique strong solution (Karatzas and Shreve, 2012, Section 5.2). As shown below
in Theorem 12, the mean field based strategies form −Nash equilibria with respect to the
space of admissible actions U . Moreover, these strategies can be expressed as Markov policies
(feedback policies), see (3.42).
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3.2 The min-LQG optimal control problem and the generic agent’s best re-
sponse
Following the MFG methodology, we start by assuming a continuum of agents, with de-
terministic mean trajectory x¯, which is supposed known in this section. The problem of
determining x¯ is treated in Section 3.3. In order to compute its best response to x¯, a generic
agent of state x, control input u and parameters θ = (A,B, σ,Q,R,M) ∈ {Θ1, . . . ,Θk} solves
the following non-degenerate min-LQG optimal control problem:
inf
u∈U
J (u, x¯, x(0)) = inf
u∈U
E
(∫ T
0
{
‖x− x¯‖2Q + ‖u‖2R
}
dt+ min
1≤j≤l
‖x(T )− pj‖2M
∣∣∣∣x(0)
)
s.t. dx(t) = (Ax(t) +Bu(t)) dt+ σdw(t),
(3.5)
where w is a Brownian motion in Rn on the probability space (Ω,F ,P) and x(0) is a random
vector distributed according to the known distribution of the agents’ initial states. The
optimal cost-to-go function of (3.5) satisfies the following HJB equation (Fleming and Soner,
2006):
−∂V
∂t
= x′A′∂V
∂x
− 12
(
∂V
∂x
)′
BR−1B′
∂V
∂x
+ 12Tr
(
σ′
∂2V
∂x2
σ
)
+ ‖x− x¯‖2Q
V (T, x) = min
1≤j≤l
‖x− pj‖2M , ∀x ∈ Rn.
(3.6)
To solve (3.6) explicitly, we follow two strategies of Polya’s second principle “devise a plan”
(Pólya, 1957), namely, “consider special cases” and “guess and check”. Indeed, we start
in Section 3.2.1 by considering the scalar (n = m = 1) binary choice (l = 2) case with
A = Q = 0. In this special case, the Hopf-Cole transformation transforms (3.6) into a heat
equation, for which one can drive an explicit solution. Then, we propose in Section 3.2.2 a
general form of this solution and show that it is indeed the unique solution of (3.6) in the
general case.
3.2.1 Scalar binary choice case with A = Q = 0
We assume in this section that n = m = 1, l = 2 and A = Q = 0. In this case, the following
generalized Hopf-Cole transformation (Evans, 1998, Chapter 4, Section 4.4)
ψ(t, x) = exp
(
− B
2
σ2R
V (t, x)
)
(3.7)
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transforms the HJB equation (3.6) to the following heat equation,
∂ψ
∂t
= −σ
2
2
∂2ψ
∂x2
ψ(T, x) = exp
(
−MB
2
2σ2R minj=1,2(x− pj)
2
)
, ∀x ∈ R.
(3.8)
Without loss of generality, we assume that p1 < p2. This heat equation has a unique solution
(Evans, 1998, Section 2.3, Theorem 1)
ψ(t, x) = 1
σ
√
2pi(T − t)
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
− (x− y)
2
2σ2(T − t)
)
ψ(T, y)dy
= 1
σ
√
2pi(T − t)

∫ c
−∞
exp
(
− (x− y)
2
2σ2(T − t) −
MB2
2σ2R(y − p1)
2
)
dy
+
∫ ∞
c
exp
(
− (x− y)
2
2σ2(T − t) −
MB2
2σ2R(y − p2)
2
)
dy
,
(3.9)
where c = (p1 + p2)/2. With the current form (3.9) of the solution, it is hard to guess what
the general solution will look like. Hence, we derive in the remainder of this section another
form of (3.9). In the degenerate case, the optimal control law of the min-LQG problem (2.23)
is expressed in terms of the optimal policies and costs of the LQR problems (2.19) that a
generic agent faces when one the alternative is available. This suggests to write the solution
(3.9) in terms of the following LQG problems,
inf
u∈U
J j (u, x(0)) = inf
u∈U
E
(∫ T
0
R
2 u
2dt+ M2 (x(T )− pj)
2
∣∣∣∣x(0)
)
s.t. dx(t) = Bu(t)dt+ σdw(t),
(3.10)
for j = 1, 2. Recall that the optimal cost-to-go V j and optimal control law uj∗ of (3.10)
are (Yong and Zhou, 1999, Chapter 6) V j(t, x) = 12Γ(t)x
2 + βj(t)x + δj(t) and uj∗(t, x) =
−B
R
(Γ(t)x+ βj(t)), where Γ, βj and δj are equal to
Γ(t) = MR
R +MB2(T − t)
βj(t) = − MRpj
R +MB2(T − t)
δj(t) =
MRp2j
2 (R +MB2(T − t)) +
σ2R
2B2
(
log
(
R +MB2(T − t)
)
− logR
)
.
(3.11)
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By expanding the integrands in (3.9) and completing the squares, we get for j = 1, 2,
(x− y)2
2σ2(T − t) +
MB2
2σ2R(y − pj)
2 = B
2
2σ2RΓ(t)x
2 + B
2
σ2R
βj(t)x+
MB2p2j
2σ2(R +MB2(T − t))
+ R +MB
2(T − t)
2σ2R(T − t)
(
y − xR +MB
2pj(T − t)
R +MB2(T − t)
)2
. (3.12)
Using these expressions in the integrands of (3.9) and making a change of variable
zj =
√
R +MB2(T − t)
R
(
y − xR +MB
2pj(T − t)
R +MB2(T − t)
)
, (3.13)
for j = 1, 2, we get
ψ(t, x) = exp
(
− B
2
σ2R
V 1(t, x)
)
P
σw(T − t) ≤ (c− x)r +MB2(T − t)d√
R2 +MB2R(T − t)

+ exp
(
− B
2
σ2R
V 2(t, x)
)
P
σw(T − t) ≥ (c− x)R−MB2(T − t)d√
R2 +MB2R(T − t)
 ,
(3.14)
where d = (p2 − p1)/2.
In the following, we characterize the probabilities in (3.14). The optimal state xj∗ of (3.10)
satisfies the linear SDE in (3.10), where u is replaced by the linear feedback uj∗. After calcu-
lation, conditioning on {x1∗(t) = x}, x1∗(T ) is distributed according to the normal distribution
(Karatzas and Shreve, 2012, page 354)
N
(
xR +MB2(T − t)p1
R +MB2(T − t) ,
σ2R(T − t)
R +MB2(T − t)
)
. (3.15)
Thus,
P
σw(T − t) ≤ (c− x)R +MB2(T − t)d√
R2 +MB2R(T − t)
 = P(x1∗(T ) ≤ c∣∣∣∣x1∗(t) = x) . (3.16)
Similarly, one can show that
P
σw(T − t) ≥ (c− x)R−MB2(T − t)d√
R2 +MB2R(T − t)
 = P(x2∗(T ) ≥ c∣∣∣∣x2∗(t) = x) . (3.17)
We summarize the above discussion in the following Theorem.
Theorem 7. In the scalar binary choice case with A = Q = 0, the HJB equation (3.6) has
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a unique solution
V (t, x) = −σ
2R
B2
log
[
exp
(
− B
2
σ2R
V 1(t, x)
)
P
(
x1∗(T ) ≤ c
∣∣∣∣x1∗(t) = x)
+ exp
(
− B
2
σ2R
V 2(t, x)
)
P
(
x2∗(T ) ≥ c
∣∣∣∣x2∗(t) = x)
]
,
(3.18)
where V j, for j = 1, 2, are the optimal cost-to-go functions of the standard LQG optimal
control problems (3.10), and xj∗, for j = 1, 2, are the corresponding optimal states.
3.2.2 General case
In this section, we propose an extension of (3.18), and show that it is indeed the unique
solution of (3.6) in the general case. Moreover, we derive in this section an explicit formula
for the min-LQG optimal control law.
The following notation is used in the remainder of this chapter. We define xj∗, uj∗ and V j
to be the optimal state trajectory, optimal control law and optimal cost-to-go of the LQG
tracking problem that the generic agent solves when pj is the only available alternative, that
is, (3.5) with pk = pj, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ l. Recall that (Yong and Zhou, 1999, Chapter 6)
V j(t, x) = 12x
′Γ(t)x+ x′βj(t) + δj(t) (3.19)
uj∗(t, x) = −R−1B′
(
Γ(t)x+ βj(t)
)
(3.20)
dxj∗(t) =
(
Axj∗(t) +Buj∗
(
t, xj∗(t)
))
dt+ σdwj(t), (3.21)
where Γ, βj and δj are the unique solutions of
d
dt
Γ(t) = Γ(t)BR−1B′Γ(t)− A′Γ(t)− Γ(t)A−Q, Γ(T ) = M,
d
dt
βj(t) = −
(
A−BR−1B′Γ(t)
)′
βj(t) +Qx¯(t), βj(T ) = −Mpj, (3.22)
d
dt
δj(t) = 12β
j(t)′BR−1B′βj(t)− 12Tr(σ
′Γ(t)σ)− ‖x¯(t)‖2Q, δj(T ) = ‖pj‖2M .
Remark 6. The final cost in (3.5) is non-smooth. Hence, the corresponding HJB equation
(3.6) and its transformed parabolic equation (3.40) below have non-smooth terminal condi-
tions. However, as shown later in Lemma 3, these partial differential equations (PDE’s)
smooth out their solutions, i.e., the only non-smoothness occurs at the terminal time. Hence,
all the PDE solutions in the remaining sections are to be understood in the strong sense.
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The term P(x1∗(T ) ≤ c|x1∗(t) = x) (resp. P(x2∗(T ) ≥ c|x2∗(t) = x)) in (3.18) is the probability
that an agent applying uj∗ is at time T closer to p1 than p2 (resp. p2 than p1), given that its
current state is equal to x. To extend these conditional probabilities to the multidimensional
multiple choice case, we define, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , l}, Wj the Voronoi cell associated with pj.
That is, Wj = {x ∈ Rn, such that, ‖x − pj‖M ≤ ‖x − pk‖M ,∀1 ≤ k ≤ l}. The generalized
versions of these conditional probabilities are thus defined as follows,
gj(t, x) := P
(
xj∗(T ) ∈ Wj
∣∣∣∣xj∗(t) = x) , (3.23)
where xj∗ defined in (3.21) is the optimal state of the LQG problem that corresponds to pj.
As in the special case, we linearize the HJB equation (3.6) using a generalized Hopf-Cole
transformation, see proof of Theorem 8 below. In the multidimensional case, however, we
make the following assumption.
Assumption 6 (Control efficiency / noise intensity isotropy). We assume that there exists
a scalar η > 0, such that, BR−1B′ = ησσ′.
Remark 7. Note the following:
i. Suppose that n = m, A = Q = 0, B = diag(b1, . . . , bn), R = diag(r1, . . . , rn) and
σ = diag(σ1, . . . , σn). σj is the intensity of the noise in the j−th direction. The control
variable acts on the state in the j−th direction through the coefficient bj, and the cost
of this action in the same direction is evaluated through the coefficient rj. Hence, the
ratio b2j/rj measures the efficiency of the control variable in the j−th direction. Following
these interpretations, Assumption 6 requires the ratio of the control efficiency to the noise
intensity be identical in all the directions. In other words, it imposes a sort of isotropy
on the ratio “control efficiency / noise intensity”.
ii. Assumption 6 always holds in the scalar case (n = m = 1).
iii. If η exists, then it is strictly positive.
iv. If η exists, since we assumed that σ is invertible, so is BR−1B′, and thus ker B′ = {0}.
In particular, the dimension of the control space is greater or equal to that of the state
space (m ≥ n). Then we must choose R = 1
η
B′(σσ′)−1B, for some η > 0.
v. Assumption 6 is satisfied in particular if B = R = σ = In, a situation that has been
studied previously in the context of other mean-field games (with A = 0) using the Hopf-
Cole transformation, see (Gomes et al., 2016, Chapter 2) and the references therein.
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We now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 8 (Min-LQG optimal cost-to-go). Under Assumption 6, the HJB equation (3.6)
has a unique solution (t, x) 7→ V (t, x) in C1,2([0, T )× Rn) ∩ C([0, T ]× Rn), defined as
V (t, x) = −1
η
log
 l∑
j=1
exp
(
−ηV j(t, x)
)
gj(t, x)
 ,∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn
V (T, x) = min
j=1,...,l
‖x− pj‖2M , ∀x ∈ Rn,
(3.24)
where V j and xj∗ are defined in (3.19) and (3.21).
Before proving Theorem 8, we need some preliminary results. We start with a technical
Lemma on the mean-square convergence of random variables.
Lemma 2. Let I be a closed subset of Rn. Let Xk ∈ Rn be a sequence of random variables
with finite first and second moments. If E[Xk] =: µk → µ for some vector µ not in I, and
E[‖Xk − µk‖2]→ 0, then lim
k→∞
P (Xk ∈ I) = 0.
Proof. I ⊂ Rn is a closed set and µ /∈ I, so the distance d between µ and I is strictly positive.
Since, µk converges to µ, there exists k0 > 0 such that for all k ≥ 0 and for all x in I we have
‖x− µk‖ ≥ d/2. Hence, using Chebyshev’s inequality (Durrett, 2010, Theorem 1.6.4),
P (Xk ∈ I) ≤ P (‖Xk − µk‖ ≥ d/2) ≤ 4
d2
E[‖Xk − µk‖2], (3.25)
for all k ≥ k0. The result follows since the right-hand side of the inequality is assumed to
converge to 0.
The following lemma concerns the regularity of the solution provided in Theorem 8.
Lemma 3 (Regularity of the solution). V defined in (3.24) is in C1,2([0, T )×Rn)∩C([0, T ]×
Rn).
Proof. Note that for gj defined in (3.23), we can write
gj(t, x) = P
(
xj∗(T ) ∈ Wj
∣∣∣∣xj∗(t) = x)
= 1√
|2piΣt|
∫
Wj
exp
− ∥∥∥∥∥y − φ(T, t)x+
∫ T
t
φ(T, τ)BR−1B′βj(τ)dτ
∥∥∥∥∥
2
Σ−1t
 dy
for Σt =
∫ T
t
φ(T, τ)σσ′φ(T, τ)′dτ,
(3.26)
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where xj∗, Γ and βj are defined in (3.21) and (3.22), and the matrix-valued function φ(t, s)
is the unique solution of
d
dt
φ(t, s) =
(
A−BR−1B′Γ(t)
)
φ(t, s), (3.27)
with φ(s, s) = In. The expression (3.26) follows from the fact that the solution of a linear SDE
with deterministic initial condition has a normal distribution (Karatzas and Shreve, 2012,
Section 2.5). In view of (3.24), (3.26), and Σt  0 for all t ∈ [0, T ), V is in C1,2([0, T )×Rn).
It remains to show the continuity on {T} ×Rn. We start by considering x ∈ Rn \ ∪lj=1∂Wj,
and (tk, xk) ∈ [0, T ) × Rn converging to (T, x). We have x ∈
◦W
j0
for some j0 ∈ {1, . . . , l},
and x 6∈ Wj for j 6= j0. In view of (3.26), gj(tk, xk) is the probability that a Gaussian vector
of mean φ(T, tk)xk− ∫ Ttk φ(T, τ)BR−1B′βj(τ)dτ (which converges to x with k) and covariance
Σtk (which converges to 0 with k) is in the closed set Wj. In this way, each j defines a
distinct sequence of random variables associated with the (tk, xk)’s. Now if one considers the
closed set I of Lemma 2 to be any of the closed sets Wj’s for j 6= j0 , one can conclude
from this lemma that gj(tk, xk) must converge to 0 for j 6= j0 and, as a consequence, to 1
for j = j0 since the Wj’s form a partition of the state space. Therefore, V (tk, xk) converges
to V (T, x). Thus, V is continuous on [0, T ]×
(
Rn \ ∪lj=1∂Wj
)
. Finally, consider a sequence
(tk, xk) ∈ [0, T ) × Rn converging to (T, c), with c ∈ ∪lj=1∂Wj. We show that V (tk, xk)
converges to V (T, c). Up to renumbering the Voronoi cells, we can assume without loss of
generality that c ∈ ∂Wj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i0} and c /∈ ∪lj=i0+1Wj, for some 1 ≤ i0 ≤ l. We
have,
ξ0 =
l∑
j=1
exp
(
−ηV j(tk, xk)
)
gj(tk, xk)
=
i0∑
j=1
exp
(
−ηV j(tk, xk)
)
gj(tk, xk) +
l∑
j=i0+1
exp
(
−ηV j(tk, xk)
)
gj(tk, xk). (3.28)
Since c /∈ ∪lj=i0+1Wj, one can use an argument similar to that above to show that the second
term of the right-hand side of the second equality converges to 0.
Next, let  > 0 and fix r > 0 small enough so that B(c, r) ⊂
(
∩lj=i0+1Wj
)c
. The value of r
will be determined later. The first term can be written
i0∑
j=1
exp
(
−ηV j(tk, xk)
)
gj(tk, xk) = ξ1 + ξ2, (3.29)
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where
ξ1 =
i0∑
j=1
exp
(
−ηV j(tk, xk)
)
P
(
xj∗(T ) ∈ Wj ∩B(c, r)
∣∣∣∣xj∗(tk) = xk) (3.30)
ξ2 =
i0∑
j=1
exp
(
−ηV j(tk, xk)
)
P
(
xj∗(T ) ∈ Wj \B(c, r)
∣∣∣∣xj∗(tk) = xk) . (3.31)
By Lemma 2, ξ2 converges to zero. Next, by solving the linear ODE’s of βj and δj in (3.22)
we get,
βj(t) = −φ(T, t)′Mpj +
∫ t
T
φ(s, t)′Qx¯(s)ds (3.32)
δj(t) = −12
∫ t
T
Tr(σ′Γ(τ)σ)dτ −
∫ t
T
‖x¯(τ)‖2Qdτ +
1
2p
′
jM
∫ t
T
φ(T, τ)BR−1B′φ(T, τ)′dτMpj
− p′jM
∫ t
T
∫ τ
T
φ(T, τ)BR−1B′φ(s, τ)′Qx¯(s)dsdτ (3.33)
+ 12
∫ t
T
∫ τ
T
∫ τ
T
(φ(s, τ)′Qx¯(s))′ φ(r, τ)′Qx¯(r)dsdrdτ.
By replacing (3.32)-(3.33) in the expressions (3.26) of gj and (3.19) of V j, one can show that
under Assumption 6,
ξ1 = exp (−ηV0(tk, xk))
i0∑
j=1
∫
Wj∩B(c,r)
fk(y) exp
(
η(‖y‖2M − ‖y − pj‖2M)
)
dy, (3.34)
where fk(y) is the probability density function of the Gaussian distribution of mean φ(T, tk)xk−∫ T
tk
φ(T, τ)BR−1B′β0(τ)dτ and covariance matrix Σtk , and V0 and β0 are equal to V j and βj
defined in (3.19)-(3.22) but for pj = 0. By the definition of c, ‖c− p1‖2M = · · · = ‖c− pi0‖2M .
Hence,
ξ1 = exp
(
−η(V0(tk, xk)− ‖c‖2M + ‖c− pj‖2M)
) i0∑
j=1
∫
Wj∩B(c,r)
fk(y)dy
+ exp (−ηV0(tk, xk))
i0∑
j=1
∫
Wj∩B(c,r)
fk(y)f(y)dy (3.35)
, ξ3 + ξ4,
where f(y) = exp (η(‖y‖2M − ‖y − pj‖2M))− exp (η(‖c‖2M − ‖c− pj‖2M)). V0(tk, xk) converges
to V0(T, c) = ‖c‖2M . fk converges in distribution to a point mass at c, and Wj ∩ B(c, r),
j = 1, . . . , i0, is a partition of B(c, r). Therefore, ξ3 converges to exp(−η‖c − pj‖2M) =
exp(−ηV (T, c)). f is continuous, and f(c) = 0. Hence, one can choose r small enough so
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that |f(y)| <  for all y ∈ B(c, r). Thus, |ξ4| ≤ , and lim sup
k
|ξ0 − exp(−ηV (T, c))| ≤ .
Since  is arbitrary, ξ0 converges to exp(−ηV (T, c)). This proves the result.
Proof of Theorem 8. To finish the proof of Theorem 8, it remains to show that V satisfies
the HJB equation (3.6). We define the transformations by a generalized Hopf-Cole trans-
formation (Evans, 1998, Chapter 4-Section 4.4) of V j(t, x), ψj(t, x) = exp (−ηV j(t, x)), for
j = 1, . . . , l. Recall (Yong and Zhou, 1999, Chapter 6) that the optimal cost-to-go V j satisfies
the HJB equation (3.6), but with the boundary condition equal to V j(T, x) = ‖x−pj‖2M . By
multiplying the right-hand and left-hand sides of (3.6) by −η exp (−ηV j(t, x)), one obtain
that
−∂ψ
j
∂t
=x′A′∂ψ
j
∂x
+ 12Tr
(
σ′
∂2ψj
∂x2
σ
)
− η‖x− x¯‖2Qψj
+ η exp
(
−ηV j(t, x)
) 1
2
(
∂V j
∂x
)′ (
BR−1B′ − ησσ′
) ∂V j
∂x
. (3.36)
Thus, under Assumption 6, we get
−∂ψ
j
∂t
= x′A′∂ψ
j
∂x
+ 12Tr
(
σ′
∂2ψj
∂x2
σ
)
− η‖x− x¯‖2Qψj
ψj(T, x) = exp
(
−η‖x− pj‖2M
)
, ∀x ∈ Rn. (3.37)
Define ψ(t, x) = exp (−ηV (t, x)) the transformation of V (t, x) defined in (3.24). Hence,
we have ψ(t, x) = ∑lj=1 ψj(t, x)gj(t, x). Equation (3.37), Assumption 6 and the identity
∂ψj
∂x
= −η (Γx+ βj)ψj, where Γ and βj are defined in (3.22), imply
∂ψ
∂t
+ x′A′∂ψ
∂x
+ 12Tr
(
σ′
∂2ψ
∂x2
σ
)
− η‖x− x¯‖2Qψ
=
l∑
j=1
(
∂gj
∂t
+
(
Ax−BR−1B′Γx−BR−1B′βj
)′ ∂gj
∂x
+ 12Tr
(
σ′
∂2gj
∂x2
σ
))
ψj. (3.38)
The process xj∗ satisfies the SDE (3.21). Therefore, by Kolmogorov’s backward equation
(Karatzas and Shreve, 2012, Section 5.B),
∂gj
∂t
+
(
Ax−BR−1B′Γx−BR−1B′βj
)′ ∂gj
∂x
+ 12Tr
(
σ′
∂2gj
∂x2
σ
)
= 0. (3.39)
Hence,
∂ψ
∂t
+ x′A′∂ψ
∂x
+ 12Tr
(
σ′
∂2ψ
∂x2
σ
)
− η‖x− x¯‖2Qψ = 0. (3.40)
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By multiplying the right and left-hand sides of (3.40) by 1
η
exp(ηV (t, x)), we obtain that
V (t, x) satisfies (3.6). The uniqueness of the solution follows from the regularity of V (See
Lemma 3) and the uniqueness of solutions to the uniform parabolic PDE (3.40) (Karatzas
and Shreve, 2012, Theorem 7.6).
Having solved the HJB equation related to the Min-LQG optimal control problem (3.5), we
now prove the existence of a unique optimal control law and derive an explicit formula for
this law. We define the following function:
u∗(t, x) = −R−1B′∂V
∂x
(t, x), ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn,
u∗(T, x) = 0, ∀x ∈ Rn.
(3.41)
Theorem 9 (Min-LQG optimal control law). Under Assumption 6, the following statements
hold:
(i) The function u∗ defined in (3.41) has on [0, T )× Rn the following form:
u∗(t, x) =
l∑
j=1
exp (−ηV j(t, x)) gj(t, x)∑l
k=1 exp (−ηV k(t, x)) gk(t, x)
uj∗(t, x), (3.42)
with V j, uj∗ and gj respectively defined in (3.19), (3.20) and (3.23).
(ii) u∗ is an admissible Markov policy, i.e. u∗ ∈ L defined in (3.4).
(iii) u∗ (t, x∗(t, w)) is the unique optimal control law of (3.5), where x∗(t, w) is the unique
strong solution of the SDE in (3.5) with u equal to u∗(t, x).
Proof.
(i) We have for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn,
u∗(t, x) = −R−1B′∂V
∂x
=
l∑
j=1
ψj(t, x)gj(t, x)∑l
k=1 ψ
k(t, x)gk(t, x)
uj∗(t, x)
+ 1
η
∑l
k=1 ψ
k(t, x)gk(t, x)
R−1B′
l∑
j=1
ψj(t, x)∂g
j
∂x
(t, x), (3.43)
where ψj defined in the proof of Theorem 8 is the transformation of V j by the Hopf-Cole
transformation. In the following, we show that the second summand is zero. By the
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change of variable z = y − φ(T, t)x+ ∫ Tt φ(T, τ)BR−1B′βj(τ)dτ in the expression of gj
(3.26) and Leibniz integral rule, we obtain that
∂gj
∂x
(t, x) = −φ(T, t)√
|2piΣt|
∫
∂Wj−φ(T,t)x+
∫ T
t
φ(T,τ)BR−1B′βj(τ)dτ
exp
(
−‖z‖2Σ−1t
)
~nj(z)ds(z)
(3.44)
= −φ(T, t)√
|2piΣt|
∫
∂Wj
exp
− ∥∥∥∥∥y − φ(T, t)x+
∫ T
t
φ(T, τ)BR−1B′βj(τ)dτ
∥∥∥∥∥
2
Σ−1t
~nj(y)ds(y),
where φ is defined in (3.27) and ~nj(y) is the unit normal component of ∂Wj and its
translation ∂Wj −φ(T, t)x+ ∫ Tt φ(T, τ)BR−1B′βj(τ)dτ . By replacing the expression of
βj and δj (3.32)-(3.33) in the expressions of the costs V j defined in (3.19) and in the
derivatives ∂gj
∂x
, one can show that under Assumption 6,
l∑
j=1
ψj(t, x)∂g
j
∂x
(t, x)
= K1(t, x)
l∑
j=1
∫
∂Wj
exp
(
K2(t, x, y) + η‖y − pj‖2M − η‖y‖2M
)
~nj(y)ds(y), (3.45)
where K1 and K2 are functions that do not depend on pj, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , l}. Note that
∂Wj = ∪kji=1Oi, where the disjoint subsets (up to a subset of measure zero) {Oi}kji=1 are
the common boundaries of Wj and the adjacent Voronoi cells. If Oi is the common
boundary of Wj and some adjacent Voronoi Cell Wk, then ~nj(y) = −~nk(y) for all
y ∈ Oi. Moreover, by the definition of the Voronoi cells, ‖y− pj‖M = ‖y− pk‖M for all
y ∈ Oi. Therefore, the right-hand side of (3.45) is equal to zero. This proves the first
point.
(ii) We show now that u∗ is an admissible Markov policy. In view of (3.42), the function ∂u∗∂x
is continuous on [0, T )× Rn. Therefore, the local Lipschitz condition holds. Moreover,
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, we have
‖u∗(t, x)‖ ≤
l∑
j=1
∥∥∥uj∗(t, x)∥∥∥ ≤ ‖R−1B′‖
l‖Γ‖∞‖x‖+ l∑
j=1
‖βj‖∞
 . (3.46)
Hence, the linear growth condition is satisfied and this proves the second point. As
a result, sufficient conditions are satisfied for the SDE defined in (3.5) and controlled
by u∗(t, x) to have a unique strong solution denoted x∗ (Karatzas and Shreve, 2012,
Section 5.2).
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(iii) By the verification theorem (Fleming and Soner, 2006, Theorem 4.3.1), we know that
u∗ is the unique optimal control law of (3.5) if it is the unique minimizer (up to a set of
measure 0) of the Hamiltonian H(x, ∂V
∂x
, u, t) = (Ax+Bu)′ ∂V
∂x
+ ‖x− x¯‖2Q + ‖u‖2R, and
if the cost-to-go V (t, x) has a polynomial growth in x and satisfies the HJB equation
(3.6). For the first condition, we have for Lebesgue× P-a.e (t, ξ) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω,
u∗ (t, x∗(t, ξ)) = −R−1B′∂V
∂x
(t, x∗(t, ξ)) = argmin
u∈Rn
H
(
x∗(t, ξ),
∂V
∂x
(t, x∗(t, ξ)), u, t
)
.
(3.47)
In fact, the control law defined in (3.41) minimizes H except on the set {T}×Ω, which
has a Lebesgue× P measure zero. Next, in view of (3.46) and the mean value theorem
in several variables, we have for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × Rn, ‖V (t, x)‖ ≤ K1(1 + ‖x‖2), for
some K1 > 0. Moreover, ‖V (T, x)‖ ≤ K2(1 + ‖x‖2), for some K2 > 0. Hence, for all
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn, ‖V (t, x)‖ ≤ K (1 + ‖x‖2), for some K > 0. Moreover, as established
in Theorem 3, V ∈ C1,2 ([0, T )× Rn) ∩C([0, T ]×Rn) satisfies the HJB equation (3.6).
This proves the result.
We show in the degenerate case (See Theorem 3) that the probability that an agent optimally
responding to a sustainable mean trajectory reaches an arbitrary small neighborhood of one
of the alternatives increases with M . In the following theorem, we extend this result to
the non-degenerate scalar case. The proof relies on the analysis of the scalar version of the
Riccati equation in (3.22). The extension of this analysis, and consequently the result of
Theorem 10, to the multidimensional case is left for future work.
Theorem 10 (Well-defined discrete choice problem). In the scalar case (n = m = 1), suppose
that the paths x¯ are uniformly bounded with respect to M for the norm
( ∫ T
0 |.|2dt
) 1
2
. Then,
for any  > 0,
P
 l⋂
j=1
{|x∗(T )− pj| > }
 = O( 1
2M
+ σ
2
22
logM
M
)
. (3.48)
Proof. To prove the result, it is sufficient to show that the expectation of the optimal cost
EJ∗(x(0)) ≤ K + σ22 logM , for some K > 0 independent of M . The result is then a direct
consequence of Chebyshev’s inequality
P
(
min
1≤j≤l
|x∗(T )− pj| > 
)
≤ 1
2
E min
1≤j≤l
|x∗(T )− pj|2 ≤ 2
M2
EJ∗(x(0)). (3.49)
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To prove the boundedness of the cost, we start by the special case where x¯ = 0 and pj = 0,
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l, i.e. the LQG case. In view of the expression of V j (3.19), the optimal
cost is equal to J∗(x(0)) = 12Γ(0)x
2(0) + σ22
∫ T
0 Γ(τ)dτ . We now show that Γ(0) is uniformly
bounded withM and that
∫ T
0 Γ(τ)dτ is of the order logM for largeM . To prove the uniform
boundness of Γ(0), we consider the following LQR problem,
inf
v
JM (s, v) = inf
v
∫ T
s
{
Q
2 y
2 + R2 v
2
}
dt+ M2 |y(T )|
2
s.t. dy
dt
= Ay +Bv, y(s) = 1.
(3.50)
The optimal cost is inf
v
JM (0, v) = 12Γ(0), where Γ is defined in (3.22). By the controllability
of (A,B), one can find a continuous control law v10 that does not depend on M and, such
that, the corresponding state y10 is at time T at 0. We have 12Γ(0) ≤ JM(0, v10). The right
hand side of the inequality is finite and does not depend on M . Hence, Γ(0) is uniformly
bounded w.r.t. M . We now prove that
∫ T
0 Γ(τ)dτ is of the order logM for large M . We
have for all M ≥ 1, 12Γ(s) = infv JM (s, v) ≥ infv J1 (s, v) =
1
2Γ1(s), where Γ1 is equal to Γ in
(3.22) but for M = 1. Hence, for all M ≥ 1, min
t∈[0,T ]
Γ(t) ≥ min
t∈[0,T ]
Γ1(t) := C > 0. C does not
depend on M . The last inequality follow from that fact that Γ1 is continuous and strictly
positive for all t ∈ [0, T ]. By dividing by Γ(t) on both sides of the Riccati equation in (3.22)
and integrating on [0, T ] the right and left hand sides, we get
logM − log Γ(0) = B
2
R
∫ T
0
Γ(τ)dτ − 2AT −Q
∫ T
0
1
Γ(τ)dτ. (3.51)
By the boundedness of Γ(0) and
∣∣∣∫ T0 1Γ(τ)dτ ∣∣∣ ≤ 1CT , we have ∫ T0 Γ(τ)dτ/ logM converges to 1
as M goes to infinity. Having shown the result for the special case, the case where x¯ 6= 0 and
p1 = · · · = pl = p can be proved by making the change of variables x˜ = x− p and u˜ = u+ ABp
and noting the uniform boundedness of x¯ and that
EJ∗(x(0)) ≤ E inf
u˜
E
(∫ T
0
{Qx˜2 +Ru˜2}dt+ M2 x˜
2(T )|x(0)
)
+
∫ T
0
Q(x¯− p)2dt+ RA
2T
B2
p2.
(3.52)
Finally, we conclude the general case by the following inequality
EJ∗(x(0)) ≤ E inf
u
E
(∫ T
0
{
Q
2 (x− x¯)
2 + R2 u
2
}
dt+ M2 (x(T )− p1)
2|x(0)
)
. (3.53)
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In the degenerate case, the probability that a generic agent is at time T far from the alter-
natives converges to zero with order 1/M (See Theorem 3). In case σ > 0, however, the rate
of convergence is σ2 logM/2M . Thus, to force the agents to be near the alternatives at time
T , one needs to impose a penalty on the final distances to the alternatives greater in the
presence of a noise than in its absence. This is due to the diffusive effect of the Brownian
motion.
3.3 Mean field equations
This section considers the problem of finding a sustainable mean trajectory x¯. In the re-
maining of this chapter, a subscript s refers to an agent with parameters Θs ∈ {Θ1, . . . ,Θk},
where the set of parameters is defined in Section 3.1. We write us∗(t, x, x¯) instead of us∗(t, x)
defined in (3.42) to emphasize the dependence on x¯. A sustainable mean trajectory x¯ must
satisfy the following mean field equations,
x¯(t) =
k∑
s=1
αsx¯s(t), with x¯s = E[xs∗], 1 ≤ s ≤ k,
dxs∗(t) = (Asxs∗(t) +Bsus∗ (t, xs∗(t), x¯)) dt+ σsdws(t),
(3.54)
where xs∗(0), 1 ≤ s ≤ k, are i.i.d. according to the initial distribution of the agents, i.e.,
the distribution of xi(0), αs are defined in Section 3.1 and {w1, . . . , wk} are k independent
Brownian motions, assumed independent of {x1∗(0), . . . , xk∗(0)}. The first equality follows
from the fact that the average state when the agents optimally respond to x¯ should converge
to x¯. But, the average state is equal to the weighted average of the averages of states in
each type s, 1 ≤ s ≤ k. The weight that corresponds to type s is equal to PNθ (Θs), which
is assumed to converge to αs. Moreover, by the independence of the initial conditions and
Brownian motions, the average state of the agents of type Θs converges by the strong law of
large numbers to x¯s(t).
To solve (3.54), we start as in the degenerate case by deriving an equivalent representation
of the solution via the stochastic maximum principle. It consists of two forward-backward
ODE’s (3.60)-(3.61) coupled in the boundary condition q¯(T ) through what we call a “Choice
Distribution Matrix (CDM)” Λ(x¯). A CDM Λ(x¯) is a k × l row stochastic matrix with its
(s, j) entry equal to the probability that a generic agent of type s is at time T closer (in the
sense of the M -weighted l2 norm) to pj than any of the other alternatives when it optimally
responds to x¯. Afterwards, we construct a one-to-one map between the sustainable mean
trajectories and the fixed point CDM’s of a finite dimensional map F defined in (3.68) below.
These fixed points are the potential distributions of the agents’ choices over the alternatives.
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In the remainder of this section, we adopt the following notations. Let X¯ = (x¯1, . . . , x¯k), X∗ =
(x1∗, . . . , xk∗), U∗ = (u1∗, . . . , uk∗), W = (w1, . . . , wk), and p = (p1, . . . , pl). Let A,B,Q,R,M
and σ be the block-diagonal matrices diag(A1, . . . , Ak), diag(B1, . . . , Bk), diag(Q1, . . . , Qk),
diag(R1, . . . , Rk), diag(M1, . . . ,Mk) and diag(σ1, . . . , σk) respectively. Define L = Ink − 1k ⊗
P1, where 1k is a column of k ones and P1 = P ′θ⊗ In where Pθ is defined in Section 3.1 . The
following assumption guarantees the existence and uniqueness of a solution for (3.60)-(3.61)
whenever the CDM in the q¯(T ) boundary condition is considered as a parameter.
Assumption 7. We assume the existence of a solution on [0, T ] to the following (nonsym-
metric) Riccati equation:
d
dt
γ = −A′γ − γA+ γBR−1B′γ +QL, γ(T ) = M. (3.55)
Note that if Assumption 7 is satisfied, the solution of (3.55) is unique as a consequence of
the smoothness of the right-hand side of (3.55) with respect to γ (Perko, 2013, Section 2.4,
Lemma 1). For a uniform population, i.e., k = 1, we have L = 0 and hence Assumption 7 is
always satisfied (Anderson and Moore, 2007, Section 2.3). For more details about Assumption
7, one can refer to (Freiling, 2002).
In the following lemma, we derive a stochastic maximum principle for the non-degenerate
min-LQG problem.
Lemma 4 (Min-LQG stochastic maximum principle). The processes
(
qs∗(t), ∂
2Vs
∂x2 (t, xs∗(t)
)
,
1 ≤ s ≤ k, with qs∗(t) = ∂Vs∂x (t, xs∗(t)), satisfy the following backward linear SDE:
− dqs∗(t) = (A′sqs∗(t) +Qs(xs∗(t)− x¯(t))) dt−
∂2Vs
∂x2
((t, xs∗(t))σsdws(t), (3.56)
with qs∗(T ) = Ms
(
xs∗(T )−∑lj=1 1Wj(xs∗(T ))pj).
Proof. The function ∂Vs
∂x
(t, x) is smooth on [0, T )×Rn. By applying Itô’s formula (Karatzas
and Shreve, 2012, Section 3.3.A) to ∂Vs
∂x
(t, xs∗(t)), and by noting that Vs satisfies the HJB
equation (3.6), we have
− dqs∗(t) = (A′sqs∗(t) +Qs(xs∗(t)− x¯(t))) dt−
∂2Vs
∂x2
((t, xs∗(t))σsdws(t), (3.57)
with qs∗(0) = ∂Vs∂x (0, xs∗(0)). It remains to show that P-a.s
lim
t→T
∂Vs
∂x
(t, xs∗(t)) = Ms
xs∗(T )− l∑
j=1
1Wj(xs∗(T ))pj
 . (3.58)
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By Theorem 9, we have on [0, T )× Rn
∂Vs
∂x
(t, x) =
l∑
j=1
exp (−ηsV js (t, x)) gjs(t, x)∑l
k=1 exp (−ηsV ks (t, x)) gks (t, x)
∂V js
∂x
(t, x). (3.59)
Fix j ∈ {1, . . . , l}. By Lemma 2, we have on {xs∗(T ) ∈ Wj}, lim
t→T
gjs(t, xs∗(t)) = 1 and
lim
t→T
gks (t, xs∗(t)) = 0, for all k 6= j. Hence, on {xs∗(T ) ∈ Wj}, we have lim
t→T
∂Vs
∂x
(t, xs∗(t)) =
lim
t→T
∂V js
∂x
(t, xs∗(t)) = Ms(xs∗(T )− pj). But, xs∗ is the solution of an SDE with non-degenerate
noise. Therefore, P (xs∗(T ) ∈ ∂Wj) = 0. This shows the result.
In the following Lemma, we give an equivalent representation of a solution x¯ of (3.54).
Lemma 5 (Equivalent representation). Under Assumption 7, x¯ satisfies the mean field equa-
tions (3.54) if and only if it satisfies the following equations
d
dt
X¯(t) = AX¯(t)−BR−1B′q¯(t), (3.60)
d
dt
q¯(t) = −A′q¯(t) +QLX¯(t), (3.61)
x¯(t) = P1X¯(t), (3.62)
with X¯(0) = EX(0) and q¯(T ) = M
(
X¯(T )− Λ(x¯)⊗ Inp
)
, where the CDM Λ(x¯) is defined as
follows:
Λsj(x¯) = P(xs∗(T ) ∈ Wj), 1 ≤ s ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ l (3.63)
dX∗(t) = (AX∗(t) +BU∗ (t,X∗(t), x¯)) dt+ σdW (t). (3.64)
Λsj(x¯) is the probability that a generic agent of type s optimally responding to x¯ is at time
T closer to the alternative pj than the other alternatives, and xs∗ is its optimal state.
Proof. By taking the expectations on the right and the left hand sides of (3.56) and the
SDE in (3.54), and in view of ∑ks=1 αsx¯s(t) = x¯, we get the necessary condition. To prove
the sufficient condition, we consider (X¯, x¯, q¯) satisfying (3.60)-(3.64). We define (xˆs, qˆs) =
(Exs∗,Eqs∗), where (xs∗, qs∗) are the s-type generic agent’s optimal state and co-state when
tracking x¯. We define e = (xˆ1, . . . , xˆk)− X¯ and q¯e = (qˆ1, . . . , qˆk)− q¯. By taking expectations
on the right and the left hand sides of (3.56) and the generic agent’s dynamics, we obtain
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that
d
dt
e(t) = Ae(t)−BR−1B′q¯e(t), e(0) = 0
d
dt
q¯e(t) = −A′q¯e(t) +QLe(t), q¯e(T ) = Me(T ).
(3.65)
Under Assumption 7, we define q′e(t) = γ(t)e(t), where γ(t) is the unique solution of (3.55).
We have d(q¯e−q′e)
dt
= −(A′ − γ(t)BR−1B′)(q¯e − q′e), with (q¯e(T ) − q′e(T )) = 0. Hence, q¯e(t) =
γ(t)e(t). By replacing q¯e(t) = γ(t)e(t) in the forward equation in (3.65), we obtain that
e = 0. This proves the result.
The following functions are used to compute the solution of (3.60)-(3.61), where the CDM
is considered as a parameter Λ. Under Assumption 7, we define R1 and R2 such that, for all
s ≥ 0,
d
dt
R1(t, s) =
(
A−BR−1B′γ(t)
)
R1(t, s),
d
dt
R2(t) =
(
A−BR−1B′γ(t)
)
R2(t) +BR−1B′R1(T, t)′M,
(3.66)
with R1(s, s) = Ink and R2(0) = 0, where γ is the unique solution of (3.55). We denote by S
the set of k × l row stochastic matrices. For Λ ∈ S, define the function x¯Λ : [0, T ]→ Rn by
x¯Λ(t) := P1(R1(t, 0)X¯(0) +R2(t)Λ⊗ In p). (3.67)
In the following theorem, we show that the sustainable mean trajectories belong to the family
of trajectories x¯Λ, where Λ ∈ S. This family is generated by (3.60)-(3.62), where the CDM in
the boundary condition is replaced by any Λ ∈ S. For x¯Λ to be a sustainable mean trajectory,
Λ should be the CDM, when the generic agents of the different types optimally respond to
x¯Λ, i.e. Λ(x¯Λ). This is equivalent to say that Λ is a fixed point of F defined below. Indeed,
F maps λ ∈ S to the CDM when the generic agents optimally respond to x¯Λ.
Thus, we define the finite dimensional map F from S into itself, such that for all Λ ∈ S,
F (Λ)sj = P(xΛs∗(T ) ∈ Wj), (3.68)
where XΛ∗ = (xΛ1∗, . . . , xΛk∗) is the unique strong solution of the following SDE parameterized
by Λ
dXΛ∗ (t) =
(
AXΛ∗ (t) +BU∗
(
t,XΛ∗ (t), x¯Λ
))
dt+ σdW (t), with XΛ∗ (0) = X∗(0). (3.69)
59
We state now the main result of this section.
Theorem 11 (Sustainable mean trajectories). Under Assumption 7, the following statements
hold:
(i) x¯ satisfies the mean field equations (3.54) if and only if
x¯ = x¯Λ (3.70)
where x¯Λ is defined in (3.67) and Λ is a fixed point of F .
(ii) F is continuous and has at least one fixed point. Equivalently, (3.54) has at least one
solution x¯.
(iii) For a uniform population, i.e, k=1, the sustainable paths x¯ are uniformly bounded with
respect to M and Λ ∈ S for the standard L2 norm
( ∫ T
0 ‖.‖2dt
) 1
2
.
Proof.
(i) Let x¯ be a path satisfying the mean field equations (3.54). Then, by Lemma 5, x¯
satisfies the equivalent representation (3.60)-(3.64). Under Assumption 7, using ar-
guments similar to those used in Lemma 5, we obtain that (3.60) and (3.61) has
a unique solution (X¯, q¯). Moreover, q¯ = γX¯ + β, where γ is the unique solution
of (3.55), and β is the unique solution of β˙ = −(A − BR−1B′γ)′β with β(T ) =
−MΛ ⊗ Inp. By replacing, q¯ = γX¯ + β in (3.60), we get that x¯ is of the form
(3.67). Next, by implementing this new form of x¯ in the expression of (3.64) and
by noting that Λ satisfies (3.63), Λ is a fixed point of F . Conversely, we consider
Λ to be a fixed point of F , X¯ =
(
R1(t, 0)X¯(0) +R2(t)Λ⊗ Inp
)
and x¯ = P1X¯. We
define q¯(t) = −(BR−1B′)−1( d
dt
X¯(t) − AX¯(t)). (X¯, q¯) satisfies (3.60)-(3.61). We have
Λsj = F (Λ)sj = P(xΛs∗(T ) ∈ Wj), where xΛs∗ is defined in (3.69). But x¯ is of the
form (3.70), hence XΛ∗ is the unique strong solution of (3.64). Therefore, x¯ satisfies
(3.60)-(3.64), and by Lemma 5, it satisfies (3.54). This proves the first point.
(ii) To show the existence of a fixed point of F , it is sufficient to show that F is continu-
ous, in which case Brouwer’s fixed point theorem (Conway, 2013, Section V.9) ensures
the existence of a fixed point. Equation (3.69) is a SDE depending on the parameter
Λ. By (Skorokhod, 1981, Theorem 1), the joint distribution of XΛ∗ and the Brown-
ian motion W is weakly continuous in Λ. Consider a sequence of stochastic matrices
{Λn}n≥0 converging to the stochastic matrix Λ. The distribution of XΛn∗ (T ) converges
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weakly to the distribution of Xλ∗ (T ). Moreover, Xλ∗ is the solution of a non-degenerate
SDE. Hence, Wj, j = 1, . . . , l, is a continuity set of the distribution of Xλ∗ . There-
fore, lim
n
F (Λn)sj = lim
n
P(xΛns∗ (T ) ∈ Wj) = P(xΛs∗(T ) ∈ Wj) = F (Λ)sj, and so F is
continuous. This proves the second point.
(iii) Finally, using arguments similar to those used in the proof of the third point of Theorem
4, one can show the third point.
Remark 8. The third point of Theorem 11 is used to prove Theorem 10 in Section 3.2 for a
uniform population.
Hitherto, we assume a continuum of agents and find a set of Nash strategies (3.42). Using
similar arguments to those used in Theorem 6, one can show the following result.
Theorem 12 (−Nash equilibrium). When applied by a finite number N of agents, the strate-
gies defined by (3.42) for a sustainable mean trajectory x¯ constitute an N -Nash equilibrium
in the set U (3.3) with respect to the costs (3.2), where N goes to zero as N increases to
infinity.
3.4 Discussions
As in the degenerate case, the finite dimensional map F defined in (3.68) characterizes the
non-degenerate game in terms of the number of approximate Nash equilibria and the potential
distributions of the agents’ choices over the alternatives. However, the presence of the noise
process changes the way the agents make their choices and the numerical scheme to compute
the Nash strategies.
3.4.1 Indecisive agents
While in the degenerate case an agent makes its choices of an alternative prior starting to
move, Theorem 9 shows that in the non-degenerate case, an agent can no longer commit to a
choice from the beginning. Indeed, the optimal strategy (3.42) is a convex combination of the
optimal strategies to go to each alternatives uj∗, 1 ≤ j ≤ l. The weights constitute a spatio-
temporal Gibbs distribution (Liggett, 2012) that puts more mass on the less costly and less
“risky” alternative. An alternative pj is considered riskier in state x at time t, if the Brownian
motion has a higher chance of driving the state of an agent closer to another alternative
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at time T , when this agent implements uj∗ from (x, t) onwards. The Gibbs distribution(
Gibbs1(t, x), . . . , Gibbsl(t, x)
)
at (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn is defined as follows,
Gibbsj(t, x) = exp (−ηV
j(t, x) + log gj(t, x))∑l
k=1 exp (−ηV k(t, x) + log gk(t, x))
, j = 1, . . . , l. (3.71)
In this distribution, the cost of an alternative pj is captured by V j, while its risk by − log gj,
where V j and gj are defined in (3.19) and (3.23).
To compute its optimal strategy, an agent needs to know its state and the probability distri-
bution of the initial conditions P0 and parameters Pθ. Indeed, given P0 and Pθ, it computes
a fixed point Λ of F defined in (3.68), and anticipates the mean trajectory x¯ = x¯Λ defined
in (3.67). Afterwards, the agent implements the feedback control law (3.42) by measuring
instantaneously its state. This choice process is summarized in Figure 3.1.
x(t)
Prior starting to move time t
P0, Pθ Λ = F (Λ) x¯ = x¯Λ
p1
pl
...
...
Gibbs1(t, x(t))× u1∗
Gibbsl(t, x(t))× ul∗
u∗ =
∑l
j=1Gibbs
j(t, x(t))× uj∗
Figure 3.1 Non-degenerate non-cooperative DCDC: the choice process
3.4.2 Numerical scheme
As discussed above, to compute the optimal strategies (3.42), it is sufficient to find a fixed
point Λ of F . But F is a map from the set S of k × l row stochastic matrices into itself.
Hence, a fixed point can be computed by applying Broyden’s method to F (Λ) − Λ. In the
binary choice case with uniform population, S is the set of (r, 1 − r), where r ∈ [0, 1], and
F (r, 1−r) = ([F (r, 1− r)]1, 1− [F (r, 1− r)]1). Hence, one can apply the bisection method to
the scalar function G(r) := [F (r, 1−r)]1−r to find a fixed point of F . Both methods assume
that one knows the value of F at any Λ ∈ S. But F (Λ) involves the probability distribution
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of the random variable XΛ∗ (T ). This can be computed by solving the FP equation related to
the diffusion process (3.69) via the finite difference implicit method (Pichler et al., 2013).
In the following, we develop a numerical scheme for the binary choice uniform population
case. The function G(r) defined in the previous paragraph is equal to
∫ c
−∞ pr(T, x)dx, where
c = (p1 +p2)/2 and pr(t, x) is the probability density function of X(r,1−r)∗ (t) defined by (3.69).
It satisfies the following FP equation,
∂pr(t, x)
∂t
= −∂ (µ(t, x, r)pr(t, x))
∂x
+ σ
2
2
∂2pr(t, x)
∂x2
, (3.72)
with pr(0, x) = p0(x),∀x ∈ R. Here µ(t, x, r) = Ax + Bu∗
(
t, x, x¯(r,1−r)
)
for x¯(r,1−r)(t) =
R1(t, 0)x¯(0) +R2(t) (rp1 + (1− r)p2), see (3.67).
We solve (3.72) via an implicit finite difference scheme (Pichler et al., 2013), with space
domain [xmin, xmax], time step ∆t and space step ∆x. We choose xmin and xmax such that the
probability of X(r,1−r)∗ to be outside [xmin, xmax] is negligible. Since the final cost encourages
the agents to move towards p1 or p2, one can heuristically set, in case of an initial Gaussian
distribution N (µ0, σ20), xmin = p1 − |µ0| − 3
√
Tσ − 3σ0 and xmax = p2 + |µ0| + 3
√
Tσ + 3σ0
(here we assume p1 < p2). These expressions reflect the fact that the agents initially centered
around µ0 with standard deviation σ0 are spread in space by the Brownian motion, which has
a maximum standard deviation
√
Tσ, and forced by the optimal control laws to be centered
at the end of the horizon around p1 and p2.
We denote by Nt the number of time nodes, by Nx the number of space nodes and by
pr(k, i) and µr(k, i), for 0 ≤ k ≤ Nt and 0 ≤ i ≤ Nx, the values of pr and µr at (t, x) =
(k∆t, i(xmin + ∆x)). The discretized FP equation (3.72) is then:
pr(k + 1, i)− pr(k, i)
∆t =−
µr(k + 1, i+ 1)pr(k + 1, i+ 1)− µr(k + 1, i− 1)pr(k + 1, i− 1)
2∆x
+ σ
2
2
pr(k + 1, i+ 1)− 2pr(k + 1, i) + pr(k + 1, i− 1)
(∆x)2 , (3.73)
or in matrix form:
Sk+1r P
k+1
r = P kr , (3.74)
where P kr = [pr(k, 0), ..., pr(k,Nx)]′ and Sk+1r = (sij)i,j∈{1,...,Nx} a tridiagonal matrix, with
si(i−1) = −σ22 ∆t(∆x)2 − ∆t2∆xµr(k + 1, i − 1), si(i+1) = −σ
2
2
∆t
(∆x)2 +
∆t
2∆xµr(k + 1, i + 1) and sii =
1 + σ2 ∆t(∆x)2 . We summarize the numerical scheme in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Fixed Point Algorithm
1: procedure Bisection Method
2: r0 = 0, r1 = 1 and err = 1
3: while err > 0.01 do
4: r = (r0 + r1)/2
5: procedure Computation of G(r)
6: for k = 0 to Nt − 1 do
7: Find P k+1r s.t. Sk+1r P k+1r = P kr
8: end for
9: G(r) = ∆x∑i≤kc pr(Nt, i), with Kc = (c− xmin)/∆x
10: err = |r0 − r1|
11: if (G(r)− r)(G(r0)− r0) < 0 then
12: r1 = r
13: else
14: r0 = r
15: end if
16: end procedure
17: end while
18: end procedure
19: Output: r, a fixed point of G
3.4.3 Relation to the discrete choice problems in microeconomics
We discuss in Section 1.2.2 the relation of the DCDC problems to the static discrete choice
models in microeconomics. In this section, we show explicitly that our results are directly
related to those in the microeconomic theory. Let us at first recall some facts about the
static models (McFadden, 1974), whereby a generic person chooses between l alternatives.
The cost he/she pays when choosing an alternative j is defined by vj = k(j) + ν, where k(j)
is a deterministic function that depends on personal publicly observable attributes, such as
the person’s financial status in the example of residential location choice (Bhat and Guo,
2004), and on alternative j. ν is a random variable accounting for personal idiosyncrasies
unobservable by the social planner. The probability distribution of ν is specified so that the
selection probabilities, i.e., the probabilities to choose each alternative given the observable
attributes, satisfy three axioms given in (McFadden, 1974). McFadden showed that when ν
has an extreme value distribution (McFadden, 1974), i.e. the cumulative distribution function
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of ν is equal to Fν(x) = e−e
−x , then these axioms are satisfied and the probability that a cost-
minimizing generic person chooses an alternative j is equal to Prj = exp(−k(j))∑l
s=1 exp(−k(s))
. Now,
the min-LQG optimal strategy at time t is u∗(t, x, x¯) =
∑l
j=1Gibbs
j(t, x)uj∗(t, x, x¯), where
Gibbsj is defined in (3.71), V j is the optimal cost if only the alternative pj is available and
uj∗ is the corresponding optimal strategy. The min-LQG optimal strategy can be interpreted
as a mixed strategy between the pure strategies uj∗(t, x) (picking alternative pj), j = 1, . . . , l.
Within this framework, a generic agent at time t chooses the alternative pj with probability
Gibbsj(t, x). Thus, the min-LQG problem can be viewed at each time t ∈ [0, T ] as a static
discrete choice problem, where the cost of choosing alternative pj includes an additional term
− 1
η
log (gj(t, x)). This term increases with the probability that a generic agent making an
early choice in favor of one alternative is driven by the Brownian motion toward one of the
other alternatives. In other words, it measures the expected cost of making a premature
choice of an alternative at time t < T , while ignoring the possibility of the future process
noise upsetting the wisdom of such decision.
3.5 Simulation results
We illustrate in this section the non-degenerate non-cooperative DCDC model through some
numerical examples.
3.5.1 Evolution of the probability distribution and sample paths
We consider a group of 50 agents with uniform dynamics, where the dynamics and costs
parameters are A = 0.1, B = 0.2, σ = 1.5, Q = 10, R = 5, M = 500, T = 2 and
p1 = −p2 = −10. The agents are initially drawn from the Gaussian distribution N (0.3, 1).
Following the numerical scheme in Section 3.4, we find Λ = (0.2, 0.8) a fixed point of F defined
in (3.68). Figure 3.2 below shows the evolution of the agents’ probability distribution and the
sample paths of 10 agents. The distribution at time T is concentrated around the alternatives
p1 and p2.
3.5.2 Influence of the social effect on the group’s behavior
In this section, we analyze the influence of the social effect on the choices’ distribution. We
consider the example of Section 3.5.1 and compute the fixed points of F (or G defined in
Section 3.4) for different values of Q. The results are shown in Figure 3.3. According to this
figure, F has only one fixed point (0.4, 0.6) without a social effect (Q = 0). Accordingly,
40% of the agents go towards p1, and the rest towards p2. As the strength of the social effect
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Figure 3.2 Non-degenerate non-cooperative DCDC: distribution’s evolution and sample
paths.
increases, the majority attracts more agents. For Q = 20, almost all the agents go towards p2.
When the social effect Q exceeds 21, F has three fixed points, where two of them correspond
to consensus on one alternative. Indeed as Q increases arbitrarily, the agents essentially forget
temporarily about the final cost, and the problem becomes a classical rendez-vous MFG where
they tend to merge towards each other rapidly. If this occurs around the midpoint of the
alternatives, then they stay grouped around this point, and before the end of the time horizon
they split between the alternatives to minimize their final costs. Some large deviations are
also possible, whereby a significant fraction of agents decides to choose one alternative, thus
pulling everyone else towards it, which may help explain the non uniqueness of outcomes for
Q > 21. Figure 3.4 illustrates the first behavior for a very strong social effect (Q = 500), i.e.
when the population splits between the alternatives. Moreover, it compares it to the case
where the social effect is absent. In both cases, the population splits almost equally between
the alternatives. While the agents stay together as much as possible under a strong social
effect, in the absence of a social effect, they split from the beginning into two groups, and
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each group moves to the less costly alternative. Although the frameworks are different, the
results illustrated in Figure 3.3 resembles to the pitchfork bifurcation diagrams studied in
(Gray et al., 2018) to model the influence of the social effect on the behavior of a population
of honeybees choosing between two nectar sites. Indeed, the results in (Gray et al., 2018)
show that for weak social effect, the dynamical system describing the evolution of the bees’
opinions toward two different sites has a unique stable equilibrium that splits the population
between the sites. For a strong social effect, however, the system has three equilibria; two
stable ones that correspond to consensus to go to each site and one unstable equilibrium that
splits the population between the sites.
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Figure 3.3 Non-degenerate non-cooperative DCDC: influence of the social effect on the
choices’ distribution.
3.5.3 Confidence zone and influence of the noise intensity on the agents’ indi-
vidual behaviors
Finally, we illustrate the influence of the noise intensity on the individual behaviors. Let us
at first define what we call a “confidence zone”. An agent is said to be in the confidence zone,
if it chooses one of the alternatives with high probability. Formally, it is defined as follows,
CZ(e) = {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R| Gibbs1(t, x) > 1− e or Gibbs2(t, x) > 1− e}, (3.75)
where e is the confidence margin. Figure 3.5 shows the confidence zones (hatched areas) for
e = 0.1 and for different values of σ. As expected, the area of CZ(0.1) decreases as the
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Figure 3.4 Non-degenerate non-cooperative DCDC: different splitting behaviors.
noise intensity increases. Indeed, the probability that an agent, making an early choice in
favor of one alternative, is driven to the other one by the Brownian motion increases with
the noise intensity, thus making the agent “indecisive”. Now, for a fixed σ, the confidence
zone expands with time. Hence, the agents become more confident. This is due to the fact
that, as time passes, the noise process has less time to drive the agent to other than the
chosen alternative. Finally, we report in Figure 3.6 the Gibbs distribution for an agent at
different instants of time. At time t = 1, the agent is closer to p2 than at time t = 1.75.
But, Gibbs2(1, x(1)) < Gibbs2(1.75, x(1.75)). This confirms that the agents become more
confident with time.
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Figure 3.5 Non-degenerate non-cooperative DCDC: confidence zones (hatched areas).
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Figure 3.6 Non-degenerate non-cooperative DCDC: evolution of the Gibbs distribution over
a sample path for σ = 6. The red (resp. blue) downward (resp. upward) arrow is the element
of the Gibbs distribution related to p1 = −10 (resp. p2 = 10).
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3.6 Conclusion
We formulate the non-degenerate non-cooperative DCDC problem as a stochastic dynamic
game. The dynamics are controlled SDE’s, and the agents have min-LQG individual costs.
We solve explicitly the novel non-degenerate min-LQG optimal control problem, and com-
pute a set of decentralized feedback strategies that qualify as approximate Nash as the size
of population increases sufficiently. Following the strategies’ form, we interpret the min-LQG
optimal control problem at each instant as a static discrete choice problem. This includes an
additional cost to penalize premature myopic decisions. The non-degenerate min-LQG opti-
mal control law exhibits some other interesting properties that we summarize and compare
to those of the degenerate case in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Degenerate and non-degenerate min-LQG optimal control problems
Degenerate min-LQG Non-degenerate min-LQG
The optimal control law is equal The optimal control law is a convex combination
to the less costly “pure” strategy of the “pure” strategies, weighted by a Gibbs
uj∗. distribution that puts more mass on the less
risky and less costly alternative.
The agents commit to their initial The agents reassess continuously the adequacy
choices. of their would-be choices along the path.
As time passes, the agents become more confident
about their choices.
The probability that an agent The probability that an agent applying the optimal
applying the optimal control law control law is far from the alternatives decays to
is far from the alternatives zero faster than 1
M
+ σ2 logM
M
.
decays to zero faster than 1/M .
As in the degenerate case, we construct a one- to-one map between the −Nash equilibria
and the fixed points of a finite dimensional map. The latter characterize the game in terms of
number of equilibria and the way the population splits between the alternatives. Furthermore,
this one-to-one map allows us to propose a simple numerical scheme to solve the mean field
equations.
The solution of the non-degenerate min-LQG optimal control problem is derived under As-
sumption 6, which is invoked at many places in the proofs. It is used in Theorem 8 to define
the Hopf-Cole transformation and linearize the HJB equation (3.6), in Lemma 3 to show the
continuity of the cost-to-go and in Theorem 9 to derive the min-LQG optimal control law.
As discussed in Remark 7, this assumption imposes a kind of isotropy on the ratio “control
efficiency / noise intensity”. Following this interpretation of Assumption 6, a future direction
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to remove it would be to apply a continuous transformation (Lie transformation) on the set
of solutions ((t, x), V (t, x)), such that the transformed solution satisfies a LQG type (at least
in the running term) HJB equation where the isotropy condition is satisfied.
Hitherto, the agents make their choices of an alternative in a non-cooperative fashion. The
next chapter considers the cooperative DCDC problem.
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CHAPTER 4 DEGENERATE COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC COLLECTIVE
DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL
We develop in Chapters 2 and 3 the non-cooperative DCDCmodels, where an agent minimizes
its cost irrespective of making the others better-off or worse-off. In some situations, this
selfish behavior neglects the social context that imposes a sort of cooperation between the
agents. Baker gave in (Baker, 1984) an example of such situations at the Chicago Options
Exchange, where the relations among the traders, supposed to be non-cooperative, affect
their trades. The aim of this chapter is to develop a cooperative DCDC model, which is
formulated in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we solve for an exact social optimum (see Definition
3, Section 1.2.1). We propose a naïve method to compute an exact solution and show
that it becomes quickly computationally intractable as the size of the population increases
sufficiently. Moreover, its implementation requires a significant amount of communication
between the agents. Instead, we develop in Section 4.3 via the MFG methodology a set
of decentralized strategies that are simple to compute and implement. These strategies are
shown to converge to a social optimum as the size of the population increases to infinity.
We discuss the results in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 illustrates via a numerical example the
advantage of the cooperative strategies with respect to the non-cooperative one in evenly
allocating the agents to the alternatives. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes this chapter.
4.1 Mathematical Model
We formulate the degenerate cooperative DCDC problem as a social optimization problem
involving N agents with dynamics,
d
dt
xi = Aixi +Biui 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (4.1)
where Ai ∈ Rn×n, Bi ∈ Rn×m, xi ∈ Rn is the state of agent i, and ui ∈ U = L2([0, T ],Rm)
its control input. The initial conditions xi(0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are assumed deterministic. The
agents cooperate to minimize the following common social cost,
Jsoc (ui, u−i, x¯, xi(0), x−i(0)) =
N∑
i=1
Ji (ui, x¯, xi(0)) , (4.2)
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where x¯ = 1/N ∑Ni=1 xi. The individual costs are defined as follows,
Ji (ui, x¯, xi(0)) =
∫ T
0
{
‖xi − Zx¯‖2Q + ‖ui‖2Ri
}
dt + min
1≤j≤l
‖xi(T )− pj‖2Mji , (4.3)
where Q  0, Ri  0, M ji  0, Zi ∈ Rn×n, and pj ∈ Rn, 1 ≤ j ≤ l, are the alternatives.
The coefficient Ri depends on the agent i. In the robotic swarm example, this reflects for
instance the intention of the social planner to limit the mobility of some robots. For a detailed
discussion about the individual costs, we refer the reader to Section 2.1.
When considering the limiting population (N → ∞), it is convenient to represent the
limiting sequence of {(xi(0), θi)}i=1,...,N := {(xi(0), Ai, Bi, Ri,M1i , . . . ,M li )}i=1,...,N by the
random vector (x(0), θ) on some probability space (Ω,F ,P). We assume that θ is in a
compact set Θ. Let us denote the empirical measure of the sequence {(xi(0), θi)}i by
PN0θ (A) = 1N
∑N
i=1 1A(xi(0), θi) for all (Borel) measurable sets A. We assume that PN0θ has a
weak limit the distribution of (x(0), θ), P0θ. We assume that x(0) is independent of θ, that
is P0θ = P0 × Pθ, where P0 and Pθ are respectively the marginal distributions of x(0) and θ.
4.2 Exact Social Optimum
In this section, we consider the problem of finding a social optimum with respect to the
social cost (4.2) (see Definition 3, Section 1.2.1). We start by showing that this problem is a
degenerate min-LQG optimal control problem. Hence, we apply the results of Section 2.2 to
compute a social optimum. We define the population’s state X = (x1, . . . , xN) and control
profile U = (u1, . . . , uN). A social optimum in the set UN is the optimal control law U∗ ∈ UN
that minimizes the social cost subject to the following population’s dynamics,
d
dt
X = AX +BU, (4.4)
where A = diag(A1, . . . , AN) and B = diag(B1, . . . , BN). The individual costs can be written
as follows,
Ji(ui, x¯, xi(0)) = min
pj∈∆
J
pj
i (ui, x¯, xi(0)), (4.5)
where ∆ = {p1, . . . , pl} is the set of alternatives, and
J
pj
i (ui, x¯, xi(0)) =
∫ T
0
{
‖xi − Zx¯‖2Q + ‖ui‖2Ri
}
dt + ‖xi(T )− pj‖2Mji . (4.6)
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Using the equality c+ min(a, b) = min(a+ c, b+ c), one can show by induction that,
Jsoc (U, x¯,X(0)) = min
d=(d1,...,dN )∈∆N
Jd(U,X(0)), (4.7)
where Jd(U,X(0)) = ∑Ni=1 Jdii (ui, x¯, xi(0)). Jd can be written as follows,
Jd(U,X(0)) =
∫ T
0
{
‖X‖2
Qˆ
+ ‖U‖2R
}
dt + ‖X(T )− d‖2Md , (4.8)
with Qˆ = IN ⊗Q+ 1N 1N×N ⊗L, R = diag(R1, . . . , RN), and Md = diag(Md11 , . . . ,MdNN ), and
L = Z ′QZ −QZ − Z ′Q. (4.9)
According to equation (4.7), the social cost is a degenerate min-LQG cost, i.e. minimum
of the lN LQR costs (4.8). Let us denote by Ud∗ and Jd∗ (X(0)) the optimal control law
and optimal cost of the LQR cost Jd, for d ∈ ∆N . Following the results of the degenerate
min-LQG optimal control problem in Section 2.2, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 13 (Social optimum). The social cost (4.2) has a social optimum Ud∗∗ , with d∗ ∈
argmin
d∈∆N
Jd∗ (X(0)).
The set ∆N is the set of potential deployment configurations. For example, d = (p1, p2, . . . , p2)
means that agent 1 chooses p1, and the rest of the agents choose p2. A deployment configu-
ration d ∈ ∆N costs the population Jd(X(0)). Theorem 13 states that a social optimum is
the optimal control law of the optimal deployment configuration.
The exact solution of the cooperative DCDC problem presents the following difficulties:
• Computational intractability: To find a social optimum (naïvely), one needs to
compute the lN LQR costs of the different deployment configurations, and pick the
less costly one. Moreover, each LQR problem involves solving a Riccati equation of
dimension nN × nN and a linear ODE of dimension nN + 1. Hence, finding a social
optimum becomes quickly intractable as the number of agents N increases.
• Significant amount of communication: According to Ud∗ , the implementation of
the social optimum requires that each agent know at least the exact initial conditions
of all the agents X(0), as well as the exact parameters θi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . As a result, the
amount of communication between the agents increases drastically as the size of the
population increases.
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In the next section, we develop a set of strategies that are simpler to compute and implement
than the exact social optimum. These strategies converge to a social optimum as the size of
the population increases to infinity.
Remark 9. Similarly to Theorem 3 in Chapter 2, we can force the cooperative agents to
reach arbitrary small neighborhoods of the alternatives by increasing the coefficients M ji .
4.3 Decentralized approximate Social Optimum
We develop in this section via the MFG methodology a set of decentralized strategies that
are simple to compute and implement. These strategies converge to a social optimum as the
size of the population increases to infinity. Following the methodology proposed in (Huang
et al., 2012), we start by looking for a person-by-person solution for a continuum of agents
(See Definition 2, Section 1.2.1). We show that this solution is a Nash equilibrium of a
non-cooperative degenerate DCDC game. Here again, we apply the results of Chapter 2 to
prove the existence of an equilibrium for a continuum of agents. Afterwards, we show that
these strategies, when applied to a finite number of agents, converge to a social optimum as
N →∞.
4.3.1 Person-by-person optimality
The person-by-person optimality is a weaker solution concept than the social optimum. These
two concepts coincide, however, under some technical conditions, for instance, the convexity
and smoothness of the costs in static games (Yüksel and Başar, 2013, Lemma 2.6.1). For a
detailed discussion about these conditions in the LQG and min-LQG MFG cases, we refer
the reader to Section 4.4.
Following the definition of the person-by-person solution (See Definition 2, Section 1.2.1),
an agent i assumes that the other agents fixed their person-by-person strategies u∗−i, and
computes its strategy u∗i by minimizing the social cost Jsoc(ui, u∗−i) over ui ∈ U . To simplify
the presentation, we omit in this section the other arguments of Jsoc. Similarly to (Huang
et al., 2012), one can show that the social cost can be written Jsoc(ui, u∗−i) = J1,i
(
ui, x¯
∗
−i
)
+
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J2,i(u∗−i), where x¯∗−i = 1/N
∑N
j=1,j 6=i x
∗
j ,
J1,i
(
ui, x¯
∗
−i
)
=
∫ T
0
{
‖xi‖2QN +
(
x¯∗−i
)′
LNxi + ‖ui‖2Ri
}
dt + min
1≤j≤l
‖xi(T )− pj‖2Mji , (4.10)
with QN =
(
In − 1
N
Z
)′
Q
(
In − 1
N
Z
)
+ (N − 1)
N2
Z ′QZ,
LN = −Z ′Q
(
In − 1
N
Z
)
−QZ + q(N − 1)
N
Z ′QZ.
The term J2,i(u∗−i) does not depend on the strategy ui of agent i. Therefore, minimiz-
ing Jsoc(ui, u∗−i) reduces to minimizing J1,i
(
ui, x¯
∗
−i
)
. Hence, a person-by-person solution
(u∗i , u∗−i) with respect to the social cost is a fixed point of the system of equations u∗i ∈
argmin
ui∈U
J1,i
(
ui, x¯
∗
−i
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Equivalently, (u∗i , u∗−i) is a Nash equilibrium with respect
to the costs J1,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . But, these costs are of the degenerate min-LQG type with a
weak coupling between the agents through x¯∗−i. Accordingly, we apply the results of Chapter
2 to compute a person-by-person solution for a continuum of agents.
Under the continuum of agents assumption, the mean field coupling term x¯∗−i is assumed
known and equal to x¯. Moreover, the coefficients QN and LN in the cost J1,i (4.10) con-
verge to Q and L as N → ∞. Hence, a generic agent of state x and parameters θ =
(Aθ, Bθ, Rθ,M1θ , . . . ,M lθ) minimizes the following min-LQG cost,
J(u, x¯, x(0), θ) =
∫ T
0
{
‖x‖2Q + x¯′Lx+ ‖u‖2Rθ
}
dt + min
1≤j≤l
‖x(T )− pj‖2Mj
θ
, (4.11)
where L is defined in (4.9). We define Γjθ, β
j
θ and δ
j
θ to be the unique solutions of the ODE’s
(2.20)-(2.22), where we replace (A,B,R,M) by (Aθ, Bθ, Rθ,M jθ ), Q in (2.21) by −L and Q
in (2.22) by 0. Following the analysis of Section 2.6, the generic agent’s best response to x¯,
and the corresponding state are on the set {x(0) ∈ Djθ(x¯)} as follows,
u∗(t, x, x¯, x(0), θ) = −B′θR−1θ
(
Γjθ(t)x+ β
j
θ(t)
)
, (4.12)
x∗(t, x¯, x(0), θ) = Φjθ(0, t)′x(0) +
∫ t
0
Ψjθ(σ, t, σ, T )M
j
θpj dσ
+
∫ t
0
∫ σ
T
Ψjθ(σ, t, σ, τ)Lx¯(τ) dτdσ, (4.13)
where Φjθ, Ψ
j
θ and the basin of attraction D
j
θ(x¯), are defined as in Section 2.6. Moreover,
there exists a sustainable mean trajectory, i.e., a fixed point of the map G that maps x¯ ∈
C([0, T ],Rn) to G(x¯) = Ex∗(t, x¯, x(0), θ), under the following assumptions.
Assumption 8. We assume that 1/N ∑Ni=1 ‖xi(0)‖2 < C, for all N > 0.
76
Remark 10. Using Portmanteau Theorem (Kallenberg, 2006, Chapter 3), one can show that
Assumption 8 implies that E‖x(0)‖2 <∞.
Assumption 9. Under Assumption 8, we assume that
√
max(k1 + k2, k3)T < pi/2, with k1,
k2 and k3 are defined as (2.63), where Qθ in the expression of k3 is replaced by L.
Assumption 10. We assume that the P0−measure of quadric surfaces in Rn is zero.
According to Theorem 6 in Section 2.7, the strategies (4.12) constitute an −Nash equilib-
rium with respect to the costs J1,i defined in (4.10), where  converges to 0 as N → ∞.
Equivalently, these strategies are approximately person-by-person optimal. We show in the
following section that they also converge to a social optimum under some conditions.
4.3.2 Asymptotic social optimum
We show in this section that the infinite population person-by-person strategies (4.12) are
asymptotically socially optimal. Moreover, we give an explicit formula of the asymptotic
social cost. We start by the following preliminary result, which states that the average state
of N agents applying the strategies (4.12), for some fixed point of G, converges to this fixed
point as N →∞. Given a fixed point path x¯ of G, we define u(N)∗ to be the strategy profile
of the agents 1, . . . , N when they apply (4.12), and x¯(N)(t) their average state under u(N)∗ ,
i.e.
x¯(N)(t) := 1
N
N∑
i=1
x∗(t, x¯, xi(0), θi) =
∫
Rn×Θ
x∗(t, x¯, x0, θ)dPN0θ (x0, θ). (4.14)
Lemma 6. Under Assumptions 8, 9 and 10,
lim
N→∞
∫ T
0
∥∥∥x¯(N)(t)− x¯(t)∥∥∥2 dt = 0. (4.15)
Proof. The functions Γjθ, β
j
θ and δ
j
θ are continuous with respect to θ, which belongs to a
compact set Θ. In view of the map G and (4.14), we have
x¯(N)(t)− x¯(t) =
∫
Rn×Θ
x∗(t, x¯, x0, θ)dPN0θ (x0, θ)−
∫
Rn×Θ
x∗(t, x¯, x0, θ)dP0θ(x0, θ). (4.16)
If x∗(t, x¯, x0, θ) was uniformly bounded and equicontinuous with respect to the initial con-
ditions and parameters, then one could show the convergence by (Stroock and Varadhan,
1979, Corollary 1.1.5). But x∗(t, x¯, x0, θ) is discontinuous. Alternatively, we show that the
set of discontinuity points has a measure zero under Assumption 10. We then show that x¯(N)
converges pointwise to x¯. Finally, we prove the uniform convergence, from which the result
follows.
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Pointwise convergence. PN0θ converges in distribution to P0θ. Therefore, there exist on some
probability space (Ω,F ,P) a sequence of random variables (XN0 , ξNθ ) of distribution PN0θ and
a random variable (X0, ξθ) of distribution P0θ, such that (XN0 , ξNθ ) converges with probability
one to (X0, ξθ). Thus,
x¯(N)(t)− x¯(t) =
∫
Ω
(
x∗
(
t, x¯, XN0 (ω), ξNθ (ω)
)
− x∗ (t, x¯, X0(ω), ξθ(ω))
)
dP(ω). (4.17)
For a fixed t, the discontinuity points of x∗ (t, x¯, x0, θ), considered now as a function of x0 and
θ, are included in the set D = {(x0, θ) ∈ Rn × Θ |x0 ∈ ∂Djθ(x¯)}. Under Assumption 10 and
the independence of x(0) and θ, one can prove that P0×Pθ(D) = 0. Hence, x∗
(
t, x¯, XN0 , ξ
N
θ
)
converges with probability one to x∗ (t, x¯, X0, ξθ). The compactness of [0, T ] and Θ, and the
continuity of Πθj imply
∥∥∥x∗ (t, x¯, XN0 , ξNθ )− x∗ (t, x¯, X0, ξθ)∥∥∥ ≤ K1‖XN0 ‖+K2‖X0‖+K3, (4.18)
for some finite K1, K2, K3 > 0 independent of N . x¯(N)(t) converges pointwise to x¯(t) for
all t ∈ [0, T ] as a consequence of Assumption 8, Remark 10 and Lebesgue’s dominated
convergence theorem.
Uniform convergence. As in the proof of Theorem 5, one can show that for all t1, t2,∥∥∥x¯(N)(t1)− x¯(N)(t2)∥∥∥ ≤ K|t1 − t2| and ‖x¯(t1)− x¯(t2)‖ ≤ K|t1 − t2|, where K > 0 is indepen-
dent of N . We fix an  > 0 and consider a partition 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tj = T of [0, T ],
such that for all t, t′ ∈ [tk, tk+1], for all N ≥ 1, ‖x¯(N)(t)− x¯(N)(t′)‖ <  and ‖x¯(t)− x¯(t′)‖ < .
By the pointwise convergence, there exists N0 such that for all N > N0, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ j,
‖x¯(N)(tk)− x¯(tk)‖ < . We fix N > N0. For an arbitrary t ∈ [0, T ], there exists k such that
t ∈ [tk, tk+1]. We have
‖x¯(N)(t)− x¯(t)‖ ≤ ‖x¯(N)(t)− x¯(N)(tk)‖+ ‖x¯(N)(tk)− x¯(tk)‖+ ‖x¯(tk)− x¯(t)‖ ≤ 3. (4.19)
This inequality holds for an arbitrary t ∈ [0, T ], therefore, lim
N→∞
sup
t∈[0,T ]
‖x¯(N)(t) − x¯(t)‖2 = 0.
This implies (4.15), and proves the result.
The following assumption guaranties the asymptotic optimality of the mean-field based strate-
gies (4.12) under a non-convex final cost. For more details about this assumption, we refer
the reader to Section 4.4 below.
Assumption 11. We assume that L  0, where L is defined in (4.9).
Assumption 11 is satisfied, for example, when Z = αIn, with α < 0 or α ≥ 2. In the first
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case (α < 0), the social effect is to drive the agents away from the mean of the population,
while in the second case (α ≥ 2) the social effect is attraction.
The following main result states that the per-agent social cost under the strategies (4.12)
converges to the per-agent optimal social cost as the number of agents increases to infinity.
In other words, the strategies (4.12) are asymptotically socially optimal.
Theorem 14 (Approximate social optimum). Under Assumptions 8, 10, and 11,
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣ inf
U∈UN
1
N
Jsoc
(
U, x(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
− 1
N
Jsoc
(
u(N)∗ , x¯
(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)∣∣∣∣ = 0, (4.20)
where u(N)∗ is the strategy profile of the N agents when they apply (4.12), x¯(N) defined in
(4.14) the corresponding average state, and x(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi is the average state of the N
agents under the strategy profile U ∈ UN .
Proof. Let x¯ be a fixed point of G and U = (u1, . . . , uN) ∈ UN , such that,
1
N
Jsoc
(
U, x(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
≤ 1
N
Jsoc
(
u(N)∗ , x¯
(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
. (4.21)
In the following, we show that U can improve the social cost by at most N , which converges
to zero as N →∞. Noting (4.13), the compactness of Θ, the continuity of Γjθ(t) with respect
to t and θ and Assumption 8, one can prove that (1/N)Jsoc
(
u
(N)
∗ , x¯(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
< c0,
where c0 is independent of N . Therefore, (1/N)Jsoc
(
U, x(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
< c0 and
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
{
‖ui(t)‖2 + ‖u∗i (t)‖2 + ‖xi(t)‖2 + ‖x∗i (t)‖2
}
dt < c1, (4.22)
where x∗i = x∗(t, x¯, xi(0), θi), u∗i = u∗(t, x∗i , x¯, xi(0), θi) and c1 > 0 is independent of N . Let
x˜i = xi − x∗i , x˜(N) = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 x˜i and u˜i = ui − u∗i . We obtain that,
1
N
Jsoc
(
U, x(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
= 1
N
Jsoc
(
u(N)∗ , x¯
(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
u˜′iRiu
∗
idt
+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
{∥∥∥x˜i − Zx˜(N)∥∥∥2
Q
+ ‖u˜i‖2Ri +
(
x˜i − Zx˜(N)
)′
Q
(
x∗i − Zx¯(N)
)}
dt (4.23)
+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
min
1≤j≤l
‖xi(T )− pj‖2Mji −
1
N
N∑
i=1
min
1≤j≤l
‖x∗i (T )− pj‖2Mji .
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For a fixed point x¯ of G, and recalling (4.11), we have
J(ui, x¯, xi(0), θi) = J(u∗i , x¯, xi(0), θi) +
∫ T
0
{
‖x˜i‖2Q + ‖u˜i‖2Ri + x¯′Lx˜i + x˜′iQx∗i + u˜′iRiu∗i
}
dt
+ min
1≤j≤l
‖xi(T )− pj‖2Mji − min1≤j≤l ‖x
∗
i (T )− pj‖2Mji . (4.24)
Now (4.23) and (4.24) yield
1
N
Jsoc
(
U, x(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
= 1
N
Jsoc
(
u(N)∗ , x¯
(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(J(ui, x¯, xi(0), θi)− J(u∗i , x¯, xi(0), θi)) (4.25)
+
∫ T
0
(
x˜(N)
)′
Lx˜(N)dt +
∫ T
0
(
x¯(N) − x¯
)′
Lx˜(N)dt.
By the bounds c0 and c1, Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, and Lemma 6, we deduce that N :=∫ T
0 (x¯(N) − x¯)′Lx˜(N)dt converges to 0 as N goes to infinity. The optimality of u∗i with respect
to J and Assumption 11 imply
1
N
Jsoc (U, xn(N), xi(0), x−i(0)) ≥ 1
N
Jsoc
(
u(N)∗ , x¯
(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
+ N . (4.26)
This proves the result.
In the following theorem, we give an explicit form for the asymptotic per-agent optimal social
cost. The obtained expression can be computed by knowing only the probability distributions
P0 and Pθ, and a fixed point path x¯ of G.
Theorem 15 (Asymptotic per-agent optimal social cost). Under Assumptions 8, 10, and
11,
lim
N→∞
inf
U∈UN
1
N
Jsoc
(
U, x(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
= −12
∫ T
0
x¯′Lx¯dt
+ E
l∑
j=1
1Dj
θ
(x¯)(x(0))
{1
2x(0)
′Γjθ(0)x(0) + β
j
θ(0)′x(0) + δ
j
θ
}
. (4.27)
Before proving Theorem 15, we start by showing the following preliminary result to approx-
imate the asymptotic per-agent cost.
Lemma 7. Under Assumptions 8, 10, and 11 ,
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣ inf
U∈UN
1
N
Jsoc
(
U, x(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
− 1
N
Jsoc
(
u(N)∗ , x¯, xi(0), x−i(0)
)∣∣∣∣ = 0. (4.28)
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Proof. Using the same notations as in the proof of Theorem 14, we have obtain that,
1
N
Jsoc
(
u(N)∗ , x¯
(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
− 1
N
Jsoc
(
u(N)∗ , x¯, xi(0), x−i(0)
)
=
∫ T
0
1
N
N∑
i=1
(∥∥∥x∗i − Zx¯(N)∥∥∥2Q − ‖x∗i − Zx¯‖2Q
)
dt (4.29)
=
∫ T
0
∥∥∥Z (x¯(N) − x¯)∥∥∥2
Q
dt +
∫ T
0
(
x¯(N) − Zx¯
)′
QZ
(
x¯− x¯(N)
)
dt.
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Lemma 6 imply
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣ 1N Jsoc
(
u(N)∗ , x¯
(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
− 1
N
Jsoc
(
u(N)∗ , x¯, , xi(0), x−i(0)
)∣∣∣∣ = 0. (4.30)
Therefore, we deduce by Theorem 14 the result.
Proof of Theorem 15. It is sufficient to show that
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣J∞soc(x¯)− 1N Jsoc
(
u(N)∗ , x¯, xi(0), x−i(0)
)∣∣∣∣ = 0. (4.31)
where
J∞soc(x¯) = E
 ∫ T
0
{
‖x∗ (t, x¯, x(0), θ)− Zx¯‖2Q + ‖u∗ (t, x∗(t, x¯, x(0), θ), x(0), θ)‖2Rθ
}
dt
+ min
1≤j≤l
‖x∗(T, x¯, x(0), θ)− pj‖2Mj
θ
. (4.32)
The result follows then from Lemma 7 and J∞soc(x¯) = ψ4 − 12
∫ T
0 x¯
′Lx¯dt, where
ψ4 = EJ∗(u, x¯, x(0), θ) =
l∑
j=1
∫
Rn×Θ
1Dj
θ
(x¯)(x0)
{
x′0Γ
j
θ(0)x0 + β
j
θ(0)′x0 + δ
j
θ(0)
}
dP0θ(x0, θ),
(4.33)
with J∗ is the optimal cost of (4.11). We use the same notation as in the proof of Lemma 6.
We have
J∞soc(x¯)−
1
N
Jsoc
(
u(N)∗ , x¯, xi(0), x−i(0)
)
= ψ1 + ψ2 + ψ3, (4.34)
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where
ψ1 =
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
{
‖x∗ (t, x¯, X0(ω), ξθ(ω))− Zx¯‖2Q −
∥∥∥x∗ (t, x¯, XN0 (ω), ξNθ (ω))− Zx¯∥∥∥2Q
}
dP(ω)dt
(4.35)
ψ2 =
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
{
‖u∗ (t, x∗, x¯, X0(ω), ξθ(ω))‖2Rξθ(ω) −
∥∥∥u∗ (t, x∗, x¯, XN0 (ω), ξNθ (ω))∥∥∥2R
ξN
θ
(ω)
}
dP(ω)dt
(4.36)
ψ3 =
∫
Ω
min
1≤j≤l
‖x∗ (T, x¯,X0(ω), ξθ(ω))− pj‖2Mj
ξθ(ω)
dP(ω)
−
∫
Ω
min
1≤j≤l
∥∥∥xˆ (T, x¯,XN0 (ω), ξNθ (ω))− pj∥∥∥2Mj
ξN
θ
(ω)
dP(ω). (4.37)
Noting that a′Pa− b′Pb = (a+ b)′P (a− b) and that the minimum of l continuous functions
is continuous, one can prove by the same techniques used in the proof of Lemma 6 that ψ1,
ψ2 and ψ3 converge to zero as N goes to infinity. This proves the result.
4.4 Discussions
We discuss in this section the results of this Chapter.
4.4.1 Uniform population
In case of a uniform population, that is, the set of parameters is Θ = {(A,B,R,M, . . . ,M)},
one can use similar techniques to those in Section 2.4 to construct a one-to-one map be-
tween the sustainable mean trajectories (fixed points of G) and the fixed points of a finite
dimensional map. The latter are the potential probability distributions of the agents’ ulti-
mate choices. The finite dimensional map is defined on the simplex {(λ1, . . . , λl) ∈ Rl|λj ≥
0 and ∑lj=1 λj = 1} as follows,
F (λ) =
(
P0
(
D1(x¯λ)
)
, . . . , P0
(
Dl(x¯λ)
))
, (4.38)
where x¯λ is the optimal state of the following LQR problem,
∫ T
0
{
‖x‖2L+Q + ‖u‖2R
}
dt+ ‖x(T )− pλ‖2M
s.t. d
dt
x = Ax+Bu, (4.39)
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with pλ =
∑l
j=1 λjpj, where λ = (λ1, . . . , λl). This characterization of the sustainable mean
trajectories has similar consequences to those in the non-cooperative case. For further dis-
cussions about these consequences, we refer the reader to Section 2.5.
4.4.2 Exact vs. approximate social optima
We develop in Section 4.3 an approximate social optimum (4.12). The corresponding strate-
gies exhibit the following advantageous properties with respect to the exact solution developed
in Section 4.2:
• Tractable computations: To compute a mean-field based strategy (4.12), an agent
needs to compute a sustainable mean trajectory and the l LQR costs corresponding to
the l alternatives, and pick the less costly one. Moreover, each LQR problem involves
solving a Riccati equation of dimension n×n and a linear ODE of dimension n+ 1. In
the uniform case, the computation of a sustainable mean trajectory reduces to finding
a fixed point to the finite dimensional map F defined in (4.38).
• Small amount of communication: According to (4.12), the implementation of an
approximate social optimum requires that each agent know only its own state and the
probability distributions P0 and Pθ.
We summarize and compare in Table 4.1 the main properties of the exact and approximate
social optima.
Table 4.1 Cooperative DCDC: Exact and approximate social optima
Exact social optimum Approximate social optimum
Computation Solve lN LQR costs each Compute a sustainable mean
involving an ODE of dim. and solve l LQR costs each
n2N2 + nN + 1 involving an ODE of dim. n2 + n+ 1
Implementation Each agent needs to know Each agent needs to know
its state and parameters, its state and parameters,
and the states and parameters and the distributions P0 and Pθ
of all the other agents.
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4.4.3 Originality of the convergence proofs and technical assumptions
Need for Assumption 11
A social optimum is necessarily person-by-person optimal. The inverse occurs under some
conditions. For example, in static games, it is required that the cost be convex and smooth
(Yüksel and Başar, 2013, Lemma 2.6.1). This condition, which is automatically satisfied in
the standard LQGMFG’s (Huang et al., 2012), is also implicitly used to show the convergence
of the person-by-person solution to the social optimum. In our case, however, Assumption
11 is needed to deal with the non-convexity and non-smoothness of the final costs. Indeed, if
we apply the techniques used in (Huang et al., 2012, Theorem 4.2) to the proof of Theorem
14, then by the convexity of the running cost, (4.23) implies that for all U ∈ UN ,
Jsoc
(
U, x(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
≥ Jsoc
(
u(N)∗ , x¯
(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
+
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
{u˜′iRiu∗i + x˜′i (Qx∗i + Lx¯)} dt +NN
+
N∑
i=1
min
1≤j≤l
‖xi(T )− pj‖2Mji −
N∑
i=1
min
1≤j≤l
‖x∗i (T )− pj‖2Mji . (4.40)
We have d
dt
x˜′i(Γ
j
θi
x∗i + βkθi) = −u˜′iRiu∗i − x˜′i (Qx∗i + Lx¯) . Hence,
1
N
Jsoc
(
U, x(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
≥ 1
N
Jsoc
(
u(N)∗ , x¯
(N), xi(0), x−i(0)
)
(4.41)
+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
φi (xi(T ))− φi (x∗i (T ))− x˜′i(T )
d
dx
φi (x∗i (T ))
)
+ N ,
where φi is the final cost of agent i. If the final costs are smooth and convex (which is not
the case), then (4.41) implies (4.20). To handle the non-convexity, steps (4.40) and (4.41)
are replaced by (4.24), (4.25) and Assumption 11.
The nature of the initial conditions matters
In the LQG MFG’s (Huang et al., 2012), the agents’ optimal states are continuous with
respect to the initial conditions. As a result, the authors could consider deterministic initial
conditions, include them in the vector of parameters, and then “randomize” the limiting
sequence {(xi(0), θi)}i≥1 by assuming that the empirical measure of the finite sequence of
{(xi(0), θi)}1≤i≤N converges weakly to a probability distribution (For more details about this
randomization process, we refer the reader to (Huang et al., 2007)). This would not change
the analysis (mainly the convergence proofs to a social optimum) with respect to the random
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initial conditions case. In our case, however, the optimal state (4.13) is discontinuous with
respect to the initial condition. If we assume random initial conditions, then as in equation
(2.80) in the degenerate DCDC game, Lemma 6 is a direct consequence of (Stroock and
Varadhan, 1979, Corollary 1.1.5). But, for deterministic initial conditions, we need some
constructions, the independence of P0 and Pθ, and Assumption 11 to bypass the discontinuity
(See the proof of Lemma 6).
4.5 Simulation Results
In this section, we compare via a numerical example the cooperative and non-cooperative
behaviors in the DCDC problems. To this end, we draw 300 agents from the Gaussian dis-
tribution N ([−5, 10], 15I2). These agents have the following dynamics and cost parameters,
Ai =
 0 1
0.02 −0.3
 Bi =
 0
0.3
 , (4.42)
Ri = 10I2, M ji = 1200I2, T = 2, p1 = −p2 = [−10 0]′ and Z = 3.5I2. We start by
the situation where the agents make their choices in the absence of a social effect Q = 0.
Afterwards, we increase gradually the social pressure, by increasing Q. Figure 4.1 illustrates
the initial and final positions of the agents in the cooperative and non-cooperative cases, for
Q = 0, Q = 20I2 and Q = 40I2. Moreover, it shows the basins of attraction in both cases.
Figure 4.2 shows the choices’ distribution and the corresponding per agent costs for different
values of Q. For the computation of the agents’ optimal strategies, we refer the reader to
Section 4.4.1 for the cooperative case and Figure 2.1 for the non-cooperative one. In the
absence of a social effect, the individual costs are decoupled, and each agent minimizes its
own cost. Hence, the optimal strategies are identical in the cooperative and non-cooperative
cases. Moreover, λ = (0.17, 0.83) is a fixed point for the finite dimensional maps (4.38)
and (2.45). Accordingly, the majority of the agents, 83%, choose p2. As the social pressure
increases, the cooperative and non-cooperative cases exhibit two opposite behaviors. The
agents tend in the non-cooperative case to follow the majority, whereas in the cooperative
context, the social pressure distributes the agents evenly between the alternatives. Indeed, in
the non-cooperative case, the agents look at the mean as an exogenous trajectory. They try to
beat it by moving in the same direction where the majority lies initially. As a result, the mean
follows them, attracting more and more agents towards the majority. In the cooperative case,
however, the agents cooperate to build a socially favorable mean, that is, a mean that doesn’t
make the majority better-off at the expenses of “harming” the minority. Hence, a fraction
of the majority follows the minority to drift the mean towards the latter and ameliorate its
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cost. Consequently, this cooperation redistributes the agents between the alternatives.
Finally, it should be noted that in the cooperative case with Q = 20I2, the 300 agents need in
total 58 sec to compute their decentralized mean-field based strategies (4.12). On the other
hand, the computation of one optimal value of (4.8) takes 56 sec. Hence, one needs (naïvely)
2300 × 56 sec to compute the exact social optimum1.
Figure 4.1 Comparison of the cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors in the collective
discrete choices problems.
4.6 Conclusion
We present in this chapter the cooperative DCDC model. We show that the naïve approach
to computing an exact solution becomes quickly intractable and its implementation requires a
significant amount of communication as the number of agents increases sufficiently. Instead,
we develop via the MFG methodology a set of decentralized simple strategies that qualify as
socially optimal as the size of the population increase to infinity.
Hitherto, the agents make their choices of alternatives under the social pressure. In the
following chapter, we study situations where the individual choices are shaped by both the
1The centralized and decentralized solutions are computed on a 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5 processor.
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Figure 4.2 Comparison of the choices’ distributions and per agent costs in the cooperative
and non-cooperative cases.
social and advertising effects.
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CHAPTER 5 DYNAMIC COLLECTIVE DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL
WITH AN ADVERTISER
We discuss in Chapter 1 the relation between the DCDC problems and elections. These
models, however, do not take into consideration the candidates’ electoral campaigns that
influence the voters’ opinions. The aim of this chapter is to extend the non-cooperative de-
generate DCDC model to account for such situations. More precisely, we consider a dynamic
choice problem, where the consumers choose between two alternatives under the social and
advertising effects. The latter is the effort exerted by an advertiser to encourage the con-
sumers to choose a specific alternative. We formulate in Section 5.1 the DCDCA problem
as a Stackelberg competition involving an advertiser and a large number of consumers. The
advertiser makes some investments to generate an advertising effect and influence the paths
of the consumers to ultimately choose a specific alternative. Subsequently, the consumers
choose between two alternatives under the social and advertising effects. In Section 5.2,
we study the continuum of consumers case via the MFG methodology. We show that the
advertiser can always make optimal investments when the consumers’ a priori opinions to-
wards the alternatives are sufficiently diverse. In other words, we show that there exists a
Stackelberg solution (See definition 4) if the consumers’ initial states are sufficiently spread.
The corresponding strategies, when applied by a finite number of consumers, constitute an
approximate Stackelberg solution. In Section 5.3, we study the special case where a priori
opinions have a certain uniform distribution. We give an explicit form of the advertiser’s
optimal investment strategy, and the consumers’ optimal choices. Moreover, we anticipate
the choices’ distribution under the social and advertising effects. Section 5.4 provides some
numerical simulation results, while Section 5.5 concludes this chapter.
5.1 Mathematical model
We formulate the DCDCA problem as a Stackelberg competition involving N consumers and
an advertiser of respective dynamics,
d
dt
xi = Axi +Bui, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (5.1)
d
dt
y = A0y +B0v, (5.2)
where xi ∈ Rn and ui ∈ U are the state and control input of the consumer i. The set of
admissible strategies U is defined in (2.3), Chapter 2. y ∈ Rn1 and v ∈ L2([0, T ],Rm1) are
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the state and control input of the advertiser. We assume that the initial conditions xi(0),
1 ≤ i ≤ N , are i.i.d. random vectors on some probability space (Ω,F ,P) with distribution
P0. The consumers and advertiser are associated with the following individual costs,
Ji(ui, x¯, v) = E
(∫ T
0
{
‖xi − αx¯−K(p2)y‖2Q + ‖ui‖2R
}
dt + min
j=1,2
‖xi(T )− pj‖2M
)
, (5.3)
J0(v, x¯) = E
(∫ T
0
‖v‖2R0dt + ‖x¯(T )− p2‖2M0
)
, (5.4)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , where α ≥ 0, Q  0, R  0, R0  0, M  0, M0  0, x¯ = 1/N ∑Ni=1 xi,
and p1 and p2 are the alternatives. We explain the meaning of these costs via the following
example.
Example 1 (Ministry of health campaign against smoking). Consider a group of N teenagers
choosing before a time T between smoking (p1 = 1) or not smoking (p2 = −1). At time t,
teenager i’s smoking inclination is modeled by a variable xi(t) ∈ [−1, 1], where the value −1
corresponds to a nonsmoker, while 1 represents a full smoker. The effort exerted by i at time
t to change its smoker status is modeled by ui(t) ∈ R. For example, |ui| would represent
the amount of money spent per unit of time paid to increase (buying extra cigarettes) or
decrease (medical treatment) its smoker status. On the other hand, the government rate of
investments against smoking is modeled by a variable v ∈ R. The variable y represents the
effectiveness of the advertising investment. The influence exerted by the advertisement on the
teenagers’ smoking status is modeled by K(p2)y, where K(p2) := p2 = “Do Not Smoke” =
−1. A teenager, in the process of choosing between not smoking or smoking, minimizes
the cost (5.3), which penalizes along the path the deviation from the peers smoking status x¯
and the government nonsmoking advertisement K(p2)y, as well as the effort to change the
smoking status. Moreover, the teenager should be by time T a smoker (p1) or nonsmoker
(p2) lest he/she be considered indecisive by its peers. Thus, lack of a decision by time T is
strongly penalized in the final cost. On the other hand, the government tries to minimize
its advertisement investments (the running cost of (5.4)), and should convince by time T
the teenagers to be nonsmokers. Failure to sway a majority of teenagers away from smoking
results in a strong penalty in the final cost.
5.2 Mean field Stackelberg competition
In our Stackelberg competition, the advertiser plays first, and then the consumers make their
choices. Thus, the game is solved as follows. Given an advertiser’s investment strategy v, the
consumers solve a degenerate non-cooperative min-LQG game parametrized by v. If for each
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admissible v the consumers’ game has a unique Nash equilibrium (u∗i (v), u∗−i(v)), then the
advertiser knows how the consumers will respond to his/her investment strategies. Techni-
cally speaking, he/she constructs a map Nash that maps its strategy v to the corresponding
consumers’ Nash equilibrium Nash(v) = (u∗i (v), u∗−i(v)). Finally, an advertiser’s optimal
strategy is an optimal control law of J0(v, x¯(v)), where x¯(v) is the average of the consumers
under their Nash equilibrium Nash(v). The main challenge here is to derive conditions for
the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium to hold. Indeed, we saw in Section 2.2 that the
Nash equilibria of the degenerate non-cooperative min-LQG games may not exist.
Instead, we solve the game via the MFG methodology. We start by assuming a continuum
of consumers. Following the results of Chapter 2, the consumers’ Nash equilibria are totally
determined by the sustainable mean trajectories. If for each v there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium, then the advertiser constructs a map that maps v to the consumers’ sustainable
trajectory x¯v. The advertiser minimizes then J0(v, x¯v). Once the infinite population game is
solved, we show that the mean-field strategies, when applied by the advertiser and a finite
number of consumers, constitute an approximate Stackelberg solution.
5.2.1 Consumers’ game
We start by assuming a continuum of consumers. Given the advertiser’s strategy v and
corresponding state y, the consumers solve a degenerate min-LQG game parametrized by
v. The results of Chapter 2 show that this game is fully characterized by the sustainable
mean trajectories. To compute these trajectories, and the consumers’ optimal strategies, we
define Γ, βj and δj to be the unique solutions of (2.20)-(2.22), where we replace x¯ in by
αx¯+K(p2)y. The functions Γ, βj and δj, which are related to the LQR problem that solves
a generic consumer when only pj is available, depend on αx¯+K(p2)y rather than x¯. Indeed,
when the advertiser’s state and consumers’ mean are fixed, a generic consumer optimally
tracks αx¯+K(p2)y. We recall that the basin of attraction D(x¯, y) of p1 is the set of points in
Rn, such that, if a consumer is initially in this region, then the optimal LQR cost associated
with p1 is less than that associated with p2. By solving the equations of βj and δj, one can
show that D(x¯, y) has the following form,
D(x¯, y) = {x0 ∈ Rn|β′x0 ≤ δ + ∆ (αx¯+K(p2)y)} , (5.5)
where β = β1(0)− β2(0) does not depend on x¯ and y. δ2(0)− δ1(0) := δ + ∆(αx¯+K(p2)y),
where δ is the term that does not depend on x¯ and y, and ∆ is a linear form on L2([0, T ],Rn),
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defined as follows,
∆(x) = (p1 − p2)′M
∫ 0
T
∫ η
T
φ(η, T )′BR−1B′φ(η, σ)Qx(σ) dσdη, (5.6)
with φ is the unique solution of d
dt
φ(t, s) = (Γ(t)BR−1B′ − A′)φ(t, s), φ(s, s) = In.
Using techniques similar to those used in Theorems 4 and 11, one can construct a one-to-one
map between the sustainable mean trajectories x¯ and the fixed points of a finite dimensional
map, and show the existence of a sustainable trajectory under the following Assumptions.
Assumption 12. The following Riccati equation has a unique solution:
d
dt
γ = −γA− A′γ + γBR−1B′γ − (1− α)Q, γ(T ) = M. (5.7)
Assumption 13. We assume that P0 is such that the P0-measure of hyperplanes is zero.
Note that if α ≤ 1, then (5.7) has a unique solution (Anderson and Moore, 2007, page 23).
The finite dimensional map is defined as follows. ∀λ ∈ [0, 1],
F (λ, y) = P0
(
D
(
x¯λ, y
))
, (5.8)
where
x¯λ(t) = R1(t, 0)Ex(0) +R2(t) (λp1 + (1− λ)p2) + Ξ(y)(t)
d
dt
R1(t, s) =
(
A−BR−1B′γ
)
R1(t, s), R1(s, s) = In
d
dt
R2(t) =
(
A−BR−1B′γ(t)
)
R2(t) +BR−1B′R1(T, t)′M, R2(0) = 0
Ξ(y)(t) = −
∫ t
0
∫ σ
T
R1(t, σ)BR−1B′R1(τ, σ)′QK(p2)y(τ)dτdσ,
(5.9)
and x(0) is a generic consumer’s initial state, which has a distribution P0. We summarize
the solution of the consumers’ game in the following theorem.
Theorem 16 (Consumers’ game solution). Under Assumptions 12 and 13, the following
statements hold:
(i) x¯(t) is a sustainable mean trajectory if and only if
x¯(t) = x¯λ, (5.10)
where λ = F (λ, y), i.e. λ is fixed point of λ 7→ F (λ, y) defined in (5.8).
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(ii) The function λ 7→ F (λ, y) has at least one fixed point λ, equivalently there exists at least
one sustainable mean trajectory.
(iii) A generic consumer’s best response to a sustainable mean trajectory x¯ is given by,
u∗(t, x, x¯, x(0), y) =
−R
−1B′ (Γ(t)x+ β1(t)) , if x(0) ∈ D(x¯, y)
−R−1B′ (Γ(t)x+ β2(t)) , if x(0) /∈ D(x¯, y),
(5.11)
where x(0) is the generic consumer’s initial state.
Theorem 16 states that there exists at least one Nash equilibrium for each advertiser’s strategy
v. But, the advertiser needs to anticipate uniquely the consumers’ behavior in response to
his/her investment strategy v. The following assumption provides a condition under which
the uniqueness of the consumers’ Nash equilibria holds.
Assumption 14. We assume that F¯ (s) := P0 (β′x0 ≤ δ + s) is differentiable and
∣∣∣ d
ds
F¯ (s)
∣∣∣ <
1
|α∆(R2(p1−p2))| (here the linear form ∆ defined in (5.6) acts on the function R2(t)(p1 − p2)).
Noting that the function d
ds
F¯ is the probability density function of β′x(0)−δ, Assumption 14
requires that the consumers’ a priori opinions x(0) be sufficiently spread in the direction β.
For example, if the consumers’ a priori opinions x(0) are distributed according to the normal
distribution N (µ0,Σ0), then β′x(0) − δ is distributed according to N (β′µ0 − δ, β′Σ0β), and
the corresponding probability density function has a maximum 1/
(√
2piβ′Σ0β
)
. In this case,
Assumption 14 is satisfied if 2piβ′Σ0β > (α∆ (R2(p1 − p2)))2. Under Assumption 14, the
function λ 7→ F (λ, y) is a contraction. Indeed, d
dλ
F = α∆ (R2(p1 − p2)) dds F¯ , which under
Assumption 14 has an absolute value strictly less than one. Therefore, we can state the
following theorem.
Theorem 17 (Unique consumers’ behavior). Under Assumptions 12, 13, and 14, given the
advertiser’s strategy v, λ 7→ F (λ, y) has a unique fixed point. Thus, the consumers’ limiting
game admits a unique Nash equilibrium.
To summarize, if the consumers have diverse a priori opinions toward the alternatives, then
for each advertising strategy v, the distribution of the consumers’ choices (i.e. (λ, 1 − λ)
for a fixed point λ of λ 7→ F (λ, y)), and the corresponding mean trajectory x¯λ defined in
(5.9) are unique. In other words, the consumers react macroscopically in a unique way to an
investment strategy. On the individual level, a consumer chooses alternative p1 if his/her a
priori opinion x(0) is in the basin of attraction D(x¯λ, y). Otherwise, he/she chooses p2.
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5.2.2 Advertiser’s game
Having determined the consumers’ individual and macroscopic (mean trajectory) responses
to the investment strategies, we turn now to the problem of finding an optimal investment
policy v. We assume in the rest of this chapter that Assumptions 12, 13, and 14 hold
to guaranty the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium for each v ∈ L2([0, T ],Rm1). The
sustainable mean trajectory that corresponds to v is denoted by x¯v in this section. It is the
mean trajectory of the consumers under their best responses u∗(t, x, x¯v, x(0), y) to it. Thus,
the advertiser solves the following optimal control problem:
min
v∈L2([0,T ],Rm1 )
J0 (v, x¯v)
s.t. d
dt
y = A0y +B0v and
d
dt
x¯v = Ax¯v +BEu∗(t, x, x¯v, x(0), y).
(5.12)
In the following theorem, we show that if the consumers’ a priori opinions are sufficiently
diverse, then the advertiser can find an optimal investment policy v∗. Afterwards, we char-
acterize in Theorem 19 this strategy as the co-state of (yv∗ , x¯v∗), where yv∗ is the advertiser’s
optimal state that corresponds to v∗. This allows us to derive explicit optimal investment
policies in some situations, for example, in case the consumers’ initial states are uniformly
distributed in the direction β (See Section 5.3 below).
Theorem 18 (Existence of an optimal investment strategy). Under Assumptions 12, 13 and
14, the advertiser’s optimal control problem (5.12) has an optimal control law v∗.
Proof. The cost functional J0 is positive and coercive with respect to v ∈ L2([0, T ],Rm1),
i.e. lim
‖v‖L2→∞
J0(v, x¯v)/‖v‖L2 = ∞. Thus, it is sufficient to show that J0 is continuous in the
reflexive Banach space L2([0, T ],Rm1) w.r.t. v. Tonelli’s existence theorem (Clarke, 2013,
Theorem 5.51) guaranties then the existence of a minimum for J0. The state y is continuous
with respect to v. The fixed points λ(y) of F are also continuous with respect to v. In
fact, suppose v and v′ two investment strategies in L2([0, T ],Rm1), and denote y and y′ the
corresponding advertiser’s states, and λ and λ′ the corresponding fixed points of λ 7→ F (λ, y)
and λ′ 7→ F (λ′, y′). We have
|λ− λ′| = |F (λ, y)− F (λ′, y′)| ≤ |F (λ, y)− F (λ′, y)|+ |F (λ′, y)− F (λ′, y′)|
≤ sup
α∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣∣dFdλ (α, y)
∣∣∣∣∣ |λ− λ′|+ |F (λ′, y)− F (λ′, y′)|. (5.13)
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Therefore, (
1− sup
α∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣∣dFdλ (α, y2)
∣∣∣∣∣
)
|λ− λ′| ≤ |F (λ′, y)− F (λ′, y′)|. (5.14)
Under Assumption 14, sup
α∈[0,1]
∣∣∣dF
dλ
(α, y)
∣∣∣ < 1. Moreover, under Assumption 13, F¯ is continuous.
∆ is continuous with respect to the norm ‖ · ‖L2 . Hence, F is continuous with respect to y,
and |F (λ′, y) − F (λ′, y′)| converges to zero as ‖y − y′‖L2 converges to zero. Therefore, the
fixed points λ of F are continuous. In view of (5.10) and the continuity of the fixed points
λ, x¯v(T ) is continuous. Therefore, J0 is continuous.
In the following theorem, we characterize an optimal strategy v∗ as the co-state of (x¯v∗ , yv∗).
Given an optimal control law v∗, we define the co-state equations:
− d
dt
P = A′0P + L∗1(W )(t), P (T ) = 0 (5.15)
− d
dt
W = L∗2(W )(t), W (T ) = M0(x¯v∗(T )− p2), (5.16)
where for all z ∈ L2([0, T ],Rn)
L∗1(z)(t) = K(p2)′Q
∫ t
0
R1(t, σ)BR−1B′z(σ)dσ + ξ∗K(p2)′H(t)
∫ T
0
R1(T, σ)BR−1B′z(σ)dσ
L∗2(z)(t) = (A−BR−1B′γ)′z(t) + ξ∗αH(t)
∫ T
0
R1(T, σ)BR−1B′z(σ)dσ, (5.17)
with ξ∗ = dF¯
ds
(∆ (αx¯v∗ +K(p2)yv∗)) .
Here, H(t) = Q
∫ t
0 φ(η, t)′BR−1B′φ(η, T )dηM(p1 − p2)(p1 − p2)′M , ∆ defined in (5.6) and φ
defined below (5.6).
Theorem 19 (Characterization of the optimal investment strategies). Under Assumptions
12, 13, and 14, if v∗ is an optimal control law of (5.12) and the corresponding equations
(5.15)-(5.16) have a unique solution (P,W ), then
v∗ = −R−10 B′0P. (5.18)
Proof. We derive the condition on v∗ (5.18) by studying the first variation of the cost
functional in (5.12) with respect to a perturbation v = v∗ + ηδv, where η ∈ R, and
δv ∈ L2([0, T ],Rm1). To this end, we need to derive at first an explicit form of the con-
straint on x¯v. We have that x¯v = x¯λ defined in (5.9), where λ is the unique fixed point of
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λ 7→ F (λ, y). By taking the derivative of x¯λ with respect to time, we obtain that,
d
dt
x¯v = L(x¯v, y)(t), (5.19)
where
L(x¯v, y)(t) = (A−BR−1B′γ)x¯v +BR−1B′R1(T, t)′F¯ ◦∆
(
αx¯v +K(p2)y)
)
M(p1 − p2)
+BR−1B′R1(T, t)′Mp2 −BR−1B′
∫ t
T
R1(σ, t)′QK(p2)y(σ)dσ. (5.20)
We compute now the Gâteaux derivatives (Clarke, 2013) of y and x¯ at v∗ in the direction δv:
d
dη
yv∗+ηδv
∣∣∣∣
η=0
:= δy
d
dη
x¯v∗+ηδv
∣∣∣∣
η=0
:= δx¯,
(5.21)
where,
d
dt
δy = A0δy +B0δv, δy(0) = 0 (5.22)
d
dt
δx¯ = L1(δy)(t) + L2(δx¯)(t), δx¯(0) = 0, (5.23)
and L1 (resp. L2) is a continuous linear operator from the Hilbert space L2([0, T ],Rn1) (resp.
L2([0, T ],Rn)) to L2([0, T ],Rn), such that for all z1 ∈ L2([0, T ],Rn1) and z2 ∈ L2([0, T ],Rn),
L1(z1)(t) = −BR−1B′
∫ t
T
R1(σ, t)′QK(p2)z1(σ)dσ
+ ξ∗∆ (K(p2)z1)BR−1B′R1(T, t)′M(p1 − p2) (5.24)
L2(z2)(t) =
(
A−BR−1B′γ(t)
)
z2(t) + αξ∗∆(z2)BR−1B′R1(T, t)′M(p1 − p2) (5.25)
Using Fubini-Tonelli’s theorem (Rudin, 1987), one can show that the adjoint operators of L1
and L2 are respectively L∗1 and L∗2 defined in (5.17). We recall from (Rudin, 1991) that the
adjoint operator of a linear continuous operator G defined from the Hilbert space (H1, 〈, 〉1)
into the Hilbert space (H2, 〈, 〉2) is the linear continuous operator G∗ defined from the Hilbert
space (H2, 〈, 〉2) into the Hilbert space (H1, 〈, 〉1) and satisfying for all x ∈ H1 and y ∈ H2
〈G(x), y〉2 = 〈x,G∗(y)〉1.
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The Gâteaux derivative of J0 is
δJ0 =
d
dη
J0
(
v∗ + ηδv, x¯v∗+ηδv
)∣∣∣∣∣
η=0
=
〈
R0v∗, δv
〉
L2
+ (x¯v∗(T )− p2)′M0δx¯(T ). (5.26)
We have
d
dt
(δy′P ) = δv′B′0P − δy′L∗1(W )(t) (5.27)
d
dt
(δx¯′W ) = L1(δy)(t)′W + L2(δx¯)(t)′W − δx¯′L∗2(W )(t). (5.28)
By integrating (5.27) from 0 to T , we get 0 =
〈
B′0P, δv
〉
L2
−
〈
L∗1(W ), δy
〉
L2
. Similarly, by
integrating (5.28), we obtain that
δx¯(T )′M(x¯v∗(T )− p2) =
〈
L1(δy),W
〉
L2
+
〈
L2(δx¯),W
〉
L2
−
〈
δx¯,L∗2(W )
〉
L2
=
〈
L∗1(W ), δy
〉
L2
. (5.29)
Therefore, δJ0 =
〈
B′0P, δv
〉
L2
+
〈
R0v∗, δv
〉
L2
. By optimality, δJ0 = 0, ∀δv ∈ L2([0, T ],Rm1).
Hence, v∗ = −R−10 B′0P .
Theorem 18 states that the advertiser can act optimally. But, it doesn’t give any indication on
how to compute an optimal investment strategy v∗. Theorem 19, however, provides a formula
(5.18) for v∗. As a result, the computation of v∗ requires solving the state equations (5.2)
and (5.19), which are coupled with the co-state equations (5.15)-(5.16) through the optimal
control law (5.18). In Section 5.3, we study a special case where the optimal strategies v∗
can be computed explicitly.
Before moving to the next section, we give a sufficient condition for the existence and unique-
ness of the solutions to (5.15)-(5.16) to hold. This condition is required to apply the results
of Theorem 19 later. Given the function W , equation (5.15) is a linear ODE which has a
unique solution. Thus, it is sufficient to study the second equation (5.16). We define the
matrix
Σ = α
∫ T
0
∫ T
σ
R1(T, σ)BR−1B′R1(T, σ)′R1(τ, T )′H(τ)dτdσ. (5.30)
Assumption 15. Either ξ∗ is equal to zero or 1/ξ∗ is not an eigenvalue of Σ, where ξ∗ is
defined in (5.17).
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Assumption 15 can be satisfied, for example, in the following two cases:
1. If the initial spread of the consumers is sufficient (dF¯ /ds is low enough).
2. If dF¯ /ds is bounded, and T is small enough.
In fact, ξ∗Σ is in both cases negligible with respect to In. Hence, 1/ξ∗ is not an eigenvalue
of Σ.
Lemma 8. Under Assumption 15, (5.16) has a unique solution.
Proof. The idea of the proof is to replace the term
∫ T
0
R1(T, σ)BR−1B′W (σ)dσ (5.31)
in the expression of L∗2(W ) by an assumed known constant K1. Equation (5.16) is then a
linear ODE parameterized by K1, whose solution is a linear operator of K1. By replacing this
solution in the term (5.31) and by requiring that K1 is equal to (5.31), one can show that the
unique solution of (5.16) is W (t) = R1(T, t)′
(
αξ∗
∫ T
t R1(σ, T )′H(σ)dσY +M0(x¯v∗(T )− p2)
)
,
where Y is the unique solution (under Assumption 15) of the following linear algebraic
equation:
(In − ξ∗Σ)Y =
∫ T
0
R1(T, σ)BR−1B′R1(T, σ)′dσM0(x¯v∗(T )− p2). (5.32)
This proves the result.
5.2.3 Approximate Stackelberg solution
We develop in the previous sections mean-field based Stackelberg strategies for a continuum
of consumers. In this section, we show that these strategies, when applied to a finite pop-
ulation, constitute an approximate Stackelberg solution. We adopt the following notations.
Given an advertiser’s strategy v, we denote by yv the advertiser’s corresponding state, x¯v
the consumers’ sustainable mean trajectory (5.19), uvi the mean-field based strategy (5.11)
when applied by consumer i, i.e. uvi = u∗(t, x, x¯v, xi(0), yv), xvi the corresponding consumer
i’s state, and x¯Nv = 1/N
∑N
i=1 x
v
i .
Theorem 20 (Approximate Stackelberg solution). Under Assumptions 12, 13 and 14, we
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have for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
J0
(
v∗, x¯Nv∗
)
− N ≤ inf
v∈L2([0,T ],Rm1 )
J0
(
v, x¯Nv
)
≤ J0
(
v∗, x¯Nv∗
)
, (5.33)
Ji
(
uv∗i , x¯
N
v∗ , v∗
)
− N ≤ inf
ui∈U
Ji
(
ui, x¯
N
−i, v∗
)
≤ Ji
(
uv∗i , x¯
N
v∗ , v∗
)
, (5.34)
where N = O(1/
√
N), v∗ is an optimal control law of (5.12), and x¯N−i = 1N
∑N
j=1,j 6=i x
v∗
j + 1N xi,
with xi the state of consumer i under its control input ui.
Proof. Inequalities (5.34) state that (uv∗i , uv∗−i) constitutes an N -Nash equilibrium with re-
spect to the costs (5.3). We refer the reader to Theorem 6 for a proof of this result. It remains
to show the first inequality. Let v ∈ L2([0, T ],Rm1), such that J0(v, x¯Nv ) ≤ J0(v∗, x¯Nv∗). We
show in the following the there exists N = O(1/
√
N) that doesn’t depend on v, and such
that J0(v, x¯Nv ) ≥ J0(v∗, x¯Nv∗)− N , which implies (5.33). We have,
J0(v, x¯Nv ) = J0(v, x¯v) + E‖x¯v(T )− x¯Nv (T )‖2M0 + E(x¯Nv (T )− x¯v(T ))′M0(x¯v(T )− p2)
≥ J0(v∗, x¯v∗) + E‖x¯v(T )− x¯Nv (T )‖2M0 + E(x¯Nv (T )− x¯v(T ))′M0(x¯v(T )− p2) (5.35)
= J0(v∗, x¯Nv∗)− N ,
where the inequality follows from the fact that v∗ is an optimal control law of (5.12), and
N = −E‖x¯v(T )− x¯Nv (T )‖2M0 − E(x¯Nv (T )− x¯v(T ))′M0(x¯v(T )− p2)
− E‖x¯v∗(T )− x¯Nv∗(T )‖2M0 + E(x¯Nv∗(T )− x¯v∗(T ))′M0(x¯Nv∗(T )− p2). (5.36)
Since x¯v is a sustainable mean trajectory, then Exvi = x¯v, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Therefore,
E(x¯Nv (T )− x¯v(T ))′M0(x¯v(T )−p2) = 0. The consumers’ initial conditions are i.i.d., which im-
plies that E‖x¯v(T )−x¯Nv (T )‖2M0 = 1NE‖Exvi (T )−xvi (T )‖2M0 . Similarly, E‖x¯v∗(T )−x¯Nv∗(T )‖2M0 =
1
N
E‖Exv∗i (T )− xv∗i (T )‖2M0 . Furthermore, Cauchy-Schwarz inequality implies,
E(x¯Nv∗(T )− x¯v∗(T ))′M0(x¯Nv∗(T )− p2)
≤ ‖M0‖
(
E‖x¯Nv∗(T )− x¯v∗(T )‖2
)1/2 (
E‖x¯Nv∗(T )− p2‖2
)1/2
(5.37)
= ‖M0‖
( 1
N
E‖xv∗i (T )− Exv∗i (T )‖2
)1/2 (
E‖x¯Nv∗(T )− p2‖2
)1/2
= C0√
N
.
C0 does not depend on v. We have J0(v, x¯Nv ) ≤ J0(v∗, x¯Nv∗). Hence,
∫ T
0 ‖v‖2dt ≤ C1, where
C1 does not depend on v. Noting that y and x¯v satisfy (5.2) and (5.19), the boundedness
of v implies that
∫ T
0 {‖x¯v‖2 + ‖yv‖2}dt ≤ C2, where C2 does not depend on v. Finally, by
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implementing (5.11) in the dynamics of consumer i, and noting the boundedness of x¯v and
yv, one can show that E‖xvi (T )‖2 ≤ C3E‖xi(0)‖2 + C4, where C3 and C4 do not depend on
v. This implies that N ≤ C5/
√
N , for some C5 that does not depend on v, and proves the
result.
Given an advertiser’s strategy v, rational consumers seek an exact Nash equilibrium. But, as
we saw in Section 2.2, an exact solution may not exist. Even if it does, it requires that each
consumer know the exact a priori opinions of the other consumers, which is not realistic in a
large population. Thus, the mean field based strategies are more suitable to describe the way
the consumers make their choices. For these strategies are more realistic to implement and
compute, and are sufficiently robust (−Nash) in face of selfish deviant behaviors. Hence, we
assume that the consumers make their choices of alternatives by implementing the mean-field
based strategies. Furthermore, we assume that the advertiser knows that the consumers solve
their game via the MFG methodology. Following these assumptions, a rational advertiser
minimizes J0(v, x¯Nv ) to find his/her optimal investment strategy, where x¯Nv is the average
state of the N consumers when they apply their mean field strategies. But, this requires that
he/she observe the states of all the consumers, which is not realistic in a large population.
Here again, the MFG provides a simpler alternative, the mean-field based strategy v∗, which
requires that the advertiser know only the initial probability distribution of the consumers.
Theorem 20 guaranties that the loss of optimality induced by v∗ is negligible in a large
population.
5.3 Case of uniform initial distribution
Because ξ∗ defined in (5.17) is a nonlinear functional of x¯v∗ and yv∗ , solving (5.2)-(5.19)-
(5.15)-(5.16) is not easy. Note however that dF¯ /ds is the probability density function of
β′x(0) − δ (see the definition of F¯ in Assumption 14), so one can hope to compute an
explicit solution when this random variable is uniformly distributed, for example. Indeed,
in this case the probability density function is piecewise constant. Hence, equations (5.2)-
(5.19)-(5.15)-(5.16) can be written as a pair of forward-backward linear ODE’s (5.40). These
equations are coupled in the boundary condition Kλv∗ , through λv∗ the probability that a
generic consumer is initially in D(x¯v∗ , yv∗). Hence, we use similar techniques to those used
in Lemma 5 and Theorem 11 to provide an explicit solution of (5.2)-(5.19)-(5.15)-(5.16), see
Theorem 22 below. This solution encapsulates the advertiser’s optimal investment strategy
v∗, and state yv∗ , the consumers’ sustainable mean trajectory x¯v∗ , as well as the fraction of
consumers that go towards p1 under a social and advertising effects.
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So we assume in this section that the consumers are “uniformly” distributed in the following
sense: the random variable β′x(0) has a uniform distribution on [a−c/2, a+c/2], where a ∈ R
and c > 0. It should be noted that Assumption 13 is satisfied for this initial distribution.
The function F¯ defined in Assumption 14 is piecewise differentiable. Therefore, we need an
alternative to Assumption 14, under which the uniqueness of the consumers’ Nash equilibria
holds. Moreover, in order to apply the variational methods of Subsection 5.2.2, we require F¯
to stay in a differentiable domain for all the advertiser’s strategies, which is the case when
the consumers are spread enough (see Lemma 9 below).
Assumption 16. We assume that c > α |∆ (R2(p1 − p2))|.
Under Assumption 16, the consumers’ limiting game admits a unique Nash equilibrium for
each advertiser’s strategy v by virtue of Theorem 17.
Theorem 21 (Existence of an optimal investment strategy). Under Assumptions 12 and 16,
the advertiser’s optimal control problem (5.12) has an optimal control law v∗.
Proof. Let v and v′ two investment strategies in L2([0, T ],Rm1), and denote y and y′ the
corresponding advertiser’s states and λ and λ′ the corresponding fixed points of λ 7→ F (λ, y)
and λ′ 7→ F (λ′, y′), where F is defined in (5.8). We have
|λ− λ′| = |F (λ, y)− F (λ′, y′)| ≤ |F (λ, y)− F (λ′, y)|+ |F (λ′, y)− F (λ′, y′)|
≤ α
c
∣∣∣∣∆(R2(t)(p1 − p2))∣∣∣∣|λ− λ′|+ |F (λ′, y)− F (λ′, y′)|. (5.38)
The rest of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 18.
Lemma 9. Under Assumptions 12 and 16, there exists c0 > 0 independent of v such that for
all c > c0, there exists a unique consumers’ Nash equilibrium corresponding to λ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. The uniqueness follows from Assumption 16. Let v ∈ L2([0, T ]). The path x¯v defined
in (5.10) is uniformly bounded with c (with respect to the L2 norm). Therefore, the optimal
cost J0(v∗, x¯v∗) ≤ J0(v, x¯v) of the advertiser’s optimal control problem (5.12) is uniformly
bounded with c. Hence, the optimal control laws v∗ and corresponding optimal states yv∗
are uniformly bounded with c. Consequently, the term ∆
(
K(p2)yv∗ + αx¯λ
)
, where x¯λ is
defined by (5.9), is uniformly bounded with c by a positive constant C1. This means that
−C1 ≤ ∆
(
K(p2)yv∗ + αx¯λ
)
≤ C1. Hence, F¯ (−C1) ≤ F (λ, yv∗) ≤ F¯ (C1). If we choose
−C1 > a − c/2 and C1 < a + c/2, that is, c > max(2(a + C1), 2(−a + C1)) := c0, the map
F defined by (5.8) takes its values in (0, 1). Therefore, λ 7→ F (λ, y) has a unique fixed point
λ ∈ (0, 1). This proves the result.
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For the rest of the analysis, we assume that c > c0. In this case, the unique fixed point λ
corresponding to an advertiser’s optimal policy v∗ is in (0, 1). Since F is differentiable in
(0, 1), one can use techniques similar to those used in Theorem 19 to show that v∗ satisfies
(5.18) (provided that the Assumptions 12 and 16 are satisfied, and 1/c is not an eigenvalue
of Σ defined in (5.30)).
The Stackelberg competition for a continuum of consumers is fully described by the optimal
state yv∗ which satisfies (5.2) for the control input (5.18), and the corresponding consumers’
sustainable mean trajectory x¯v∗ , which satisfies (5.19). To compute an explicit solution of
the game, we rewrite the equations of yv∗ and x¯v∗ as two coupled forward-backward ODE’s.
Let us start by equation (5.19). Using similar techniques to those used in Lemma 1, one can
derive the following equivalent representation of (5.19),
d
dt
x¯v∗ = Ax¯v∗ −BR−1B′q¯v∗
− d
dt
q¯v∗ = A′q¯v∗ + (1− α)Qx¯v∗ −QK(p2)yv∗ ,
(5.39)
with x¯v∗(0) = Ex(0), q¯v∗(T ) = M(x¯v∗(T )− λv∗p1 + (1− λv∗)p2), and λv∗ is the unique fixed
point of λ 7→ F (λ, yv∗). Next, we define the states h = (x¯v∗ , yv∗ ,W1) and d = (q¯v∗ , P,W,W2).
Here W1(t) :=
∫ t
0 R1(T, σ)BR−1B′W (σ)dσ and W2(t) :=
∫ T
t R1(T, σ)BR−1B′W (σ)dσ are the
forward and backward propagating parts of the integral
∫ T
0 R1(T, σ)BR−1B′W (σ)dσ that
appears in (5.15)-(5.16). The pair (h, d) satisfies
d
dt
h = K1(t)h+K2(t)d
d
dt
d = K3(t)h+K4(t)d
(5.40)
with h(0) = (Ex(0), y(0), 0) and d(T ) = K5h(T ) +Kλv∗ , where K1(t) = diag(A,A0, 0),
K2(t) =

k1 0 0 0
0 k2 0 0
0 0 k3 0
 K5 =

M 0 0
0 0 0
M0 0 0
0 0 0
 , (5.41)
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K3(t) =

−(1− α)Q QK(p2) 0
0 0 k4
0 0 −αH(t)/c
0 0 0
 , K4(t) =

−A′ 0 0 0
0 −A′0 0 −K(p2)′H(t)/c
0 0 k5 −αH(t)/c
0 0 −k3 0
 ,
(5.42)
Kλv∗ = −
(
M(λv∗p1 + (1 − λv∗)p2), 0,M0p2, 0
)
, k1 = −BR−1B′, k2 = −B0R−10 B′0, k3 =
R1(T, t)BR−1B′, k4 = −K(p2)′
(
QR1(t, T ) + 1cH(t)
)
and k5 = −(A−BR−1B′γ)′.
The equation system (5.40) consists of two coupled nonlinear forward-backward ODE’s. The
final condition d(T ) depends through λv∗ non-linearly on the path (x¯v∗(σ), yv∗(σ)), σ ∈ [0, T ].
As in the previous chapters, we need the following assumption to decouple and solve these
equations.
Assumption 17. The following generalized Riccati equation has a unique solution
d
dt
Π = K4Π− ΠK1 − ΠK2Π +K3, Π(T ) = K5. (5.43)
Using similar techniques to those used in Lemma 5 and Theorem 11, one can show that under
Assumption 17, (h, d) is a solution of (5.40) if and only if
h(t) = Φ1(t, 0)h(0) +Ru(t)Kλ =:
(
x¯λ, yλ,W λ1
)
, (5.44)
d(t) = Π(t)h(t) + Φ2(t, T )Kλ =:
(
q¯λ, P λ,W λ,W λ2
)
, (5.45)
where Φ1 and Φ2 are the state transition matrices of of K1 + K2Π and K4 − ΠK2, Ru(t) =∫ t
0 Φ1(t, σ)K2(σ)Φ2(σ, T )dσ and λ is a fixed point of the following final dimensional map,
Fu(λ) = F¯ ◦∆
(
αx¯λ +K(p2)yλ
)
. (5.46)
Theorem 22 (Explicit Stackelberg solution). Under Assumptions 12, 16, and 17, the Stack-
elberg competition (for a continuum of consumers) has a unique solution (v∗, x¯v∗), where
v∗ = −R−10 B′0P λ∗ and x¯v∗ = x¯λ∗, with P λ∗ and x¯λ∗ defined in (5.44)-(5.45) for the unique
fixed point λ∗ of Fu.
Proof. By Theorem 21 we know that there exists an optimal investment strategy v∗. This
strategy and the corresponding sustainable mean trajectory satisfy v∗ = R−10 B′0P λ and x¯v∗ =
x¯λ, where P λ and x¯λ are defined in (5.44)-(5.45) for a fixed point λ of Fu. It remains to
show that Fu has a unique fixed point λ∗. Let λ and λ′ be two distinct fixed points of Fu.
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Then, λ and λ′ are respectively the fixed points of s 7→ F (s, yλ) and s 7→ F (s, yλ′), where F
is defined in (5.8). Following Lemma 9, λ and λ′ belong to (0, 1). But, β′x(0) has a uniform
distribution, which implies that Fu has a shape similar to that of the cumulative distribution
function of a uniform distribution. Thus, all the real numbers in the interval [0, 1] are fixed
points of Fu, and as a result of F . This leads to a contradiction, and shows that Fu has a
unique fixed point.
Theorem 22 states that for a population of consumers with sufficiently diverse a priori opin-
ions uniformly distributed in the direction β, the unique optimal investment strategy is
v∗ = −R−10 B′0P λ∗ . This strategy convinces a fraction of the consumers to choose the adver-
tised alternative. This fraction is equal to 1 − λ∗, where λ∗ is the unique fixed point of Fu.
One can apply the bisection method to find λ∗. Once λ∗ is computed, the agents can com-
pute the vectors (h, d), given by (5.44)-(5.45). The advertiser can then implement its optimal
strategy (5.18), where P λ∗ is the second component of d. Subsequently, the consumers can
predict their limiting macroscopic behavior, the first component of d, and implement their
optimal strategies (5.11).
5.4 Simulation results
To illustrate the collective choice mechanism in the presence of social and advertising effects,
we consider a group of 6000 consumers that have opinion states initially uniformly distributed
between −25 and 5. The consumers are choosing between p1 = −20 and p2 = 20. The social
effect is represented by αx¯, where α = 0.5. We consider two scenarios. In the first one, the
consumers make their choices in the absence of an advertising effect (K(p2) = 0), while in the
second scenario, an advertiser advertises for p2. The advertising effect is modeled in the cost
by K(p2)y = p2y, where y is the (influence) state of the advertiser. We set T = 3, A = 0.5,
B = 0.1, A0 = −0.1, B0 = 0.1, y(0) = 0, Q = 10, R = R0 = 10, and M = M0 = 2000. In the
absence of an advertising effect, λ = 0.84 is the unique fixed point of Fu defined in (5.46).
Accordingly, 84% of the consumers choose p1 (Fig. 5.1). On the other hand, the presence of
advertising for alternative p2 increases from 16% to 87% the fraction of consumers that go
towards p2 (Fig. 5.1).
5.5 Conclusion
We introduce in this chapter a dynamic collective choice discrete model with an advertiser.
In this model, a large group of consumers choose between two alternatives while influenced
by their average and an advertising effect. The latter is generated by an advertiser aiming at
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Figure 5.1 Evolution of the consumers’ density in the absence and presence of an advertising
effect.
convincing the population of consumers to choose p2. We develop approximate Stackelberg
solutions, which are decentralized and simple to implement. In case the consumers are
initially uniformly distributed in the direction β, we provide an explicit form of the unique
solution, and characterize it by the fraction of consumers that choose p1. This fraction is the
unique fixed point of a well defined finite dimensional map.
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION
6.1 Summary
In this thesis, we study a class of dynamic collective discrete choice problems. We formu-
late the non-cooperative degenerate problem as a dynamic non-cooperative game in Chapter
2. We propose a naïve approach to compute an exact Nash equilibrium, if it exists. This
approach becomes computationally intractable and requires a significant amount of commu-
nication between the agents when their number is large. Alternatively, we develop via the
MFG methodology a set of strategies that are simple to compute and implement. This sim-
plification occurs at the expenses of weakening the robustness of the equilibrium. Indeed,
the mean-field based strategies constitute an approximate Nash equilibrium. The robustness
of these equilibria improves, however, as the number of agents increases sufficiently.
In Chapter 3, we consider the non-cooperative non-degenerate collective discrete choice prob-
lem. We solve the game via the MFG methodology. This includes solving a new class of
stochastic optimal control problems, that we call min-LQG. We derive an explicit form of
the optimal solution, and interpret it at each instant as a static discrete choice problem,
where the cost of choosing an alternative includes an additional term to penalize premature
myopic decisions. In the degenerate case, the agents make their choices of alternatives before
starting to move. In the non-degenerate case, however, the agents can no longer commit to
a choice from the beginning.
We formulate the cooperative collective discrete choice problem in Chapter 4. Here again,
the MFG is invoked to simplify the exact solutions. In fact, Section 4.2 shows that the naïve
approach to computing a social optima is computationally intractable in a large population.
Section 4.3 develops a set of mean-field based strategies that are simpler to compute and
implement than the exact solution. Moreover, they converge to a social optimum as the
number of agents increases to infinity. We provide a numerical example showing that the co-
operative strategies have the advantage of distributing much more evenly the agents between
the alternatives than the non-cooperative strategies.
The non-cooperative and cooperative problems share a common feature. Their solutions (for
a continuum of agents) are mapped one-to-one to the fixed points of some finite dimensional
maps. The latter are the potential probability distributions of the agents’ choices over the
alternatives. This mapping has two important consequences. First, one can anticipate the
way the population splits between the alternatives. Second, it reduces the infinite dimensional
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problems of finding a solution to the DCDC problems, to computing a fixed point for a finite
dimensional map. Accordingly, we suggest simple numerical schemes to compute the infinite
population Nash equilibria and social optima.
In Chapter 5, we extend the degenerate non-cooperative collective discrete choice problems
by including an advertiser in the game. We derive conditions for an approximate Stackelberg
solution to exist. When the consumers are initially uniformly distributed, we compute an
explicit form of the approximate solution and characterize it by a scalar describing the way
the population of consumers splits between the alternatives under the social and advertising
effects.
6.2 Future directions
In the concluding section of Chapter 3, we discuss some future directions to generalize the
results of the min-LQG optimal control problem. It is of interest also for future work to
consider an infinite compact set of alternatives. Some interesting applications are modeling
the collective tissue invasion phenomenon exhibited by some biological societies, such as
cancer cells (Deisboeck and Couzin, 2009). The question that arises in such situations is:
how do the cancer cells migrate from their initial positions and distribute themselves on the
surface of the tissue? From a macroscopic point of view, this problem can be viewed as a
dynamic optimal transport problem (Villani, 2008), where a mass with an initial distribution
on some set is carried with least effort and distributed on some compact destination set
according to a predefined final distribution. Indeed, we expect that, by adjusting the weights
attributed to the points in the destination set, we could distribute the mass on the destination
set according to a predefined final distribution. In this case, the min-LQG problem with
infinite compact set of alternatives could describe the microscopic processes underlying some
optimal transport problems. Even the current formulation of a finite number of alternatives
could be interpreted as an optimal transport problem if we approximate the final predefined
distribution by a finite number of Dirac functions.
We assume in our models that each agent interacts with all the other agents through the
average state of the population. In real situations, for example elections, this interaction
is local. In the future, it would be interesting to study discrete choice models with local
interactions. Another future direction is to extend the current advertising model to an
oligopolistic one, where multiple advertisers are competing to increase the number of their
consumers.
So far, we assume in our discrete choice models that the agents know the probability distribu-
106
tions of their initial states and parameters. In practice, they have to learn these distributions.
An interesting future direction is to incorporate a learning process (Bertsekas and Tsitsik-
lis, 1989) in the game, a consensus-like algorithm, for example, where the agents have to
communicate their states and parameters periodically. This learning process creates in the
non-cooperative case some challenging problems. First, we need to understand how this pro-
cess affects the robustness of the equilibrium. Does it incite the agents to deviate from the
equilibrium? Second, how does this process affect the distribution of the agents’ choices over
the alternatives?
In some situations, beside some personal attributes, the social effect, and the distance to
the alternatives, the quality of the alternatives influences also the individual choices. For
example, the quality of candidates (or their electoral programs) in elections is a major factor
shaping the final choices. In a rescue mission, for instance, a collection of robots identify
multiple potential sites to visit. But, they are more attracted to those that contain more
victims. Usually, the quality of the alternatives are not known a priori, and are learned along
the path to make a final choice. Future work could try to extend our current formulation to
capture the quality of the alternatives.
Finally, throughout the thesis, we reduce the infinite dimensional problem of finding a solu-
tion to our game to computing a fixed point of a finite dimensional map. A challenging future
direction is to understand the ingredients that made this reduction possible and try to gener-
alize it to a larger class of nonlinear individual costs and dynamics. An important advantage
of this approach is to simplify the numerical schemes (Achdou and Capuzzo-Dolcetta, 2010)
to solve the mean field equations.
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